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Summary  
Previous research has shown that high trait-anxious children, relative to low trait-anxious 
children, are at an increased risk of developing fear due to threatening information (Field, 2006b; 
Field and Price-Evans, 2009). However, the mechanism that underlies this relationship remains 
unknown. Cognitive models of vulnerability to anxiety propose that biases in the processing of 
threat-relevant material play a part in the aetiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Beck 
and Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992) and as such could potentially explain the relationship between 
trait-anxiety and fear development in the face of ambiguous information in children. For 
example, high-anxious children tend to interpret ambiguous information in a more negative 
manner (interpretation bias) and remember ambiguous information as being more threatening 
than it was originally (memory bias) (see Hadwin and Field, 2010, for a review). Additionally, 
high-anxious children have been found to engage in negative cognitive rehearsal (Comer, 
Kendall, Franklin, Hudson, and Pimental, 2004). The experiments in this thesis investigated 
whether these cognitive biases underlie the relationship between trait anxiety and fear 
development in non-clinical children.  
In a series of three experiments, children (aged 8-11 years) were presented with some ambiguous 
information regarding two novel animals (the quoll and the cuscus) and before completing a 
cognitive rehearsal task were told that they would soon be asked to approach the animals. There 
were several findings: 1) High trait-anxious children were not significantly more likely than low 
trait-anxious children to display any of the cognitive biases tested (i.e., interpretation bias, 
memory bias or cognitive rehearsal). However, tentative evidence suggested that interpretation 
bias exacerbated the relationship between trait anxiety and fear; 2) Whether children cognitively 
rehearsed the ambiguous information or not had no significant impact on their fear for the 
animals, nor did the valence of their thoughts; 3) Children who interpreted the ambiguous 
information more negatively were more likely to become fearful of the animals and were also 
more likely to remember more negatively-biased and less positively-biased pieces of ambiguous 
information; 4) It was the lack of positively-biased memories not the increased number of 
negatively-biased memories that led children who interpreted the information more negatively to 
become more fearful of the animals as a result. The findings are discussed with reference to their 
implications for the theory and prevention of childhood fear: that positive interpretation and 
memory bias training may act to decrease or even help to prevent fear development in children. 
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0 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 1 is an overview of the cognitive characteristics of anxious individuals that are believed 
to play an important role in the aetiology and maintenance of long-term fear and anxiety, 
namely: attention bias to threat, interpretation bias, memory bias and cognitive rehearsal. In 
particular, it evaluates the evidence that these information-processing biases are present in both 
high trait anxious adults and children and considers them as potential mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between trait anxiety and the development of fear in the face of ambiguous 
information.  
Chapters 2 to 4 describe a series of experiments that investigate interpretation bias, cognitive 
rehearsal and memory in high and low trait anxious children. The experiments are all identical 
with respect to interpretation bias and memory, for example, they all investigate whether these 
cognitive biases are present in high trait anxious children and whether they can explain the 
relationship between trait anxiety and fear. However, each of the experiments differ with respect 
to cognitive rehearsal: 
Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) investigates whether highly trait anxious children relative to less trait 
anxious children have a natural tendency to cognitively rehearse ambiguous information 
regarding novel animals and the resulting effects on fear responding. Results revealed that highly 
trait anxious children are not more likely to cognitively rehearse ambiguous information and that 
cognitive rehearsal (in both high and low trait anxious children) does not significantly affect fear 
responding. Nevertheless, it was found that the majority of children cognitively rehearsed the 
ambiguous information about the animals; therefore, there was no control group of children to 
compare against the group of children who thought about the animal.   
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Chapter 3 (Experiment 2) looks at the causal effect of experimentally inducing cognitive 
rehearsal vs. distraction of ambiguous information about novel animals on fear beliefs and 
avoidance in children. Findings indicated that whether children were instructed to cognitively 
rehearse ambiguous information or were prevented from doing so via a distraction task did not 
significantly effect fear beliefs or avoidance towards the animals. However, it was found that in 
general children were having more threat thoughts than positive thoughts about the animals and 
so the effect of negative vs. positive cognitive rehearsal remains unknown. 
Chapter 4 (Experiment 3) takes into account the content of children’s thoughts and addresses 
whether experimental manipulation of either a positive or negative cognitive rehearsal style leads 
to differential fear responding towards novel animals in children. Results indicated that neither 
positive nor negative cognitive rehearsal significantly affects fear responding. 
Chapter 5 examines the data from each of the three experiments when combined into one large 
data set. This was done because with regards to interpretation bias and memory, Experiments 1, 
2 and 3 found fairly inconsistent results and it is possible that some of these inconsistencies were 
due to the relatively small sample sizes of each individual experiment. The main findings were: 
1) children who were more trait anxious became more fearful of the animals due to ambiguous 
information; 2) Children who displayed a greater threat interpretation bias of the information 
became more fearful of the animals; 3) Neither a threat interpretation bias nor cognitive rehearsal 
was found to significantly mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear; 4) Children 
who engaged in negative cognitive rehearsal did not become significantly more fearful of the 
animals, although they did interpret the information in a significantly more threatening manner; 
5) Children who displayed a greater threat interpretation bias remembered the information in a 
more negatively and less positively biased manner; however this relationship was not moderated 
14 
 
by trait anxiety; 6) Children who interpreted the information as being more threatening 
constructed fewer false positive memories of the ambiguous information, and in turn, became 
more fearful of the animals.  
Chapter 6 discusses the findings from the experiments in relation to issues raised in the 
information processing bias literature and concludes that positive interpretation and memory bias 
training may act to decrease or even help to prevent fear development in children. It is suggested 
that no significant effects of cognitive rehearsal were found due to the ambiguous nature of the 
information and as such future research should investigate the effects of cognitive rehearsal in 
the face of a mildly threatening experience. 
15 
 
1 Background to the Cognitive Characteristics of Anxious Individuals 
 
1.1 Aims and Objectives of this Thesis 
The current experiments are designed to look at the effects of memory bias, interpretation bias 
and cognitive rehearsal when learning about new potentially threatening stimuli. This will (1) 
add to the extremely scant literature on memory biases and cognitive rehearsal in anxious 
children; and, (2) add to our knowledge of the effect that such processes have on learning and the 
interpretation of new potentially threatening information.  
1.2 Chapter Overview 
Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent forms of psychological disturbance affecting 
children and adolescents (Anderson, Williams, McGee, & Silva, 1987) and possibly even the 
most prevalent (Cartwright-Hatton, McNicol, & Doubleday, 2006). Studies illustrate that roughly 
2.5% to 5% of children and adolescents meet criteria for an anxiety disorder at a given time 
(Ronald, Schniering, &Hudson, 2009). Anxiety in childhood is a serious problem and can have 
long term negative consequences in a number of important domains of child development, such 
as social and academic functioning (Pine, 1997) and has been linked to other major conditions, 
such as depression (Kovacs, Gatsonis, Paulauskas, & Richards, 1989) and substance misuse 
(Kushner, Sher, & Beitman, 1990). Although much anxiety in youth is normal and many 
childhood anxiety disorders remit within 3 to 4 years (Last, Perrin, Hersen, & Kazdin, 1996), 
many such disorders persist into adulthood (Last, Philips, & Statfield, 1987), and retrospective 
studies of adults suffering from an anxiety disorder indicate that most adults report the onset of 
their disorder in childhood, or at the latest, in adolescence (Kim-Cohen et al., 2003).  
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Given that we are now becoming increasingly aware that anxiety is a serious problem in 
childhood, it is important for us to recognize which particular characteristics of anxious children 
are likely to be at the root of their anxiety, or play a part in maintaining their anxiety. Such 
increased understanding may help to refine theories of anxiety pathology, facilitate accurate 
identification of children at risk for anxiety disorders and signify points of entry for both 
preventative and curative interventions. Cognitive models of vulnerability to anxiety propose that 
individual differences in the processing of threat-relevant material play a part in the aetiology 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992).  For example, 
anxious people tend to selectively process information that is consistent with their view that the 
world is dangerous (see Ouimet, Gawronski & Dozois, 2009, for a review). As such, a large 
body of research has investigated the degree to which these information-processing biases are 
associated with symptoms of anxiety pathology (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2004).   
In this chapter, evidence for the presence of each of the cognitive biases in anxious adults and 
children will be examined in turn, along with a discussion of the potential role that they may play 
in the development of fear. As part of this review, temperamental factors which are believed to 
increase vulnerability to anxiety will be considered in detail because a central hypothesis of this 
thesis is that children scoring high on the temperament dimension of ‘trait anxiety’ will be in a 
more general state of physiological arousal and therefore, more prone to acquiring fear in a given 
learning episode than children who are less trait anxious. There will also be a discussion into 
recent models of information processing biases, which have suggested how the cognitive biases 
might interact at different stages of information processing leading to the development of fear. 
This chapter begins though, with a discussion into what we mean by ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’. 
1.3 Definition of Fear and Anxiety 
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Fear has been defined as a negative reaction to a specific threatening stimulus with escape or 
avoidance the outcome of increased threat proximity; anxiety on the other hand is regarded as 
being a more general state of distress, more enduring with less specific or more generalized cues, 
it involves heightened physiological arousal but does not necessarily lead to structured functional 
behaviour (Lang, Davis & Öhman, 2000). The current research will investigate the effects of 
ambiguous information and biased information processing on ‘fear’ because it is thought that the 
mechanisms of acquisition operate at an individual stimulus level (in a given learning episode we 
will be providing information about something specific, i.e., a novel animal). The difference 
between whether a child acquires ‘fear’ or ‘anxiety’ lies in the extent to which they have learning 
experiences about a specific group of related stimuli (fear) or a diffuse array of situations 
(anxiety). However, the underlying mechanisms are likely to be similar. These learning 
experiences will interact with the child’s temperament, which could in turn shape the degree to 
which children generalize experiences about particular stimuli or situations (fear) to a broader 
range of stimuli/situations (anxiety). 
When investigating the effects of cognitive biases on the development of fear in children, it is 
important to consider all characteristics of the fear emotion. According to Lang (1968) an 
emotion is made up of three response systems: (1) subjective states and cognitions associated 
with those states (verbal-cognitive responses); (2) behavioural changes; and (3) physiological 
states. This tripartite model is well established as a theoretical model and has also provided the 
backbone for a fairly recent development of treatment for child anxiety (Davis & Ollendick, 
2005). Therefore, for any particular cognitive bias to be considered as important in the 
vulnerability of fear development in children, it must be able to explain how each of these 
components might be changed during the course of development.  
18 
 
1.4 Cognitive Characteristics of Anxious Individuals 
1.4.1 Attentional bias 
Although attentional bias will not be investigated in the current research, for completeness it is 
important to briefly review the role of attentional biases in adult and child anxiety. Attentional 
bias refers to the propensity of anxious individuals to pay more attention to potentially 
threatening environmental stimuli than non-anxious controls (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a 
meta-analysis). Theoretical models of anxiety propose that this hypervigilance for threatening 
stimuli is the result of an over activation of normal responses to danger (e.g., Barlow, 2002). The 
presence of an attentional bias has been found in non-clinical individuals with high trait and/or 
state anxiety (e.g., Mogg et al., 2000). A large body of research has also found associations 
between anxiety and attentional bias in a range of anxiety disorders, for example: spider phobia 
(Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986); generalized anxiety disorder (Bradley, Mogg, 
White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, &Weinman, 
1989); obsessive–compulsive disorder (Tata, Leibowitz, Prunty, Cameron, & Pickering, 1996); 
posttraumatic stress disorder (Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991); social phobia 
(Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; Mogg & Bradley, 2002)); and panic disorder (McNally, 
Reimann, & Kim, 1990). Mathews and MacLeod (2002) and Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) 
have found that induced attentional biases can increase anxiety in previously non-anxious 
individuals. 
The presence of an attentional bias has also been found in trait anxious children (Bijttebier, 
Vasey, & Braet, 2003; Schippell, Vasey, Cravens-Brown, & Bretveld, 2003; Vasey, Daleiden, 
Williams, & Brown, 1995); however, it remains unclear from where these biases come (Vasey & 
MacLeod, 2001). Developmental models of anxiety suggest that an attentional bias for threat-
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related stimuli is a normal characteristic of young children but this bias decreases with age in 
normally developing children who learn to inhibit the automatic processing of potential threat, 
whereas anxious children do not develop this ability (Kindt, Bierman & Brosschot, 1997; Kindt 
& van den Hout, 2001). Kindt and van den Hout (2001) suggest that anxiety experienced during 
childhood creates a failure to inhibit selective attention to threat which, in turn, increases 
susceptibility to developing an anxiety disorder in adulthood. This hypothesis is also consistent 
with Lonigan’s temperament model, which sugests that the development of effortful control (the 
ability to inhibit selective attention to threat) is important because it mediates the relationship 
between threat-related attentional bias and the beginning of an anxiety disorder (Lonigan, Vasey, 
Phillips & Hazen, 2004). For example, young children (aged 8) may lack adequate effortful 
control to suppress attentional reactions to threat-related stimuli or information that is relevant to 
their particular developmental stage causing them to become fearful (Nightingale, Field, & 
Kindt, 2010).  
More recently, research has shown that an attentional bias can be created in normally developing 
children via a short burst of threat information about a novel animal (Field, 2006a) and that trait 
anxiety moderates this effect (Field, 2006b). This research suggests that environmental factors 
are likely to have a role in the development of attentional biases and children who are trait 
anxious are more susceptible to these environmental influences than non-trait anxious children. 
However, the underlying mechanism through which trait anxiety predicts the development of 
fear and attentional bias due to threat information is still unknown.  
1.4.2 Reasoning Biases 
Reasoning refers to the cognitive process involved in drawing conclusions, making judgements 
and testing hypotheses logically and reliably (Muris, 2010). This is an important characteristic of 
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human functioning because it facilitates the individual in understanding their internal and 
external environment. However, strong evidence suggests that in children suffering from anxiety 
disorders, reasoning is often erroneous and biased in a number of ways (see Muris, 2010).  
For example, one such reasoning bias is known as reduced evidence for danger (RED) bias and 
predicts that individuals with anxiety problems tend to require less information before perceiving 
a situation as threatening (Muris, 2010). Evidence for the presence of RED bias in anxious youth 
was first provided by Muris, Merkelbach and Damsma (2000) who exposed a group of 8-13 year 
old non-clinical children to vignettes of social situations, which were presented to them in a 
piecemeal manner. The results indicated that children with high levels of social anxiety required 
fewer sentences before deciding that a story was going to be threatening relative to children with 
low levels of social anxiety (see also Muris, Kindt et al., 2000). 
Another reasoning bias, termed emotional reasoning by Beck, Emery and Greenberg (1985), 
describes the fact that anxious individuals tend to infer danger from physical anxiety responses 
rather than from objective threat and as a result, false alarms are not recognised and anxiety 
tends to persist. So far, results have indicated that emotional reasoning is present in non-clinical 
children (e.g. Muris, Merckelbach & Van Spauwen, 2003) and that early manifestations of 
emotional reasoning seem to exist in children as young as 4 years old (e.g. Morren, Muris & 
Kindt, 2004; Muris, Vermeer & Horselenberg, 2008). 
A distinct type of reasoning bias, known as covariation bias refers to the tendency of anxious 
individuals to more easily associate anxiety-related stimuli with negative outcomes (Mineka & 
Tomarken, 1989).  In experiments with adults, anxious and non-anxious participants are shown a 
series of slides consisting of anxiety-relevant (e.g. spiders) and neutral (e.g. flowers) pictures. 
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Slide offset was followed by one of three outcomes, namely, an aversive shock (i.e. negative 
outcome), a tone or nothing. Despite the fact that fear-relevant and neutral pictures were equally 
often followed by each of the outcomes, anxious participants systematically overestimated the 
contingency between anxiety-relevant stimuli and negative outcomes (e.g. De Jong, Merckelbach 
& Arntz, 1995;Pauli, Montoya & Martz, 1996).   
Unfortunately, due to the unethical nature of the experimental procedure (electrical shock), this 
bias has been more difficult to investigate in children (Muris, De Jong, Meesters, Waterreus, & 
Van Lubeck, 2005). One way in which researchers have overcome this issue is by employing a 
thought experiment, in which children are asked to imagine that they receive a mild electric 
shock after viewing some of the fear-relevant and neutral pictures. However, although studies by 
Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Den Breejen, and Makkelie (2007), and Field and Lawson (2008) have 
provided support for the presence of covariation bias in anxious youths, a study by Muris, De 
Jong et al., (2005) yielded somewhat disappointing results. Thus, it is apparent that more 
research is required to demonstrate that this type of reasoning bias operates in children with 
anxiety problems.  
Probability bias is another type of reasoning bias that has been hypothesised to be present in 
anxious youths. This reasoning bias refers to the fact that anxious children have a tendency to 
estimate that future negative events are far more likely to occur, and in particular to themselves 
(Butler & Mathews, 1987). Probability bias in youths can be measured by means of the 
Subjective Probability Questionnaire (Dalgleish et al., 1997), which simply asks children to 
estimate the likelihood that a given negative event will happen in the future.  Of course, it is 
expected that anxious children will provide increased probability estimates of future negative 
events, and in particular for those events that may happen to themselves. However, the evidence 
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on probability bias in anxious youths is mixed. On the one hand, studies in non-clinical children 
and adolescents have provided support for the presence of this type of reasoning bias in youths 
(e.g., Canterbury et al. 2004; Muris & Van der Heiden, 2006); on the other hand, research in 
clinically referred anxious youths has generally yielded negative results. For example, Dalgleish 
et al., (1997) examined the occurrence of probability bias in 9- to 18-year-old children and 
adolescents with anxiety disorders, depression, or no psychiatric disorder and found that neither 
anxious nor depressed youths estimated negative events to occur more frequently than did non-
clinical youths. Thus, it has to be concluded that the evidence for an anxiety-related probability 
bias in children and adolescents is not very compelling. Nevertheless, Dalgleish et al. (1997, 
2000) have argued that such negative findings may be a result of inhibitory processes 
overshadowing the probability bias, and this may be particularly true in youths displaying high 
anxiety levels. Briefly, such inhibitory processes may reflect children and adolescents’ strategy 
to minimize the likelihood that negative events will actually happen to them (i.e., ‘strategic 
inhibition’ hypothesis). Future research is necessary to test this hypothesis and to further explore 
the role of probability bias in anxious children and adolescents. 
The reasoning bias of greatest interest to the current thesis is interpretation bias. This bias refers 
to the tendency of anxious individuals, relative to non-anxious controls to readily provide a 
threatening interpretation of ambiguous situations and stimuli (e.g., Eysenck, Mogg, May, 
Richards, & Mathews 1991; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Richards and French, 1992). 
A large body of research has demonstrated an association between threat interpretation biases 
and panic disorder (e.g., Richards, Austin, & Alvarenga, 2001), social phobia (e.g., Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000; Stopa & Clark, 2000; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003) and generalised 
anxiety disorder (Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004) (see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005, for 
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review). This interpretation bias could be important in maintaining anxiety in ambiguous 
situations in real life. In the study by Eysenck et al. (1991), clinically anxious, recovered 
clinically anxious, and non-anxious controls were presented with a mixture of unambiguous and 
ambiguous sentences. The ambiguous sentences could be interpreted in either a threatening or 
non-threatening manner (e.g., the doctor examined little Emma’s growth). The key finding of 
this study was that in a subsequent recognition memory test, anxious participants were more 
likely than non-anxious controls and recovered anxious participants to disambiguate the 
sentences in a threatening rather than a non threatening manner; e.g., anxious participants were 
more likely to choose the sentence referring to Emma’s tumour (threat) rather than her height 
(non threat) than the other two groups. Correct rejections of distracter sentences that were 
matched for valence but differed in meaning from the original suggests that these group 
variations in interpretation style most likely reflect differences in how the ambiguous sentence 
was originally encoded in memory (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) 
With regard to the child literature, interpretation bias is one of the more widely researched of the 
cognitive biases. For example, Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, and Ryan (1996) employed a sample of 
anxiety disordered children, children with oppositional defiant disorder, and controls (all aged 
between 7 and 14 years). The children were presented with vignettes of ambiguous situations and 
asked what they thought was happening in each situation. Subsequently, children were presented 
with a choice of two possible neutral outcomes and two possible threatening outcomes and were 
asked to indicate which they believed was most likely to occur. Both anxious and oppositional 
children more frequently perceived ambiguous situations as threatening than did normal controls, 
with anxious children more often choosing avoidant outcomes and oppositional children more 
frequently choosing aggressive outcomes of the ambiguous situations. Similarly, other studies 
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that have used the ambiguous situation paradigm have found that anxious children are more 
likely than non-anxious children to interpret ambiguous or mildly unpleasant scenarios as more 
negative and dangerous, overestimate danger and underestimate their own coping skills, provide 
more avoidant solutions to ambiguous situations and make threatening conclusions based on less 
information (e.g. Bögels, van Dongen, & Muris, 2003; Bögels & Zigterman, 2000; Chorpita, 
Albano, & Barlow, 1996; Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005; Waters, Craske, Bergman, & 
Treanor, 2008)  
Using a homophone paradigm, Hadwin, Frost, French, and Richards (1997) investigated 
interpretation bias in anxious and non-anxious children aged between 7 and 9 years. Anxiety 
levels were measured using the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds 
and Richmond, 1985) and children were then presented with homophones that had both a neutral 
and a threatening interpretation (e.g., dye versus die). The results demonstrated that children who 
were more anxious were significantly more likely to make threat interpretations of the 
homophones. In another study, Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (2000) 
presented 9-16 year olds with a set of homophones that were printed on cards. As in previous 
studies, each homophone had a threat interpretation and a non-threat interpretation with which it 
was associated. Participants were asked to compose a sentence containing the ambiguous word. 
Anxious children and adolescents formed significantly more sentences using the threatening 
interpretation of the homophone than did the non-anxious children.  
The studies mentioned so far, together with others (e.g., Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Suarez & Bell-
Dolan, 2001) provide evidence that interpretation bias is a cognitive distortion, which is 
characteristic of both children and adults who are highly anxious and anxiety-disordered. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be inferred from these studies whether interpretation bias is a causal 
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factor in anxiety or whether anxiety (or vulnerability to anxiety) is the cause of a negative 
interpretation style, or alternatively, whether there is no direct causal link between anxiety and 
interpretation and both anxiety and interpretation style are the outcome of separate and unrelated 
processes (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook & Yiend, 2007). 
Direct evidence that interpretive bias can make a causal contribution to anxiety reactivity have 
come from interpretation bias training studies that have demonstrated that it is possible to 
experimentally manipulate interpretation bias through training and doing so affects state anxiety 
(e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005; Wilson, MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006;). More specifically, studies have shown that when these biases 
are trained in non-anxious adults, their state anxiety increases. For example, Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) presented participants with descriptions of ambiguous social situations, 
which were disambiguated only by the final word of the sentence. For half of the participants, 
this final word was consistent with emotionally negative outcomes and for the remainder this 
word was consistent with emotionally positive outcomes. Participants were required to complete 
this fragment, and answer a question designed to reinforce the designated emotional valence. The 
results revealed that training had been successful: participants in the threat interpretation bias 
training group responded significantly faster to negatively valenced fragments, whereas 
participants in the non-threat interpretation training group responded faster to positively valenced 
fragments. The crucial finding of this study was that when participants were subsequently asked 
to interpret a new set of ambiguous sentences, participants in the negative training group more 
frequently chose negative interpretations, whereas participants in the positive training group 
more often endorsed positive interpretations, suggesting that interpretation bias can be 
successfully manipulated by learning experiences. More important, state anxiety levels changed 
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congruent with the valence of the induced interpretation bias: state anxiety levels increased after 
negative and (non-significantly) decreased after positive interpretation bias induction. These 
findings suggest that the way ambiguous stimuli are interpreted has a causal effect on levels of 
state anxiety. However, increases in state anxiety were found only in participants who were 
required to actively generate meaning: namely, participants who had to complete the resolving 
fragment and subsequent question. In other conditions in which participants were presented with 
the same ambiguous descriptions but were not required to complete the final resolving word for 
themselves developed the same interpretative bias for new descriptions, but their anxiety levels 
did not change. These findings have since been replicated with the additional finding that the 
effects of training on interpretation biases can be maintained over 24 hours (Yiend et al., 2005). 
In a more recent study, Wilson et al. (2006) used training procedures to induce interpretive 
biases favouring the threatening or nonthreatening meanings of ambiguous information in a 
sample of 48 undergraduate students. Subsequent to the training manipulation, emotional 
reactions to a stressful video were assessed and results revealed that the interpretation bias 
manipulation had successfully modified emotional reactivity (state anxiety). More specifically, 
only those participants who had received the threat training condition displayed a significant 
elevation of state anxiety in response to the stressful video, whereas the non-threat trained 
participants reported no significant state-anxiety response to the video clips. Taken together, 
these studies suggest that interpretation biases play a causal role in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders as predicted by cognitive theories (e.g. Beck, Emery and 
Greenberg, 1985).  
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Unfortunately, there has been far less research conducted in the child literature and what has 
been done has also obtained inconsistent findings. Muris, Huijding, Mayer and Hameetman 
(2008) were the first to attempt to experimentally manipulate interpretation bias in children. 
They designed the “Space Odyssey” paradigm to train a sample of non-clinical children aged 8-
12 years to (depending on which condition they were randomly assigned) develop either a 
negative or positive interpretation bias. This training paradigm consisted of 30 brief descriptions 
of events that could occur on a make believe planet. Each description was followed by two 
possible outcomes: one negative and one positive. Children were instructed to choose one of the 
possible outcomes and were subsequently presented with feedback on their choice. In the 
negative training condition, the choice of a negative outcome was reinforced, whereas in the 
positive training condition the choice of a positive outcome was reinforced. Subsequently, 
children were presented with a series of ambiguous sentences and their perceptions of threat 
were assessed. The results revealed that the training phase had been successful in inducing the 
designated interpretation bias and most importantly, children’s subsequent threat perception 
scores were affected in congruence with the training they received. Namely, children in the 
negative training condition displayed higher threat perception scores than children in the positive 
training condition. Moreover, children who were more vulnerable (exhibited high levels of 
anxiety symptoms) were especially affected by training.  
Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, and Vreden, (2009) subsequently replicated this study 
with the inclusion of a baseline measure of interpretation bias to investigate change in 
interpretation bias as a result of the experimental manipulation. Consistent with Muris, Huijding 
et al. (2008), they found that the experimental training was successful in influencing children’s 
interpretation biases in the predicted direction. However, the observed effect sizes were fairly 
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small, and inconsistent with Muris, Huijding et al., (2008), high-anxious children were not 
significantly more affected by the experimental manipulation than low-anxious children. 
Moreover, no evidence was found to support the idea that distorted cognition underlies child 
anxiety problems because the change in interpretation bias was not significantly associated with 
change in avoidance tendencies. Lester, Field and Muris (2010a) also failed to find significant 
differential effects of interpretation bias modification on state anxiety in children aged 7-15 
years. These findings are inconsistent with the adult literature (e.g. Mathews and Macintosh, 
2000), which has reported that change in interpretation bias leads to a change in state anxiety 
levels.  
Nonetheless, other studies have reported significant effects of interpretation bias training on 
levels of aniexy in children. For example, in a similar study to that of Lester et al. (2010a), 
Lester, Field and Muris (2010b) found preliminary evidence that interpretation bias modification 
was capable of directly evoking modification congruent changes in self-report state anxiety in a 
sample of children (6-11 years). Specifically, they found that anxiety increased significantly 
across negative modification and decreased non-significantly across positive modification. 
Vassilopoulos, Banerjee and Prantzalou (2009) also found significant effects of interpretation 
bias modification on anxiety levels in a sample of highly socially anxious children aged 10-11 
years. Specifically, their results revealed that the interpretation training sessions not only reduced 
threatening interpretations but also reduced social anxiety, and were found to last a minimum of 
three days following the completion of the training. These findings are consistent with existing 
theoretical and empirical models, which hypothesise that interpretation biases play a causal role 
in vulnerability to anxiety by impacting on how ambiguous situations and events are processed 
(see Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
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It would seem that the majority of experiments in this area have not only provided support for 
the notion that childhood anxiety is associated with a bias towards making threat interpretations 
of ambiguous scenarios but additionally, interpretation bias training studies have suggested that 
anxiety vulnerability may be attributable, at least in part, to threat-relevant interpretive biases. In 
other words, a threat related interpretation bias causes anxiety. However, little is known about 
how interpretation biases affect learning about novel ambiguous stimuli. For instance, 
investigations into interpretation biases in children thus far, have focused on interpretation of 
ambiguous situations, stories and homophones, all of which children are likely to have had some 
experience with. The current experiments, therefore, aim to extend previous research by 
investigating how interpretation biases affect learning about new, potentially threatening stimuli 
to give some indication of how interpretation biases feed into learning. 
1.4.3 Memory Bias  
Information-processing models of emotional disorders propose that anxious individuals are 
characterized by a memory bias for threat-relevant information. Memory bias is conceptualized 
as a propensity to selectively remember information congruent with an emotional state. In 
anxiety this would entail recall of memories congruent with the cause of anxiety, which 
ultimately leads to a biased explanation of ambiguous situations (Muris & Field, 2008).  
A large body of experimental research has investigated the association between anxiety and 
selective memory for threatening information. However, in contrast to findings on attentional 
and interpretational bias, the findings on memory bias have been mostly contradictory. As Coles 
and Heimberg (2002) wrote in their extensive review of the literature, inconsistent findings make 
it difficult to come to satisfactory conclusions. More recently, Mitte (2008) conducted a meta-
analysis on the memory bias and anxiety literature and found no overall relationship between 
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anxiety and implicit memory for threat-related information: the effect sizes did not differ 
significantly either between high-anxious and low-anxious individuals or between primed and 
un-primed material. For example, in experiments in which participants have been presented with 
briefly flashed stimulus words  (such as weapon) and asked to decide whether it is a meaningful 
word or not, or asked to complete the word stem wea___ with the first word that comes to mind, 
their choices have not been found to vary as a function of trait anxiety: all participants, both low 
and high trait anxious perform equally well. On the other hand, across all studies which have 
investigated the relationship between anxiety and memory recall for positively and negatively 
valenced stimuli, the between-groups effect sizes imply that high-anxious individuals relative to 
low anxious individuals show enhanced recall for threatening material (g = -0.11) and poorer 
recall for positive material (g = 0.19). Although the main effect sizes are small, the difference 
between the two effects sizes is moderate in size, indicating that the simultaneous consideration 
of positively and negatively valenced stimuli may be relevant for anxiety. That is, the between-
groups effect sizes suggested a slight tendency for high-anxious individuals to preferentially 
process negative stimuli and a slight tendency for low-anxious individuals to preferentially 
process positive stimuli. 
Despite the lack of evidence in support of memory biases in anxious individuals, there is 
currently a large body of evidence indicating the presence of a memory bias in individuals 
suffering from depression (see Williams, 1997, 2001). Specifically, in a study looking at 
memories of negatively and positively valenced word lists, Bradley and Mathews (1983) found 
that compared with non-depressed controls, depressed participants remembered a greater number 
of negative adjectives relative to positive adjectives. With regards to more personally relevant 
material, Williams (1997, 2001) found that depressed individuals show a greater latency to 
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retrieve positive life events from memory than non-depressed individuals; however, they are not 
much faster than non-depressed controls at retrieving negative events. This finding suggests that 
it is not so much the presence of negative memories that increases an individual’s risk for 
depression but it is the lack of positive memories that is important.  
Research also suggests that depressed individuals have difficulties in remembering specific 
episodes from their autobiographical memory (see Williams et al., 2007 for a review). For 
example, when asked to recall a specific time of feeling happy or sad, depressed people, relative 
to non depressed controls, showed a tendency to respond with more categorical rather than 
specific memories and generalise across similar events (e.g., ‘‘the times I’ve been hurt by other 
people’’ vs. ‘‘that very Friday evening when my partner told me she was seeing somebody 
else’’) (Raes, Verstraeten, Bijttebier, Vasey & Dalgleish 2010). This phenomenon is known as 
over general memory (OGM) and has also been found to be present in depressed children 
(Drummond, Dritschel, Astell, O’Carroll, & Dalgleish, 2006; Reas, et al., 2010; Vrielynck, 
Deplus & Philippot, 2007).  
Although the current study is looking at anxiety and not depression, extensive research has 
shown that there is a large overlap in the symptoms of anxiety and depression in both adult and 
youth populations (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Seligman and 
Ollendick, 1998). This is evidenced by high correlations between self-report measures of anxiety 
and depression, with coefficients typically in the r = .45 to .75 range in adults (Clark &Watson, 
1991) and in the .50 to .70 range in children (Brady & Kendall, 1992) and by high rates of 
comorbidity between anxiety and depressive disorders (e.g., Brady & Kendall, 1992). Overlap of 
items on self-report measures of anxiety and depression accounts for only a small proportion of 
the shared variance between them (Seligman & Ollendick, 1998; Stark & Laurent, 2001, Cole, 
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Truglio & Peeke, l997). Clark and Watson (1991) proposed a tripartite model to account for the 
large proportion of unexplained shared variance and comorbidity between anxiety and 
depression. This model posits that anxiety and depression share the same underlying construct: 
negative affect (NA), which represents the extent to which an individual feels upset or 
unpleasantly engaged, rather than peaceful. Watson (2005) has since argued that the 
identification of this higher order dimension— negative affectivity — has particularly important 
implications for DSM-V, because it suggests that these disorders should be linked together into a 
more general category of distress related syndromes rather than remaining as entirely distinct 
diagnostic classes. Hence it would seem that the aforementioned literature indicating that 
memory biases are present in depressed individuals has some bearing on anxiety potentially. 
Despite the potential importance of memory biases in maintaining adult anxiety and depression, 
little is known about how these biases develop. There have been relatively few investigations on 
this issue in the child anxiety literature and what has been done has provided mixed results (see 
Muris & Field, 2008, for a review). For example, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, and 
Dalgleish (2000) found modest evidence for a memory bias in a group of 9 to 17 year olds who 
were instructed to learn groups of words from three categories (negative, positive and neutral). 
During a free recall task, children with a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
and control children did not differ with respect to recall of negative words; however, it was 
found that youths with PTSD recalled relatively more negative words relative to positive and 
neutral words than control youths. Using the same methodology, Dalgleish, et al., (2003) looked 
at a clinical group of 7- to 18-year-old youths with PTSD or Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) and found no differences relative to controls in a free-recall test. Watts and Weems 
(2006) found that a memory bias score correlated significantly with child-and parent-reported 
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anxiety scores, although the magnitudes of the correlations were modest (r = .23 and r = .26, 
respectively). Finally, Daleiden (1998) found that a memory bias was present in high trait 
anxious children for negative words but only in tasks that that required processing of the 
meaning of the stimuli.  
This brief overview of research on anxiety-related memory bias in children and adolescents 
tentatively suggests that there may be biases for recalling threat memories in anxious children 
and adolescents. However, it also highlights the current lack of clear evidence for this type of 
cognitive distortion in youths and shows that more work is needed. For example, it also remains 
unclear whether biased memory increases feelings of fear and anxiety; the current research will 
address this issue.  
1.4.4 Cognitive Rehearsal 
Repetitive, prolonged, and recurrent thought about one’s self, one’s concerns and one’s 
experiences is a cognitive process frequently engaged in by anxious individuals (Harvey, 
Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004) and may even play a part in the aetiology of anxiety. For 
example, Mor and Winquist (2002) conducted a meta-analysis and found that cognitive rehearsal 
about threat creates anxiety. Examples of such repetitive thinking include worry, rumination, 
emotional processing, mental simulation, cognitive processes, rehearsal, reflection, repetitive 
thought and problem solving (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Papageorgiou 
& Wells, 2004; Wyer, 1996). Across these constructs, there are substantial similarities and 
overlap in theoretical conceptualizations and functional definitions (Watkins, 2008). Moreover, 
Field and Cartwright-Hatton (2008) showed that various forms of ‘negative iterative thinking’ 
i.e. rumination, worry, interpretation of intrusions, obsessive beliefs and shame could best be 
represented as indicators of a common cognitive process when predicting social anxiety. For 
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these reasons and particularly in the interest of avoiding unnecessary confusion, the term 
cognitive rehearsal (CR) will be used throughout this thesis to symbolize all the constructs listed 
above. The term cognitive rehearsal will be used in preference to other labels because it is a 
broader and more inclusive term and it is less likely to cause confusion than terms such as 
rumination and worry which both already have multiple conceptualizations and meanings. 
Despite the current lack of research on cognitive rehearsal in the child anxiety literature, the 
research that is available indicates that this pattern of negative repetitive thought is present in 
anxious youth (Comer, Kendall, Franklin, Hudson, & Pimental, 2004; Hodson, McManus, Clark, 
& Doll, 2008) and has been shown to be associated with poor problem solving skills, impaired 
motivation, and inhibition of instrumental behaviour (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004 for a 
review) and therefore, it is not surprising that cognitive rehearsal has been found to play a role in 
the strengthening and maintenance of anxious states (Rector, Antony, Laposa, Kocovski & 
Swinson, 2008) 
Negative cognitive rehearsal is considered to be an unconstructive and maladaptive thought 
process in the sense that it is believed to act to inflate an individual’s aversive evaluation of an 
aversive outcome (Davey & Matchett, 1994). This idea fits with evidence from conditioning (see 
Field, 2006c) that suggests that following a traumatic episode in which an association has been 
established between a novel stimulus (CS) and an aversive outcome (US), subsequent 
presentations of the CS alone often results in an inflated fear response (CR) even though the 
aversive US is no longer present. This phenomenon is known as incubation, and negative 
cognitive rehearsal is believed to be one likely explanation for its occurrence (Davey, 1992). For 
example, research has shown that following a traumatic episode, many individuals engage in 
negative cognitive rehearsal of the traumatic US (Marks, 1987) and Davey (1992) has argued 
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that this negative cognitive rehearsal could act to inflate and refine the aversive mental 
representation of the US that is evoked by future encounters with the CS causing an increased 
fear response.  
In a laboratory experiment with adults, Jones and Davey (1990) presented participants with 
pairings of a CS (a triangle) and an aversive US (loud tone) in combination with presentations of 
a different CS (a kitchen tap), which was never paired with a US. Once differential conditioned 
fear had been established, participants were divided into three groups: participants in the first 
group were asked to think about the US (loud tone) whenever the word ‘think’ was present on 
the VDU screen and to imagine this tone and their reactions to it as vividly as they could. In the 
second group, participants were given the same instructions, only instead of thinking about the 
loud tone they were instructed to think about an irrelevant aversive event. Finally, in the third 
group, participants were again presented with the same instructions except they were instructed 
to think about an irrelevant benign event. Participants in all three groups completed six of these 
cued cognitive rehearsal (thinking) trials with a 10 second interval between each trial. The cue-
word ‘think’ was present for 6 seconds on each trial. Subsequently, participants were given test 
presentations of both CS+ and CS- alone. The results revealed that rehearsal of the aversive US 
produced a fear response CR during testing which was slightly stronger than that established 
during conditioning. On the other hand, participants who rehearsed either the irrelevant aversive 
event or the irrelevant benign event showed no change in CR during testing. These results 
suggest that cognitive rehearsal of the US is indeed sufficient to prevent extinction of the 
conditioned fear response CR, and in some circumstances it can increase it (Davey, 1989). 
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1.5 Temperament and Anxiety 
Evidence suggests that temperament factors play a significant role in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety pathology (for reviews see Frick 2004; Nigg 2006) particularly with 
regard to the broad temperament construct of trait anxiety and risk for the development of 
anxiety and depression (e.g., Clark, Watson & Mineka, 1994; Compas, Connor-Smith & Jaser, 
2004; Derryberry & Rothbart 1997; Lonigan, Vasey, Phillips, & Hazen, 2004). At one time 
theoretical, this relationship is now well established experimentally both cross-sectionally (e.g., 
Anthony, Lonigan, Hooe & Phillips, 2002; Eisenberg et al. 2001; John,Caspi, Robins, Moffitt & 
Stouthamer- Loeber,1994; Lonigan, Hooe, David & Kistner, 1999; Muris 2006; Muris, Bodden, 
Merckelbach, Ollendick, & King, 2003; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters & Boomsma, 2004; Muris, 
Meesters & Blijlevens, 2007) and longitudinally (e.g., Biederman et al. 2001; Caspi, Henry, 
McGee, Moffitt, &Silva,1995; Eisenberg et al. 2005; Hirshfeld et al. 1992; Kagan, Snidman, 
Zentner & Peterson, 1999; Lonigan, Phillips & Hooe, 2003; Prior, Smart, Sanson & Oberklaid, 
2000; Rende, 1993).  
Gray (1987) proposed that the dimension of trait anxiety is underpinned by a neural system 
circuit, or set of circuits known as the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) and its anatomical 
substrate, known as the septo-hippocampal system, which is believed to control the experience of 
anxiety in response to anxiety provoking stimuli. The BIS is activated by warnings of 
punishment or non-reward, novel stimuli and innate fear stimuli, its outputs being the inhibition 
of ongoing motor behaviour, an increased level of arousal and increased attention. Gray (1982) 
also proposed that the BIS mediates individual differences in trait anxiety. Anxious individuals 
and patients with generalized anxiety disorder would have an overactive BIS (Gray, 1982), 
whereas low anxiety subjects and primary psychopaths would be characterized by an underactive 
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BIS (Fowles, 1980). The BIS construct is then related to a dimension that comprises inhibitory as 
well as disinhibitory disorders.  
The belief that the BIS underpins a core temperamental trait significant in the development of 
fear re-emerges throughout the literature and has been conceptualized in different ways: For 
example, Tellegen (1985) proposed a personality dimension negative emotionality, which 
corresponds to both anxiety (in terms of responses to stress) and the BIS. However, Clark and 
Watson (1991) have termed negative emotionality, negative affect in their more recent tripartite 
model. Rothbart, Ahadi, and Evans (2000) have proposed fear to be one of four core 
temperaments in childhood, and that this temperamental trait is underpinned by the BIS. On the 
other hand, however, developmental models of anxiety have identified neuroticism–negative 
affect (and trait anxiety, which is a strong correlate of NA/N) to be underpinned by the BIS. 
Although on the face of it confusing, evidence suggests that these dimensions show a high 
degree of convergence with one another (see Nigg, 2006, for a review) and can therefore be 
distilled into one temperament construct. In keeping with Gray and McNaughton’s (2003) 
terminology, this temperament will be termed trait anxiety throughout this thesis and will be 
used as a predictor of fear acquisition because it is thought that children scoring high on this 
personality characteristic will be in a more general state of physiological arousal and therefore 
more prone to acquiring fear in a given learning episode than children who are less trait anxious. 
For example, recent research has found that child reported trait anxiety moderates the 
relationship between threat information and fear development (Field 2006b; Field & Price-
Evans, 2009). Specifically, children high on trait anxiety have shown greater avoidance, 
attentional bias and physiological arousal (fear) towards previously novel animals after 
experiencing threat information about them. 
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Hypothesis 1: The starting point of my thesis is, therefore, that trait anxiety will predict 
fear responses to potentially threatening verbal information. The remaining hypotheses 
look at how different forms of cognitive processing influence this relationship. 
1.6 Interactions between Trait Anxiety and the Cognitive Biases 
Although evidence has highlighted the importance of trait anxiety in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety pathology, the mechanisms underlying this relationship remain 
inadequately understood (Lonigan et al. 2004). Lonigan et al. (2004) have suggested that one 
potential underlying mechanism that may explain the relationship between temperament and 
anxiety refers to attentional biases towards threat, which have been demonstrated in anxious 
children and adults (see Vasey & MacKeod, 2001, for a review or see attentional bias section 
above). Specifically, they suggest that the relationship between Negative affect/ Neuroticism 
NA/N (i.e. trait anxiety) and risk for elevated levels of anxiety is in part mediated by an 
attentional bias towards potentially threatening stimuli in the environment and that this risk is 
moderated by a temperamental process known as effortful control, which acts to override the 
urge to attend to threat cues in the environment.  
Lonigan and Vasey (2009) have recently provided some support for this model. For example, in 
a sample of 104 children (specially selected because they reported high or low levels of trait 
anxiety and EC), they found that EC moderates the relationship between trait anxiety and 
attentional bias; only children with low levels of EC and high levels of trait anxiety showed an 
attentional bias towards threat during a dot probe detection task. It is important to note 
nonetheless, that these results only provide support for part of Lonigan et al.’s (2004) model and 
the hypothesis that an attentional bias towards threat mediates the relationship between trait 
anxiety and later anxiety still remains to be tested. However, studies of children and adults have 
found a link between high levels of trait anxiety and an attentional bias toward threat cues (see 
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Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a comprehensive review) and between an attentional bias and anxiety 
pathology in children (e.g., Dalgleish et al. 2003; Vasey et al. 1995; Watts & Weems 2006) and 
adults (MacLeod et al. 1986; Mogg et al. 1992; Mogg et al. 1989) and therefore, it seems highly 
likely that an attentional bias towards threat may mediate the relationship between trait anxiety 
and later anxiety/fear.  
Based on this argument, attentional bias is only one potential mechanism through which trait 
anxiety might lead to fear. Other biases related to attentional bias might also mediate this 
relationship such as interpretation biases. For example, according to Mathews and Mackintosh 
(1998), the mechanisms underlying attentional bias and interpretation biases are the same, i.e. 
they both involve competition of cognitive recourses. Mathews and Mackintosh’s (1998) model 
argues that attention gained by one stimulus decreases attention to the other through inhibitory 
connections. If a stimulus corresponds to stored information associated with threat, it will receive 
greater activation from the TES and, therefore, greater attention (and increased sensations of 
anxiety). The theory behind interpretation bias is much the same in that when faced with 
ambiguity, it has been argued that the threat evaluation system TES encourages the activation of 
threat meanings while the positive evaluation system PES encourages the activation of non threat 
meanings. At the same time activation of one meaning tends to inhibit activation of the other, so 
interpretation is pulled in one direction or the other, depending on how well the ambiguous 
stimulus corresponds to stored representations in the TES and PES (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998). Due to these similarities between interpretation bias and attentional bias, it seems likely, 
based on Lonigan et al.’s (2004) model, that the relationship between trait anxiety and fear, as 
well as being mediated by a threat attention bias is also mediated by a threat interpretation bias. 
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Hypothesis 2: Given that Interpretation biases have the same underlying mechanisms as 
attention biases, they should mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. 
There is also good reason to speculate that cognitive rehearsal mediates the relationship between 
trait anxiety and fear. For instance, reflecting back to the section on cognitive rehearsal (p.15), 
evidence suggests that this type of repetitive thought about one’s self, one’s concerns and one’s 
experiences is characteristic of both trait anxious adults (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 
2004) and children (Comer, Kendall, Franklin, Hudson, & Pimental, 2004; Hodson, McManus, 
Clark, & Doll, 2008) and in addition, it has been argued that cognitive rehearsal may play a part 
in the etiology of anxiety problems: for example, a meta-analysis of the literature found that 
cognitive rehearsal about threat creates anxiety (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Therefore, it could also 
be predicted that cognitive rehearsal mediates the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. 
Hypothesis 3:Given that negative cognitive rehearsal is characteristic of anxious 
individuals and is believed to play a part in the etiology of anxiety, it should mediate the 
relationship between trait anxiety and fear. 
1.7 Interactions Between Interpretation bias and Memory bias 
Thus far, the cognitive biases have each been discussed separately, however, it is unlikely that 
they operate in isolation. Recently, Muris and Field, (2008) have proposed a comprehensive 
model of information processing in which they suggest that the cognitive biases are linked and 
interact with each other at different stages of information processing and impact on feelings of 
fear and anxiety. For example, the model suggests that when confronted with potential threat, 
novelty or ambiguity, anxious children tend to shift their attention towards any potentially 
threatening stimuli (i.e., attention bias). Subsequently, during the interpretation stage, anxious 
youths have a tendency to ascribe a threatening meaning to ambiguous stimuli (i.e., interpretation 
bias), this threatening meaning is then encoded into memory, resulting in a greater memory for 
information concerning danger (i.e. memory bias); thus, for children who are high trait anxious, 
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ambiguous situations are readily evaluated as dangerous. The model also posits that this biased 
information processing brings forth feelings of fear and anxiety, which in turn boost the 
frequency of cognitive biases and may reinforce the maladaptive vulnerability and danger 
schemas. Based on this model, it could be predicted that when faced with ambiguity, 
interpretation bias should predict memory bias, which in turn should lead to an increased fear 
response and this relationship should be stronger for children who are highly trait anxious than 
for children who are less trait anxious. 
Evidence for such connections between interpretation bias and memory come from the 
aforementioned study by Eysenck et al., (1991) in which it was found that in a recognition 
memory test, non-anxious participants were more likely to remember previously heard 
ambiguous sentences as having a benign meaning, whereas currently anxious patients were 
equally as likely to remember the ambiguous sentences as having either a threatening or a benign 
meaning. Most relevant here, is that participants correctly rejected valence-matched distracter 
sentences indicating that the group differences found were likely to reflect variations in how the 
original ambiguity had been encoded into memory.  
Hypothesis 4: Given that cognitive biases at early stages of information processing are 
thought to impact on subsequent stages, and that these biases are more likely to be present 
in high trait-anxious than low-trait anxious individuals, it is predicted that threat 
interpretation biases should predict biased memory encoding and this relationship should 
be moderated by trait anxiety. 
Hypothesis 5: Based on Hypothesis 4, given that the cognitive biases interact at different 
stages of information processing leading to increased feelings of fear and anxiety, it is 
predicted that memory bias should mediate the relationship between interpretation bias 
and fear. 
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1.8 Ethics 
Employing children in any research project raises ethical issues. Likewise, the use of material 
that is fear-relevant elevates the need for sensitive handling of participants and careful 
consideration of their needs. Bearing in mind these considerations, the ethical aspects of this 
research have been given substantial attention, and it is believed that the designed protocol meets 
and exceeds current British Psychological Society and American Psychological Society ethical 
standards, and will not infringe the rights of any participant. 
All of the procedures used have been used before in published research and/or have been used at 
the University of Sussex and have been through a local ethics committee. This includes the use 
of fear information about novel animals (e.g. Field, & Lawson, 2003), the touch box task (e.g. 
Field, & Lawson, 2003; Field, 2006a; Askew & Field, 2007) and the nature reserve task (Field & 
Stoulksen-Coulsen, 2007). The main issues relating to the British Psychological Society and 
American Psychological Society ethical standards are: 
1. Deception: In all the experiments children will receive inaccurate ambiguous information 
about an animal. However, children will be given correct information as soon as possible 
and so the deception is short lived.  
2. Use of a heart rate monitor: The children will be required to wear a heart rate monitor in 
experiment 3. However, the monitor only requires to be clipped to the children’s ear. The 
female experimenter will demonstrate how to attach the ear clip before asking the child to 
do so themselves. This procedure has been approved by the dept. ethics committee for 
use with a more invasive heart rate monitor in 2006. 
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It is worth noting that the children in these experiments are not expected to acquire persistent 
fears. Rather the aim of this research is to show short-term changes in beliefs and behaviours 
about novel animals. There is no evidence from over 30 experiments using similar procedures 
that children acquire fears as a result of verbal information. Additionally, extensive debriefing 
and activity sheets will be provided to the children after the experiments (see appendix C) that 
have been successfully used in similar research. Also, parental consent for child participation 
will be collected before any child is tested. Finally, children will be fully informed that they can 
withdraw at any point they wish to do so. 
The children will not be at risk. All procedures have been used before in child samples (that 
include this age range) and will not cause any physical or psychological harm. Children typically 
enjoy these experiments and through our debriefing activity sheets (see Appendix C) they learn 
about some animals that they are not taught about in the normal course of school activities.  
Ethical approval was obtained by the University of Sussex, School of Life Sciences ethics 
committee before conducting any of the experiments described in this thesis (see appendix F). 
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2 Experiment 1: Do Highly Trait Anxious Children Naturally Cognitively 
Rehearse Ambiguous Information? 
2.1 Introduction 
It is well established that verbal threat information is sufficient to increase fear beliefs and 
avoidance towards novel animals in children (Field, Argyris & Knowles, 2001; Field, 2006a, 
2006b; Field & Lawson, 2003; Muris, Bodden, Merckelbach, Ollendick & King, 2003). 
However, it is unclear how these effects link to clinical phenomenology. There are several well-
established clinical phenomena seen in anxious children such as cognitive rehearsal, memory 
bias and interpretation bias (Harvey et al., 2004), which could interact with the verbal 
information pathway to fear. 
Child reported trait anxiety has been found to moderate the effect that verbal threat information 
has on the fear emotion (Field 2006b; Field & Price-Evans, 2009). Specifically children high on 
trait anxiety show greater avoidance, attentional bias and physiological arousal towards 
previously novel animals after hearing threat information about them. However, the question of 
why trait anxiety facilitates the effect of threat information on fear remains unanswered. The 
likely explanation is that the cognitive processes associated with trait anxiety influence how that 
information is interpreted, elaborated and stored in memory. For example, anxious individuals 
tend to have repetitive thought processes such as rumination and worry (Harvey et al., 2004; 
Marks, 1987) and a memory bias for threat information (Muris & Field, 2008). 
Repetitively thinking about negative experiences inflates the effect of those experiences (Davey 
& Matchett, 1994). This tendency to cognitively rehearse information has also been found to be 
present in anxious children (Hodson, McManus, Clark, & Doll, 2008) and may act to inflate their 
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aversive evaluation of the aversive outcome; This idea fits with evidence from conditioning (see 
Field, 2006c) which suggests that once an association has been established between a novel 
stimulus (CS) and an aversive outcome (US), cognitive rehearsal of the US affects the 
representation of the US that is evoked by the CS. Additionally, Field (2006c) argues that threat 
information operates via basic associative learning systems such that threat information about a 
stimulus evokes a pre-existing conceptual representation of threat that becomes associated with 
that stimulus. Furthermore, threat information has the power to create or change that 
representation. So, it is not that thinking about the threat information makes it more aversive per 
se, but that thinking about it inflates the aversiveness of the representation of threat that it 
evokes. In other words, it is possible that the relationship between trait anxiety and the effect of 
verbal threat information is driven by the way the child interprets the information (i.e., trait 
anxious children dwell more on the threat information and in doing so derive more negative 
meaning from it).  
It is also possible that trait anxious children selectively focus on and remember threat 
information to a greater extent than non anxious children, leading anxious children to become 
more sensitive to the effects of threat information (Muris & Field, 2008). The investigation of 
memory biases has been a focal point of research on the cognitive processing of emotional 
information in the adult literature; however, there have been relatively few investigations on this 
issue in the child anxiety and depression literature and the studies which have been done have 
had mixed findings. For example, Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, and Dalgleish (2000) 
found evidence for the presence of a memory bias in children suffering from PTSD. However, 
using the same methodology, Dalgleish et al. (2003) found no significant differences between 
children with PTSD or GAD relative to controls. Watts and Weems (2006) found that a memory 
46 
 
bias score correlated significantly with child- and parent-reported anxiety scores, although the 
magnitudes of the correlations were not huge (r = .23 and r = .26, respectively). Finally, 
Daleiden (1998) found that a memory bias was present in high trait anxious children.  
Another of the cognitive biases, known as ‘interpretation bias’ is one of the more widely 
researched of the cognitive biases, at least in terms of the child literature, and refers to the 
phenomenon that anxious individuals show a propensity to interpret ambiguity in a threatening 
way (see Hadwin and Field, 2010, for a review). For example, Hadwin et al. (1997) utilized a 
homophone paradigm to investigate interpretation bias in anxious and non-anxious children aged 
between 7 and 9 years. Anxiety levels were measured using the Revised Children's Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1985) and children were presented with 
homophones that had both a neutral and a threatening interpretation (e.g., dye versus die). The 
results demonstrated that children who were more anxious were significantly more likely to 
make threat interpretations of the homophones. 
In another study, Taghavi, et al., (2000) presented 9-16 year olds with a set of homophones that 
were printed on cards. As in previous studies, each homophone had a threat interpretation and a 
non-threat interpretation associated with it. Participants were asked to compose a sentence 
containing the ambiguous word. Anxious children and adolescents formed significantly more 
sentences using the threatening interpretation of the homophone than the non-anxious children. 
These studies, together with others (e.g., Rapee et al., 1996; Bögels et al., 2000; Chorpita, et al., 
1996; Dineen et al., 2004) indicate that interpretation bias is a cognitive distortion that is 
characteristic of children who are high-anxious and anxiety-disordered.  
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Muris and Field (2008) proposed a theoretical framework for understanding how cognitive biases 
interact and impact on the processing of threat-related information. Based on Kendall (1985) and 
Daleiden and Vasey’s (1997) models, they suggest that different cognitive biases occur at 
different stages of information processing. For example, during the early encoding stage, anxious 
children appear to focus their attention towards potentially threatening stimuli (i.e., attention 
bias). Further, during the interpretation stage, anxious youths tend to disambiguate stimuli as 
threatening (i.e., interpretation bias) and exhibit an enhanced memory for information relating to 
danger (i.e., memory bias) resulting in anxious children readily evaluating situations as 
dangerous.  
This theoretical model suggests that the cognitive biases are linked and may interact with each 
other at different stages of information processing and impact on feelings of fear and anxiety. In 
other words, distortions at an early stage of processing (e.g., encoding) increase the likelihood of 
biases at subsequent stages of processing (e.g., interpretation) (Daleiden & Vasey, 1997). It 
seems logical therefore that once attention has been captured by an ambiguous stimulus and 
interpreted as being threatening, the stimulus is then likely to be encoded into memory as being 
more threatening that it was in reality. Conversely, Dalgleish et al. (2003) found quite a degree 
of discrepancy on tests measuring attentional, memory, and probability bias in clinically anxious 
youths, thus implying that distortion at one stage of information processing is not necessarily 
associated to the presence of a cognitive bias at another stage. However, this finding may be due 
to the psychometric qualities (i.e., reliability, validity) of the tests administered to measure the 
various types of information-processing biases. Watts and Weems (2006) found only limited 
support for significant interrelations amongst the cognitive biases. However, these studies both 
investigated links between the cognitive biases in a very general way. For example, each 
48 
 
measure used was unrelated to all the others; there was no consistency in content between the 
tasks used to measure the different cognitive distortions, as they each involved different 
situations. The current study aims to use a superior and more concise method for investigating 
the interrelations amongst cognitive biases, specifically by employing one single, well-defined 
experience and measuring participant’s interpretation and memory of that experience. 
The primary aim was to establish how children naturally think about ambiguous information 
about some novel animals (a quoll and a cuscus) and whether how they think about that 
information varies as a function of trait anxiety. Looking at conditioning research (Field, 2006c); 
we might expect children who are highly trait anxious to have a natural tendency to cognitively 
rehearse ambiguous information, leading them to dwell on the information and derive more 
threatening meaning from it resulting in an increase of fear towards the animals. In addition, this 
experiment was designed to look at whether children who are more trait anxious are more likely 
to interpret ambiguous information as threatening (interpretation bias) and thus remember the 
information as being more threatening (memory bias) than children who are less trait anxious. 
Finally, this experiment aims to investigate how these cognitive biases might interact with each 
other and with trait anxiety and their resulting impact on fear and avoidance of the animals. 
Five main hypotheses arise from the theory just discussed. (1) Replicating Field (2006b), 
children who are more trait anxious, relative to children who are less trait anxious, would 
become more fearful of a novel animal after hearing some ambiguous information about it. (2) 
Because children who are more trait anxious have been found to disambiguate ambiguous 
information as more threatening (Field, 2006b), the relationship between trait anxiety and fear 
should be mediated by interpretation bias. In other words, children who are more trait anxious 
would interpret the information as being more threatening and therefore become more fearful of 
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the animals. (3) The relationship between trait anxiety and fear should also be mediated by how 
children think about the information: children who are more trait anxious are predicted to 
cognitively rehearse the ambiguous information and in doing so derive a more negative meaning 
from it, leading them to become more fearful of the animals. (4) Children who disambiguate the 
verbal information in a threatening way (interpretation bias) would subsequently encode the 
information more negatively into memory and therefore show a memory bias for the information 
and this relationship would be moderated by trait anxiety. In other words, the relationship 
between interpretation and memory would be stronger for highly trait anxious children than for 
less trait anxious children. (5) Finally it is predicted that memory will mediate the relationship 
between interpretation bias and fear: children who interpret the information as being more 
threatening would also encode the information as being more threatening into memory which 
would lead to them becoming more fearful of the animals. 
2.2 Method  
2.2.1 Design 
Two different animals were used in this experiment about which children in the UK have no 
prior experience (both are Australian marsupials): a Quoll and a Cuscus. Information was 
manipulated so that children heard some ambiguous information about one of the animals and no 
information about the other animal (counterbalanced across groups). Natural levels of cognitive 
rehearsal were measured by a score of the severity of animal thoughts, which could range from 0 
(severe negative thought) to 5 (severe positive thought). The outcome variables were: fear beliefs 
(Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ)) and avoidance (Nature Reserve Task (NRT) both measured 
before the information was given and after the information and cognitive rehearsal phases of the 
experiment; behavioural avoidance (measured using a Behavioural Approach Task), memory of 
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the information (measured using a free recall task and prompted memory questions), 
interpretation of the ambiguous information (measured using both forced choice and free 
response questions). Trait anxiety was measured as a predictor using the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Children (STAI-C; Speilberger, 1973). All tasks and questionnaires are described 
below. 
2.2.2 Participants 
Fifty-five children (31 boys, 24 girls) between the ages of 8 and 11 years (M = 112.71 months, 
SD = 10.02) took part. A lower age limit of 8 years was selected because to participate, children 
needed to be able to describe their thoughts and anticipate their actions well enough to respond 
accurately to the measures being administered (Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994). An additional 
reason for choosing this age range is that normative fears are focused on animals during this 
period (Field and Davey, 2001). Parents of children in years four (8-9 years), five (9-10 years) 
and six (10-11 years) were sent letters (see appendix A) describing the procedures used in the 
experiment (but not the main purpose) along with a consent form (see appendix B) to return to 
the school if they would like their child to participate (the experiment ran strictly on an opt-in 
basis only). A total of 150 children were invited to participate, giving a response rate of 36.7%. 
At the start of the testing session, children were reminded that they could withdraw at anytime. 
The children were enrolled from a school in a socially deprived designated regeneration area in 
Worthing, West Sussex. Most pupils were of white British or mixed backgrounds. 
Approximately four per cent were from other backgrounds, mostly from Bangladesh and India.  
 
 
51 
 
 
2.2.3 Materials 
Animals: Pictures of two Australian marsupials were used: the cuscus and the quoll (see Field & 
Lawson, 2003; Field, 2006a, 2006c; Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007). These animals were used 
because they are novel to most children in the UK. This novelty ensured that the children had no 
previous encounters with either of the animals and no prior fear beliefs towards them. No 
children expressed any recognition of the animals. 
Information: The children heard a short vignette (176 words) containing ambiguous information 
regarding one of the animals (counterbalanced across groups e.g. Field 2006a; Field & Lawson, 
2003). The information comprised of ambiguous statements regarding the appearance, habitat, 
behaviour and feeding patterns of the animal. A copy of the vignette can be found in appendix D. 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAI-C; Speilberger, 1973): The Trait Subscale 
of the Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC) (Spielberger, 1973) was 
administered to measure participants’ trait anxiety. This self-report measure is designed to assess 
enduring or chronic anxiety. It contains 20 items each with a four-point Likert-type scale 
resulting in a maximum total score of 60. The STAIC has been used extensively in research with 
clinical and non-clinical populations and has well-established psychometric properties. 
Cronbach’s alphas between .78 and .81 and moderate test-retest reliability coefficients between 
.68 and .71 after an eight week time interval have been reported (Spielberger et al., 1973). In the 
current sample α = .80. 
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ; Field and Lawson, 2003): Field and Lawson’s (2003) FBQ 
was used to obtain a measure of the children’s fear beliefs regarding the animals. This 
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computerized instrument is comprised of randomly presented statements relating to children’s 
thoughts, physiological reactions and behaviours towards each animal in 7 hypothetical scenarios 
(the items are repeated for each animal). Children respond to each statement on a 5-point Likert 
scale (0= No, not at all; 1 = No, not really; 2 = Don’t know/ Neither; 3= Yes, probably; 4 = Yes, 
Definitely). An average score was calculated from the 7 items for each animal ranging from 0 
(no fear beliefs) to 4 (maximum fear beliefs). Each child’s mean fear belief at baseline (before 
the experiment) was subtracted from their mean fear belief after the experimental manipulations 
to obtain a difference score representing the mean change in fear beliefs.  The internal 
consistencies in the current sample were high and consistent with values across several previous 
studies (see Field, 2006b): before information; α = .82 (cuscus subscale) and α = .87 (quoll 
subscale) and after information; α = .90 (cuscus subscale) and α = .87 (quoll subscale). 
Behavioural Approach Task (BAT): Children were asked to approach two identical pet carriers (a 
plastic pet carrier designed for a cat) containing a cuddly toy; one labelled ‘quoll’ and the other 
‘cuscus’. As such, children believed that they were approaching boxes containing the animals 
about which they had already answered questions or about which they had heard information. 
Variations of this task have been used in many previous studies to assess children’s behavioural 
avoidance and physiological responses to animals (e.g. Field & Lawson, 2003; Field et al., 2008; 
Field & Schorah, 2007; Field & Price-Evans, 2009; Kelly, Barker, Field, Wilson, & Reynolds 
2010). These carriers had been modified so that the children could not see inside, and so that a 
long tube was protruding from the door. This tube contained 11 holes in which the child could 
place their finger. Children were asked to place their finger into all 11 holes (one hole at a time) 
along the plastic tube. The holes become progressively closer to the animal box with the first 
hole being the furthest away from the box and the last whole being the closest. The time taken to 
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place their finger into the holes and the number of holes completed was used as a measure of 
their behavioural avoidance. 
Nature Reserve Task (NRT): The nature reserve task is designed to measure children’s 
avoidance/feelings towards the animals (Quolls and Cuscuses) without using the touch boxes 
described above (Field & Storksen-Coulsen, 2007). This task was completed twice, once for the 
quoll and once for the cuscus. The task uses a rectangular wooden board 45 to 60 cm covered in 
green material (to give the impression of grass). The edges have fences, bushes and trees made 
from brown (for wood) and green (for leaves) pipe cleaners. Small yellow balls are stuck to the 
‘grass’ to represent flowers. Children are told that the board represented a nature reserve in 
Australia, in which one of the animals (e.g. cuscuses) live (at which point the experimenter 
places a picture of the relevant animal at one end of the nature reserve board). The children are 
then asked to imagine that they are visiting this nature reserve and they are given a Lego figure 
(a boy for boys and a girl for girls) that represents them. They are asked to place the Lego figure 
anywhere in the nature reserve that shows where they would like to be when they visit. The 
distance (cm) from the centre of the cuscus picture to the Lego figure is measured to indicate the 
child’s relative preference and avoidance of the animal. This procedure is then repeated for the 
quoll (the cuscus picture is removed and replaced with a picture of a quoll). 
Cognitive rehearsal (CR): To measure the extent to which children would naturally cognitively 
rehearse a future task, a thought sampling task was conducted.  The children were told that in a 
few minutes it will be time for them to approach the animal boxes but for now they should just 
sit quietly and ‘take a break’. After fifteen seconds of ‘taking a break’; the experimenter 
prompted the child to tell her what they had been thinking and anything they said was audio 
recorded using an Olympus DS30 digital recorder. The children were then instructed to sit 
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quietly for a further fifteen seconds after which they were once again instructed to tell the 
experimenter what they had been thinking. This process was repeated twice more, four times in 
total; therefore, the children were sitting in silence for one minute in total. 
Free-Recall Memory question: In the free recall memory procedure, the experimenter asked the 
child to remember as much of the information as possible via an open-ended prompt: ‘Could you 
now tell me everything you can remember about the information that you heard earlier about the 
quoll/cuscus’. The child’s response was digitally recorded and coded later (see the coding section 
below). 
Prompted Memory Recall Questions: Children’s memory of the information was also tested 
using four prompted open-ended questions because prompt questions have been shown to obtain 
extra memory information from the children once they had exhausted their free recall memory 
(Wareham & Salmon, in press; McGuigan & Salmon, 2004). Each question began with ‘What 
can you remember about what/where/how a cuscus/quoll …?’ Each question focused on a 
different attribute of the animal by completing the sentence in a different way: physical 
appearance (‘looks’), habitat (‘lives’), behaviour (‘behaves’) and feeding (‘eats and drinks’). 
Therefore, the questions covered all aspects of the information that they had previously heard. 
See appendix E for a copy of the interpretation bias and memory bias questionnaire.  
Interpretation of the ambiguous information questions: Each of the four prompted open-ended 
memory questions (described above) was followed by a set of related questions to assess the 
child’s interpretation of the original information, (15 in total). Each question required a free 
response followed by a two alternative forced choice response. For example, the first prompted 
memory question was ‘What can you remember about how a cuscus/quoll looks?’ This question 
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was then followed by five related questions one of which was; ‘Cuscuses have long sharp claws 
that they use to dig and scratch. What do you think they scratch?’ to which the child was asked to 
respond freely and their response was digitally recorded and later coded (see coding section 
below). Once the child had finished responding to the question, a two alternative, forced choice 
question was asked which consisted of a threat interpretation and a neutral interpretation (i.e., 
‘which of these do you think is more likely? (A) They scratch humans and other animals or (B) 
they scratch trees). The full list of questions can be found in appendix E. 
2.2.4 Ethical Issues 
Ethical approval was obtained by the University of Sussex School of Life Sciences ethics 
committee (see appendix F). The experiment ran on a strict ‘opt- in’ only basis and children were 
told at the start of the experiment that they could withdraw from the experiment at anytime. At 
the end of the experiment all children were fully debriefed. 
2.2.5 Debriefing 
For the purpose of this study it was essential to use deception, both in the form of mis-
information and also in the behavioural approach task, in which children were falsely told that 
the boxes contained real animals. A complete and detailed debriefing procedure was used.  This 
procedure consisted of the experimenter reading some factual information about the animals to 
the class and providing each child with a copy of a fact sheet. The children then completed a 
word search and a maze using the fact sheet provided to find the correct answers. At the end of 
the lesson the correct answers were discussed as a class and any questions the children had were 
answered. A copy of the puzzles and fact sheet can be found in appendix C. 
2.2.6 Procedure 
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Both the ambiguous information and FBQ were administered using a custom written computer 
program in Visual Basic.net written by Andy Field, which was run and completed on an HP 
pavilion zv5000 laptop computer.  
First, children completed the STAI-C with the help of the experimenter. The FBQ was then 
administered. The preliminary screen provided complete instructions of how to complete the 
task; when the child was happy that they understood the instructions, they clicked on the ‘OK’ 
button, which lead onto the questions. Each question appeared under a named picture of the 
relevant animal in a randomized order. The children answered each question by clicking on one 
of five buttons labelled as explained above, after which a button labelled ‘Sure?’ appeared; this 
process helped to ensure that children were in no doubt of their response before moving onto the 
next question. Questions were presented in a random order. Next, children were guided through 
the nature reserve task twice (once for each animal) which was followed by instructions that they 
would now hear some information about one of the animals provided by a teacher. The 
information was administered using the aforementioned custom-written software on the laptop 
computer. Children listened through headphones to a pre-recorded MP3 file spoken by a female 
in her mid 20s. A picture of a female adult (an ‘average’ female face also aged mid-20s supplied 
by Professor David Perrett’s laboratory at St. Andrews University, UK), was displayed on the 
left side of the computer screen and an image of the relevant animal was displayed on the right 
side of the screen. This procedure ensured that the transfer of information was identical across 
the children. 
The children were then told that in a few minutes time they will be asked to approach the animal 
boxes and put their fingers in the holes but for now they should just sit quietly and ‘take a break’. 
At fifteen-second intervals, the experimenter prompted the children to tell her what they had 
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been thinking and their responses were audio recorded for later coding. This process was 
repeated four times in total; therefore, the children were sitting in silence ‘taking a break’ for one 
minute in total. The free-recall measure of memory was then administered: children were then 
asked to recall as much of the information that they had previously heard as possible and again 
their response was audio recorded. Next, the children completed the FBQ for the second time 
and were then told that they would now approach the animals. The touch box task began with 
each child stood on a marked position on the floor, they were then asked to place their finger into 
all 11 holes (one hole at a time) along the plastic tube. The holes become progressively closer to 
the animal box with the first hole being the furthest away from the box and the last whole being 
the closest. The children then completed the nature reserve task for the second time twice (once 
for each animal). The children were then given the prompted-recall memory task followed by the 
‘interpretation of ambiguous information’ measure (read aloud by the experimenter) regarding 
the animal about which they had heard information and their responses were audio recorded. 
Finally the children were debriefed.  
2.2.7 Coding 
All data were coded by the experimenter and a sample of 10 data sets (18%) were second coded 
by an independent non-psychologist. 
Cognitive rehearsal: As described above children were asked by the experimenter what they had 
been thinking about four times at 15 second intervals whilst ‘taking a break’. This produced four 
sets of thoughts, which could have been about anything at all. Each thought the child had about 
the animal and/or approach task was coded for severity using one of the following five 
categories; 5 = very positive thought, 4 = medium positive thought, 3 = low positive thought, 2 = 
low negative thought, 1 = medium negative thought, 0 = very negative thought. A mean severity 
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score was then calculated for each child by subtracting their severity of non-animal thoughts 
from their severity of animal thoughts. The inter-rater reliability for the severity of thoughts was 
significant, Cohen’s κ = .58, p < .01. 
Prompted Memory questions and Free Recall of verbal information: Answers to the open-ended 
memory questions were coded as follows: each statement the child recalled about the animal was 
coded as belonging to one of the following categories: an accurate recall of the original 
information, from the original information but remembered more negatively, from the original 
information but remembered more positively, a negative statement not from the original 
information (a false negative memory), a positive statement not from the original information  (a 
false positive memory), or a neutral statement not from the original information (a false neutral 
memory). These scores were then totalled across questions so that each child had a total score 
for:  the number of accurate memories, the number of more negative memories, the number of 
more positive memories, the number of false negative memories, the number of false positive 
memories and the number of false neutral memories for prompted memory and free recall. Inter-
rater reliability for the prompted recall memory questions (1, 2, 3 and 4) was significant, Cohen’s 
κ = .83, p < .001, as was the inter-rater reliability for the free recall, Cohen’s κ = .83, p < .001. 
Inter-rater reliability was not measured for free recall ‘false memories’ because in the sample of 
10 children whose data were second coded, very few false memories were reported.  
Interpretation of verbal information: Responses to the two alternative forced choice questions 
were scored as being either a threat or non-threat interpretation. Free response interpretation 
questions were also coded as being either a threat interpretation (and given a score of 1) or as a 
non-threatening interpretation (and given a score of 0). These scores were then added together to 
give each child a total score for forced choice interpretation and free recall interpretation, with a 
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higher score indicating a more negative interpretation bias. The minimum interpretation bias 
score a child could get was zero indicating that all their responses were non-threat interpretations 
of the information, the maximum score a child could get was 15, which would indicate that all 
their responses were threat interpretations of the information. Inter-rater reliability for the free 
response interpretation questions was significant, Cohen’s κ = .94, p < .001. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Data Scoring and Initial Analysis 
The touch box data: The touch box task produced a ceiling effect in that the majority of children 
put their finger into all of the holes along the touch box tube, regardless of whether they had 
heard some ambiguous information about the animal or not. Looking at the two histograms 
below (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) it can be seen that there was little variance in the scores and 
therefore, no further analysis was conducted on these data. 
 
Figure 2.1: Histogram of the number of holes of the information animal box into which children put their finger. 
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Figure 2.2: Histogram of the number of holes of the no information animal box into which the children put their 
finger. 
Interpretation of ambiguous information data: A bias corrected bootstrap of Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient revealed that the scores for the open response and forced choice 
interpretation questions were highly correlated; r = .75, p < .001 (two-tailed). Therefore, it was 
decided to combine these two variables to create a new variable called ‘interpretation bias’ and 
this was done by calculating the average of each child’s total score for the open response and 
forced choice questions. 
Memory Variables: Prompted and Free recall: There are 10 different memory variables (free 
recall and prompted recall for each of accurate, more negative, more positive, false negative, 
false positive). To see how these variables relate to each other, a principal components analysis 
was run on all the data from all three experiments as described in Chapter 5. The principal 
components analysis was conducted on all the data from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 combined rather 
than on the data from each individual experiment to provide a larger data sample (N = 187) and 
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therefore, a more reliable result. For example, a sample size of 100 has been classed as poor and 
a sample size of 300 has been classed as good (Comrey & Lee, 1992, cited in Field, 2009). There 
are fewer than 100 participants per experiment (approx 55 in each) therefore each has a ‘poor’ 
sample size; by combining the data we get a better approximation of a ‘good’ sample size (N = 
187). The result of the analysis, described in detail in Chapter 5, was five components that 
related very clearly to accurate memory, more positive, more negative, false positive and false 
negative. Each component had two variables that loaded onto it: the free and prompted versions. 
Therefore, five new variables were created for use in the following analysis that were the average 
of free and prompted recall. These were: accurate memory, more negative memory, more 
positive memory, false negative memory and false positive memory. See Chapter 5 for a full 
description of the principal components analysis.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of all the main variables  
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
STAI-C 55 25 49 37.40 6.30 
FBQ 55 −1.10 4.10 3.70 .90 
NRT 55 −43.0 62.00 4.20 16.90 
IB 55 .00 11.50 4.20 2.90 
False positive Memory  55 .00 2.00 .20 .40 
False Negative memory 55 .00 1.50 .20 .30 
More negative memory 55 .00 2.00 .50 .50 
Accurate memory 55 .00 8.00 2.70 1.60 
More Positive memory 55 .00 2.50 .80 6.10 
CR 
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.00 4.30 2.20 1.10 
(CR = Cognitive rehearsal, IB = Interpretation bias)  
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Table 2.2: Bias corrected bootstrap Pearson correlation coefficients and their Confidence Intervals (based on 1000 
samples) for all main variables 
Variables Pearson Correlation CI (Lower, Upper) 
STAI-C   FBQ 
NRT 
IB 
CR 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.03 
−.03 
−.03 
.00 
−.10 
.04 
−.22 
−.09 
−.08 
−.18, .26 
−.23, .17 
−.31, .26 
−.29, .36 
−.32, .17 
−.31, .34 
−.46, .08 
−.35, .18 
−.38, .23 
FBQ NRT 
IB 
CR 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.36** 
.33* 
−.14 
.18 
−.16 
−.15 
.10 
.19 
−.12, .63 
−.12, .61 
−.40, .13 
−.18, .54 
−.31, .03 
−.36, .18 
−.14, .36 
−.14, .45 
NRT IB 
CR 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.13 
−.06 
−.08 
−.28* 
−.03 
−.07 
−.01 
−.23, .43 
−.39, .31 
−.43, .26 
−.57, .15 
−.27, .23 
−.31, .15 
−.31, .26 
IB CR 
False Negative 
False Positive 
More Negative 
Accurate 
More Positive 
−.28* 
.02 
−.13 
.00 
−.22 
−.32* 
−.50, −.05 
−.26, .33 
−.36, .13 
−.35, .32 
−.41, .01 
−.57, −.02 
CR False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.02 
.12 
.00 
.15 
.29* 
−.25, .27 
−.30, .59 
−.29, .28 
−.11, .41 
.04, .51 
False Negative Memory False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.12 
−.03 
−.05 
.10 
−.18, .34 
−.24, .25 
−.37, .35 
−.25, .48 
False Positive Memory More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.02 
−.09 
−.12 
−.25, .35 
−.29, .19 
−.37, .18 
More Negative Memory Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.41** 
.11 
.16, .61 
−.18, .41 
Accurate Memory More Positive Memory 
 
.40** .19, .60 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Analysis: All hypotheses for Experiment 1 were tested by performing simple regressions. The b 
coefficients and their standard errors were estimated using bias corrected bootstrapped samples 
based on 1000 samples in IBM SPSS 18.  
2.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Trait anxiety should predict fear 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the more trait anxious the child, the more fearful they would become of 
the animals following the information and cognitive rehearsal task; however, Table 2.3 shows 
that this was not found to be the case: trait anxiety did not significantly predict change in fear 
beliefs (FBQ) or avoidance (NRT).  
2.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Interpretation bias should mediate the relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear 
Contrary to expectations, Table 2.3 also shows that trait anxiety was not a significant predictor of 
interpretation bias; children who were more trait anxious did not interpret the information in a 
more threatening way than the children who were not trait anxious. Similarly and again contrary 
to expectations, Interpretation bias did not significantly predict fear beliefs (FBQ) or avoidance 
(NRT) so, the way in which children interpret ambiguous information (either as threatening or 
not) did not significantly impact on their fear beliefs and avoidance (Table 2.3), thus 
interpretation bias did not mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. 
2.3.4 Hypothesis 3: Cognitive rehearsal should mediate the relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear 
This hypothesis was also found to be incorrect. Table 2.3 also shows that trait anxiety was not a 
significant predictor of cognitive rehearsal, children who were more trait anxious did not engage 
in more severely negative thoughts than the children who were less trait anxious. Similarly and 
again contrary to expectations, cognitive rehearsal did not significantly predict fear beliefs 
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(FBQ) or avoidance (NRT) so, whether the children had severely negative thoughts or positive 
thoughts did not significantly impact on their fear beliefs and avoidance (Table 2.3), thus 
cognitive rehearsal cannot be tested as a mediator of the relationship between trait anxiety and 
fear. 
Table 2.3: Bias corrected bootstrap estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors (based on 1000 
samples) of eight independent regressions that were run with a different outcome variable each time.  
Predictor Outcome B     SE    CI  
(lower) 
   CI 
(upper) 
P      R2 
STAI-C FBQ .01 .02 −.02 .04 .47 .00 
 NRT −.02 .33 −.67 .63 .94 .00 
 IB .01 .06 −.11 .13 .88 .00 
 CR −.00 .03 −.06 .06 .99 .00 
IB FBQ .10 .06 −.01 .21 .29 .10 
 NRT .81 1.06 −1.21 2.78 .59 .02 
CR FBQ .12 .13 −.11 .36 .37 .02 
 NRT .86 2.84 −4.62 6.22 .74 .00 
Trait anxiety (STAI-C), Interpretation bias (IB) and Cognitive rehearsal (CR). 
2.3.5 Hypothesis 4: Interpretation bias should predict biased memory and this 
relationship should be moderated by trait anxiety 
Hypothesis 4 stated that interpretation bias should predict biased memory: children who 
disambiguate the information in a more threatening way should then encode this information as 
being more threatening in memory and as such should remember the information as being more 
negative than it was. Nevertheless, as Table 2.4 shows, this was not found to be the case for any 
of the memory variables. Because a significant relationship was not found between interpretation 
bias and memory bias, trait anxiety cannot be tested as a moderator. However, one finding that 
came close to being significant (p = .06) was that the greater the child’s interpretation bias for the 
information, the less accurate their memory was for the information (Table 2.4), so an 
interpretation bias decreased memory accuracy of the information and vice versa.  
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Table 2.4: Shows the bias corrected bootstrap estimates of the regression coefficients and their standard errors 
(based on 1000 samples) of five independent regressions that were run with a different outcome variable each time.  
Predictor Outcome B   SE CI (lower) CI                   
(upper) 
p  R2 
IB Accurate −.11 .06 −.26 .02 .06 .043 
 More Negative −.01 .03 −.06 .05 .87 .00 
 More Positive −.05 −.03 −.12 .00 .11 .06 
 False Negative .00 .02 −.03 .03 .91 .00 
 False Positive −.02 .02 −.05 .01 .11 .02 
 
2.3.6 Hypothesis 5: Memory should mediate the relationship between interpretation bias 
and fear 
For mediation to have occurred the following needs to be true (Baron and Kenny, 1986): (1) 
Interpretation bias should significantly predict fear; (2) Interpretation bias should significantly 
predict memory; (3) the relationship between interpretational bias and fear should be 
significantly reduced when memory is entered as a simultaneous predictor. Therefore, because 
there was no significant relationship between IB and FBQ or between IB and NRT (Table 2.3) it 
does not make sense to test for mediation.  False-positive memory did, however, have a 
significant negative relationship with fear beliefs (Table 2.5), this suggests that children who 
remembered more false-positive information become less fearful of the animals after the 
information relative to children who remembered less false-positive information. This finding 
indicates that the way in which information is encoded into memory impacts on fear beliefs. 
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Table 2.5: Shows the bias corrected bootstrap estimates of the regression parameters and their standard errors 
(based on 1000 samples) of ten independent regressions that were run with a different outcome variable each time. 
Memory 
Predictor 
Outcome b SE CI (lower) CI (upper) P R2 
Accurate NRT 
FBQ 
−.75 
.07 
1.37 
.06 
−3.42 
−.07 
1.23 
2.0 
.54 
.16 
.01 
.02 
More 
Negative 
NRT 
FBQ 
−2.03 
−.27 
4.16 
.23 
−11.02 
−.79 
6.80 
.26 
.59 
.24 
.00 
.02 
More 
Positive 
NRT 
FBQ 
−.17 
.25 
4.13 
.22 
−7.86 
−.24 
8.27 
.76 
.97 
.31 
.00 
.03 
False 
Negative 
NRT 
FBQ 
−5.24 
.44 
12.28 
.64 
−28.08 
−.57 
13.38 
1.84 
.78 
.70 
.01 
.02 
False 
Positive 
NRT 
FBQ 
−12.42 
−.35* 
7.27 
.22 
−22.44 
−.80 
9.79 
.12 
.15 
.02 
.08 
.02 
*p < .05 
2.4 Discussion 
Contrary to what was expected, the present study indicates that high levels of trait anxiety did 
not predict increased levels of fear and avoidance due to verbal information. This finding is 
inconsistent with Field (2006b; Field & Price-Evans, 2009) who found that trait anxiety 
moderates the effect of threat information on fear. Specifically, children high on trait anxiety 
showed greater avoidance and attentional bias towards previously novel animals after 
experiencing verbal information. However, Field (2006) used threat information whereas 
ambiguous information was used in the current study, which probably explains this 
inconsistency. Nevertheless, we predicted that anxious children should interpret the ambiguous 
information in a more threatening way and this did not appear to be the case. This finding is not 
only inconsistent with what was predicted but also with a growing body of research which have 
demonstrated that high trait anxious children do show a tendency for interpreting ambiguous 
stimuli as threatening (Bogels & Zigterman, 2000; Hadwin et al., 1997; Muris, Merckelbachet 
al., 2000; Muris & van Doorn, 2003; Taghavi et al., 2000; Lester, Seal, Nightingale & Field, 
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2010). Additionally, this finding is inconsistent with the adult literature; research has shown that 
anxious individuals tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli or events as negative or threatening (e.g., 
Amir, Beard & Bower, 2005; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991). For example, 
when presented with ambiguous sentences, participants with a clinically diagnosed anxiety 
disorder were more likely to offer threatening (rather than non-threatening) interpretations 
compared to recovered clinically anxious and never anxious participants (Eysenck et al., 1991). 
Another unexpected finding was that the way in which children interpreted the ambiguous 
information (as either threatening or non-threatening) regardless of whether they were anxious or 
not, did not significantly predict memory encoding nor did it significantly predict fear and 
avoidance. However, there was a trend in the direction of greater levels of interpretation bias 
predicting less accurate memory, therefore suggesting that children who showed a greater 
interpretation bias for the information remembered the information less accurately, however this 
finding did not quite reach significance. 
Interestingly, children who remembered less false positive information (positive information 
remembered that was not in fact told) became more fearful of the animals due to information 
whereas children who remembered more false positive memories showed a decrease in fear 
beliefs due to information. This finding is in line with Williams (1997) who reported that 
depressed individuals show a greater latency to retrieve positive life events from memory than 
non-depressed individuals; however, they are not much quicker than non-depressed controls at 
retrieving negative events. Although the current study is looking at anxiety and not depression, it 
is well documented that anxiety and depression are strongly related conditions in both adult and 
youth populations (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Seligman & Ollendick, 1998). Additionally, 
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it has been argued that anxiety and depression share a variety of cognitive aspects (e.g., Kendall 
& Watson, 1989). 
The present findings also indicate that high levels of child trait anxiety do not significantly 
predict a negative thinking style; additionally the severity of the children’s cognitive rehearsal 
had no significant impact on their levels of fear or avoidance. These findings are surprising 
because anxious youth frequently present to the clinical setting expressing a repetitive thinking 
style regarding anticipated negative outcomes or feared events (Comer, Kendall, Franklin, 
Hudson, & Pimental, 2004) and support has been found for the importance of rumination in the 
strengthening and maintenance of anxious states (Rector, Antony, Laposa, Kocovski & Swinson 
(2008).  
One potential problem with the current study was that during the naturalistic cognitive rehearsal 
task in which children were instructed to ‘take a break’, the majority of children thought about 
the animal (mean number of animal thoughts per child = 2.85), very few children had thoughts 
that were not about the animal (mean number of non animal thoughts per child = 0.71); therefore, 
a true comparison between the effects of thinking about the animal vs. not thinking about the 
animal could not be made. The next step would be to include a control group who would be 
prevented from thinking about the animal and information by engaging them in a distracter task. 
This would provide a baseline of not thinking against which to compare the thinking scores. As 
such, it would be necessary to manipulate cognitive rehearsal, in other words instead of asking 
children to relax and take a break; explicitly asking them to repeatedly think about the animal 
and information and keep reminding them to do so. This would help to ensure that they were 
thinking in an iterative style.
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3 Experiment 2: The Effect of Cognitive Rehearsal vs. Distraction 
3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 was a naturalistic study which looked at what children naturally think about after 
hearing some ambiguous information about a novel animal and whether what they think varies as 
a function of trait anxiety. The results revealed that none of the original hypotheses were 
supported: high trait anxious children did not become more fearful of the animals due to 
information, nor were they more likely to interpret the information as threatening or remember it 
to be more threatening than it was originally. Additionally, fear levels were not significantly 
affected by the presence of an interpretation or memory bias. It was also predicted that trait 
anxious children would cognitively rehearse the information resulting in them becoming more 
fearful of the animal. However, trait anxiety did not significantly predict cognitive rehearsal; in 
other words, it was found that trait anxious children are not more likely to cognitively rehearse 
ambiguous information than non trait anxious children. Additionally, the extent to which 
children cognitively rehearsed did not significantly predict how fearful they became. 
Nevertheless, it was found that the majority of children had thoughts about the animals, and there 
were very few children who thought about something other than the animals; therefore, there was 
no group of ‘non-animal thinkers’ to compare against the group of children who thought about 
the animal.  The aim of Experiment 2, therefore, was to explore the effect of manipulating 
cognitive rehearsal about ambiguous information. The current experiment looked at the effect of 
explicitly instructing children to think iteratively about the animals compared to a control group 
who completed a verbal distracter task, aimed at preventing them from thinking about the 
animals. This experimental manipulation would provide a group of children who did not think 
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about the animals making it possible to investigate the causal effect of thinking vs. not thinking 
about the animals on fear levels towards the animals.  
Although there is currently limited research into cognitive rehearsal in the child anxiety 
literature, the research that is available has shown that this style of negative repetitive thought is 
present in anxious children (Comer, et al. 2004), reflects detrimental thought processes and is 
believed to play a part in the etiology of both depression and anxiety disorders (e.g., Barlow, 
Allen, & Choate, 2004). Additionally, a negative repetitive style of thinking is believed to be 
associated with poor problem solving skills, impaired motivation, and inhibition of instrumental 
behaviour (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004 for a review). Therefore, it was predicted that by 
instructing children to cognitively rehearse ambiguous information about novel animals, fear 
beliefs and avoidance would increase in all children but this relationship would be stronger for 
those who are more trait anxious than for those who are less trait anxious.  
The hypotheses for Experiment 2 remain the same as in Experiment 1, with the exception of the 
hypotheses relating to cognitive rehearsal (see hypothesis 3): (1) Replicating Field (2006b), 
children who are more trait anxious, relative to children who are less trait anxious, would 
become more fearful of a novel animal after hearing some ambiguous information about it. (2) 
Because children who are more trait anxious have been found to disambiguate ambiguous 
information as more threatening (Field, 2006b), the relationship between trait anxiety and fear 
should be mediated by interpretation bias in other words, children who are more trait anxious 
would interpret the information as being more threatening and therefore become more fearful of 
the animals. (3) Cognitive rehearsal (whether the child was asked to think about the ambiguous 
information vs. engage in a distractor task) would result in an increase in fear beliefs and 
avoidance in all children but this relationship would be stronger for those who are more trait 
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anxious than for those who are less trait anxious. In other words, induced cognitive rehearsal 
would moderate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear.  (4) Children who disambiguate 
the verbal information in a threatening way (interpretation bias) would subsequently encode the 
information more negatively into memory and therefore show a memory bias for the information 
and this relationship would be moderated by trait anxiety. (In other words, the relationship 
between interpretation and memory would be stronger for highly trait anxious children than for 
less trait anxious children.) (5) Finally it is predicted that memory will mediate the relationship 
between interpretation bias and fear: children who interpret the information as being more 
threatening would also encode the information as being more threatening into memory which 
would lead to them becoming more fearful of the animals. 
3.2 Method 
Most of the materials and procedures in this experiment were identical to Experiment 1. 
3.2.1 Design 
As in Experiment 1, two unfamiliar Australian marsupials were used: a quoll and a cuscus. 
Information was manipulated so that children heard some ambiguous information about one of 
the animals and no information about the other animal (counterbalanced across groups). 
Cognitive rehearsal was manipulated by asking half of the children to think about the 
information they were given about one of the animals and the other half were instructed to 
complete a distracter task to prevent them from thinking about the animals (counterbalanced 
across groups). The thoughts of the group who were instructed to think about the information 
were subsequently scored for severity, which could range from 0 (severe negative thought) to 5 
(severe positive thought). The dependent variables were identical to those in Experiment 1: fear 
beliefs (Fear Beliefs Questionnaire, FBQ) and avoidance (Nature Reserve Task, NRT) both 
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measured before the information was given and after the information and cognitive rehearsal 
phases of the experiment; behavioural avoidance (measured using a Behavioural Approach 
Task), memory of the information (measured using a free recall task and prompted memory 
questions), interpretation of the ambiguous information (measured using both forced choice and 
free response questions). Trait anxiety was measured as a predictor using the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Children (STAI-C, Speilberger, 1973). 
3.2.2 Participants 
Fifty-four children (17 boys, 37 girls) between the ages of 9 and 11 years (M = 125.44 months, 
SD = 5.80) took part. This age range was chosen because normative fears are focused on animals 
during this period (Field and Davey, 2001). Twenty-seven children were instructed to think 
about the information they just heard and the impending task of approaching the animals (20 
girls and 7 boys) and 27 children completed the distraction task (17 girls and 10 boys). The 
children were enrolled from a primary school in West Sussex, U.K. The school was a smaller 
than average primary school, situated in a seaside town near Brighton. Very few pupils were 
eligible for free school meals. Only a few pupils speak a language other than English at home. 
Parents of children in years four (8-9 years), five (9-10 years) and six (10-11 years) were sent 
letters (see appendix A) describing the procedures used in the experiment (but not the main 
purpose) along with a consent form (see appendix B) to return to the school if they would like 
their child to participate (the experiment ran strictly on an opt-in basis only). A total of 160 
children were invited to participate, giving a response rate of 34%. At the start of the testing 
session, children were reminded that they could withdraw at anytime.  
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3.2.3 Cognitive Rehearsal 
To investigate the effect of manipulating cognitive rehearsal about ambiguous information and a 
future task, half of the child sample completed a cognitive rehearsal task in which they were 
instructed to think specifically about the information and the impending behavioural approach 
task. They were told ‘In a few minutes you are going to approach the animal box and put your 
hand in but for now I would like you to think to yourself about the information you have just 
heard and the task of putting your hand in the animal box’. After 15 seconds the children were 
prompted to tell the experimenter what they had been thinking and their response was audio 
recorded using a digital voice recorder. The children were then instructed to carry on thinking 
about the information and future task and again after 15 seconds the children were prompted to 
tell the examiner what they had been thinking and their response was audio recorded as before. 
This process was repeated a further two more times (four times in total) and all child responses 
were audio recorded by the experimenter for later coding. The other half of the child sample 
completed a distracter task (see below) to prevent them from cognitively rehearsing the 
information as much as possible.  
Distracter task to prevent cognitive rehearsal: To investigate the effects of manipulating 
cognitive rehearsal, it was necessary for half of the child sample to be prevented from 
cognitively rehearsing about the animals and approach task. To achieve this goal, half of the 
children completed a distracter task in which they were asked to say a random letter of the 
alphabet out loud to the experimenter, one per second for one minute. Rapee (1993) found that 
participants were least able to worry whilst completing verbal tasks such as this one relative to 
other tasks such as spatial tasks. 
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3.2.4 Ethical Issues 
Ethical approval was obtained by the University of Sussex School of Life Sciences ethics 
committee (see appendix F). The experiment ran on a strict ‘opt- in’ only basis and children were 
told at the start of the experiment that they could withdraw from the experiment at anytime. At 
the end of the experiment all children were fully debriefed. 
3.2.5 Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that for Experiment 1 except there was a 
variation on the cognitive rehearsal task. Specifically, after hearing the ambiguous information, 
half of the children were instructed to think quietly to themselves about the information and the 
impending behavioural approach task, after 15 seconds of thinking, the experimenter prompted 
them to tell her what they had been thinking and their responses were audio recorded using a 
digital voice recorder. This process was repeated four times in total, therefore the children were 
‘thinking’ for one minute in total. The other half of the children completed a distracter task 
(described below) to prevent them from thinking about the information as much as possible.  
3.2.6 Coding 
As in Experiment 1, all data sets were coded by the experimenter and a sample of 10 were 
second coded by an independent non-psychologist.  
Inter-rater reliability: Inter rater reliability for the interpretation of ambiguous information was 
significant, Cohen’s κ = .98, p < .001, as was the inter-rater reliability for the prompted recall 
memory questions, Cohen’s κ = .77, p < .001, and also for the free recall memory task, Cohen’s 
κ = .56, p < .001. As in Experiment 1, inter-rater reliability was not measured for ‘false 
memories’ in the free recall task because in the sample of 10 children whose data were second 
coded, there were hardly any false memories reported.  
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Internal consistency data for Fear beliefs questionnaire (FBQ, Field and Lawson, 2003): The 
internal consistencies in the current sample were high and consistent with values across several 
previous studies (see Field, 2006b) and with Experiment 1: before information; α = .76 (cuscus 
subscale) and α = .81 (quoll subscale) and after information; α = .91 (cuscus subscale) and α = 
.87 (quoll subscale). 
Internal Consistency data for The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAI-C; 
Speilberger, 1983): The STAI-C was found to have high reliability in the current sample; α = .85 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Initial Analyses 
Cognitive Rehearsal: A Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test showed that on average children had 
significantly more threat thoughts than non threat thoughts about the animal for which they heard 
some ambiguous information, z = −2.8, p < .01. 
Touch box data: As in Experiment 1, the touch box task produced a ceiling effect in that the 
majority of children put their finger into all the eleven holes. Looking at the two histograms 
below (Figures 3.1 and 3.2) it can be seen that there is little variance in the scores and therefore, 
no further analysis was conducted on these data. 
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of the number of holes in the information animal box into which the children would put their 
finger. 
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of the number of holes of the no information animal box into which children would put their 
finger. 
Interpretation of ambiguous information data: It was found that the scores for the open response 
and forced choice interpretation questions were highly correlated Pearson’s bootstrapped r = .67, 
p = .00 (two-tailed) and so it was decided to combine these variables calculating the average of 
the open response and forced choice scores for each child to create a new variable called 
interpretation bias. 
Analysis: Analyses were conducted by performing simple regressions unless stated otherwise. 
The estimates and their standard errors of the regression coefficients were bias corrected 
bootstrapped based on 1000 samples.  
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of all the main variables  
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
STAI-C 54 23.00 54 35.91 7.20 
FBQ 54 −1.63 2.50 .32 .84 
NRT 54 −25.50 51.00 1.46 12.44 
IB 54 1.50 10.50 4.79 2.42 
Accurate Memory 54 .00 7.50 3.04 1.51 
More Negative Memory 54 .00 2.50 .66 .69 
False Negative Memory 54 .00 3.00 .58 .78 
More Positive Memory 54 .00 3.00 .75 .67 
False Positive Memory 54 .00 2.00 .20 .45 
CR Severity 27 .00 3.25 1.78 1.00 
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Table 3.2: Bias corrected bootstrap Pearson correlation coefficients and their Confidence Intervals (based on 1000 samples) for 
all main variables 
Variables Pearson Correlation CI (Lower, Upper) 
CR vs. Distractor Condition FBQ 
NRT 
IB 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.05 
-.18 
-.04 
-.13 
-.04 
.09 
-.12 
-.01 
-.23, .31 
-.41, .09 
-.32, .27 
-.39, .21 
-.28, .23 
-.19, .34 
-.34, .12 
-.29, .28 
STAI-C   FBQ 
NRT 
IB 
CR Severity 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.45* 
.28 
.16 
−.37 
.90 
.14 
.38 
.01 
.01 
.02, .70 
−.11, .62 
−.23, .50 
−.67, −.09 
−.30, .43 
−.32, .52 
.02, .69 
−.45, .44 
−3.3, .45 
FBQ NRT 
IB 
CR Severity 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.46* 
.32 
−.48* 
.39 
.17 
.48* 
−.06 
.05 
.03, .77 
−.04, .63 
−.72, −.20 
−.10, .75 
−.20, .64 
.13, .78 
−.51, .36 
−.27, .38 
NRT IB 
CR Severity 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.30 
−.50* 
−.01 
.14 
.37 
.17 
−.02 
−.01, .55 
−.70, −.26 
−.33, 3.52 
−.14, .47 
−.11, .71 
−.22, .49 
−.45, .43 
IB CR Severity 
False Negative 
False Positive 
More Negative 
Accurate 
More Positive 
−.44* 
.35 
.42* 
.36 
.11 
−.03 
−.72, −.20 
−.02, .66 
.15, .68 
−.02, .68 
−.34, .52 
−.44, .40 
CR Severity False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
−.24 
−.40* 
−.35 
.14 
.12 
−.62, .18 
−.74, .10 
−.71, .07 
−.17, .48 
−.25, .43 
False Negative Memory False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.01 
−.01 
−.03 
.04 
−.29, .43 
−.37, .48 
−.34, .25 
−.29, .40 
False Positive Memory More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.29 
−.22 
−.26 
−.21, .73 
−.54, .06 
−.54, −.04 
More Negative Memory Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.06 
−.34 
−.39, .47 
−.65, .03 
Accurate Memory More Positive Memory 
 
.09 −.27, .48 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). CR vs. Distractor 
(whether the children were in the cognitive rehearsal or distracter condition) CR Severity (the severity of thoughts of children in 
the cognitive rehearsal condition). 
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3.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Trait anxiety should predict fear 
In Experiment 1, contrary to expectations, trait anxiety did not significantly predict change in 
fear beliefs (FBQ) or avoidance (NRT). However, Table 3.3 shows that in the current 
experiment, although trait anxiety once again does not significantly predict avoidance, it does 
predict fear beliefs: children who were more trait anxious became more fearful of the animals 
subsequent to hearing the information relative to less trait anxious children.  
3.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Interpretation bias should mediate the relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear 
It was predicted that the relationship between trait anxiety and fear would be mediated by 
interpretation bias; specifically, a child who is more trait anxious is more likely to interpret 
information in a negatively biased way and this interpretation bias creates an increase in fear (in 
other words trait anxiety should, as well as having a direct effect on fear, have an indirect effect 
via interpretational biases). For this mediation model to be true (1) trait anxiety should predict 
fear (which it does), (2) interpretation bias should predict fear beliefs, which is not the case 
(Table 3.3), and (3) trait anxiety should significantly predict interpretation bias, which is also not 
the case (Table 3.3). The fact that interpretation bias does not significantly predict fear beliefs 
and trait anxiety does not significantly predict interpretation biases means that interpretation 
biases do not mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and the change in fear beliefs 
towards the animals.  
3.3.4 Hypothesis 3: Cognitive rehearsal (whether or not children were instructed to think 
about the information and future touch box task or not) should moderate the 
relationship between trait anxiety and fear. 
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It was hypothesized that the relationship between trait anxiety and fear beliefs would be 
moderated by cognitive rehearsal (whether children were instructed to think about the 
information and future touch box task or not). Moderation is different to mediation in that a 
mediator variable explains the relationship between two other variables whereas a moderator is a 
variable that influences the strength of the relationship between two other variables (MacKinnon, 
2008). Thus, the current hypothesis is that the relationship between trait anxiety and fear beliefs 
will be stronger for trait anxious children who were instructed to think about the information and 
future approach task relative to those who were in the distracter group. In other words, fear 
beliefs will be exacerbated by a combination of trait anxiety and cognitive rehearsal. This 
hypothesis was tested by predicting fear beliefs from trait anxiety, cognitive rehearsal and the 
interaction between trait anxiety and cognitive rehearsal (Table 3.4). The independent 
regressions included CR, STAIC and also their interaction term (to test for moderation). Looking 
at Table 3.4, the cognitive rehearsal task did not significantly predict fear and the interaction 
between cognitive rehearsal and trait anxiety was not significant, therefore, cognitive rehearsal 
did not moderate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear beliefs. 
Table 3.3: Bias corrected bootstrap estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors (based on 1000 
samples) of five independent regressions that were run with a different outcome variable each time.  
Predictor Outcome B     SE CI 
(lower) 
CI 
(upper) 
p   R2 
STAI-C FBQ .04* .02 .01 .07 .03 .12 
 NRT −9.72 6.68 −24.26 .64 .07 .03 
 IB    .02 .04 −.06 .10 .58 .00 
IB FBQ .09 .05 −.01 .18 .09 .06 
 NRT 1.58 .83 .10 3.10 .13 .10 
*p < .05, STAI-C (trait anxiety), IB (interpretation bias). 
Point biserial correlations revealed that cognitive rehearsal (thinking about the information and 
approach task vs. distracter task) did not significantly correlate with fear beliefs (FBQ) or 
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avoidance (NRT) (Table 3.5). Therefore, asking children to think about the information and 
approach task did not affect their cognitive or behavioural fear response towards the animals. 
Table 3.4: Test of moderation: Bias corrected bootstrap estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors 
(based on 1000 samples). 
Predictor Outcome B SE CI 
(lower) 
CI 
(upper) 
p    R2 
 FBQ      .13 
STAIC  .02 .03 −2.78 .67 .30  
CR vs. D  −.82 1.21 −.01 .10 .47  
STAIC*CR  .03 .04 −3.08 2.74 .45  
 NRT      .07 
STAIC  .13 .28 −.25 .93 .41  
CR vs. D  −14.46 13.49 −41.52 20.18 .14  
STAIC*CR   .28 .41 −.54 .96 .39  
(CR vs. D = Cognitive rehearsal task vs. distracter task). 
Table 3.5: Summary of Point biserial correlation coefficients (sig 1-tailed) between cognitive rehearsal (whether 
children were asked to think about the information and approach task vs. the distracter task) and fear beliefs (FBQ) 
and avoidance (NRT) 
Variables  rpb        SE CI 
(Lower) 
    CI        
(Upper) 
        P 
 
R2 
CR  FBQ .05 .14 −.24 .33 .35 .00 
 NRT −.18 .13 −.41 .13 .09 .03 
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3.3.5 Hypothesis 4: Interpretation bias should predict biased memory and this 
relationship should be moderated by trait anxiety 
Hypothesis 4 was tested by performing simple regressions. The estimates and their standard 
errors of the regression coefficients were bias corrected bootstrapped based on 1000 samples.  
Hypothesis 4 stated that interpretation bias would predict biased memory. This relationship was 
not found to be significant in Experiment 1 for any of the memory variables; however in the 
current experiment, this relationship was found to be significant for both ‘more negative’ and 
‘false negative’ memory (Table 3.6). These findings suggest that children who disambiguate 
information in a more threatening way remember the information as being more negative and 
remember a greater amount of negative information that was not actually given relative to 
children who disambiguate the information in a non threatening way. It was also predicted that 
these relationships would be moderated by trait anxiety; in other words, trait anxiety would 
exacerbate the relationship between interpretation bias and biased memory. This hypothesis was 
tested by performing two separate multiple regressions; one with more negative memory as the 
outcome variable and one with false negative memory as the outcome variable and the predictors 
interpretation bias, trait anxiety and the interaction between trait anxiety and interpretation bias 
(Table 3.7). The independent regressions included IB, STAIC and also their interaction term (to 
test for moderation). The IB and STAIC predictors were centred before computing their 
interaction term. Centring is achieved by subtracting the mean of the variable from each value 
within that variable. The main advantages of centering are that it (1) reduces multicollinearity 
(high correlation) between the IB and STAIC predictors and the IB × STAIC interaction term 
and (2) can provide more meaningful interpretations of the regression coefficients. In various 
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instances (such as this one), the predictors will not have a meaningful zero point and therefore, 
centering is necessary (http://www.selfgrowth.com/articles/CenteringVariables to Reduce 
Multicollinearity.html, extracted 23/09/09). 
Two individual multiple regressions (Table 3.7) revealed that trait anxiety is a significant 
moderator of the relationship between interpretation bias and more negative memory; however, it 
is not a significant moderator of the relationship between interpretation bias and false negative 
memory. So, children who disambiguate information in a more threatening way encode this 
information more negatively in memory and this relationship is stronger for children who are 
more trait anxious than for less trait anxious children.  
Further probing of this interaction using simple slopes analysis provides additional information 
to facilitate interpretation of the effect (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). Specific values of 
(centered) trait anxiety were entered into an online utility to evaluate the effect of interpretation 
bias on more negative memory at specific conditional values of the moderator (trait anxiety). 
These values (as recommended by Preacher et al. (2006)) were, at the mean and at 1 SD above 
and below the mean (i.e., where centered trait anxiety = 7.2, 0, and −7.2). A plot of these effects 
is shown in Figure 3.3, in which it can be seen that as trait anxiety increases, the slope relating 
interpretation bias to more negative memory becomes more positive. The simple slope is 
−0.0062 at −1 SD (p = .91, non significant), 0.109 at the mean of trait anxiety (p = .00, 
significant), and 0.2242 at +1 SD (p = .00, significant). These results indicate that the 
relationship between interpretation bias and more negative memory is significant only for 
children who have mid to high levels of trait anxiety and not for children who have relatively 
low levels of trait anxiety.  
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However, as the selection of ±1 SD for trait anxiety is largely arbitrary, Preacher et al. (2006) 
suggest that of more interest are the values of trait anxiety for which the simple slope is 
statistically significant. The region of significance on the moderator (trait anxiety) ranges from 
−27.46 to −2.28, indicating that any particular simple slope outside this range is statistically 
significant. Since centered trait anxiety ranges from approximately −12.91 to 18.09, this again 
suggests that the effect of interpretation bias on more negative memory is significant only for 
mid to high values of trait anxiety. Additionally, because the confidence bands in Figure 3.4 do 
not include simple slopes of zero for values of trait anxiety above −2.28, it can be concluded that 
the simple slope of more negative memory regressed on interpretation bias is significantly 
different from zero for values of trait anxiety above -2.28.  
  
Figure 3.3: Mean plot illustrating the interaction of Interpretation Bias and Trait Anxiety. 
More negative slopes correspond to higher levels of Trait Anxiety. 
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Figure 3.4: Plot illustrating confidence bands for observed sample values of trait anxiety. 
 
Table 3.6: Bias corrected bootstrap estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors (based on 1000 
samples) of five independent regressions that were run with a different outcome variable each time. 
Predictor Memory 
Outcome 
B       SE CI      
(lower) 
CI     
(upper) 
p    R2 
IB Accurate  .05 .08 −.12 .19 .55 .01 
 More 
negative 
.10* .04 .02 .17 .04 .12 
 More 
positive 
−.02 .04 −.10 .04 .47 .01 
 False 
negative 
.13** .04 .05 .20 .00 .16 
 False 
positive 
.00 .02 −.04 .05 .96 .00 
*p < .05 **p < .01, IB (interpretation bias) 
 
Table 3.7: Multiple bias corrected bootstrap estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors (based on 
1000 samples) were run to investigate whether trait anxiety moderated the relationship between interpretation bias 
and memory (more negative and false negative). (Centred variables) 
Predictor Memory 
Outcome 
B    SE  CI    
(lower) 
     CI    
(upper) 
P      R2 
STAIC 
IB 
More 
Negative 
.02 
.12* 
.01 
.04 
−.01 
.05 
.04 
.16 
.24 
.01 
.28 
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STAIC×IB  .02* .01 .00 .03 .01  
STAIC 
IB 
STAIC×IB 
False 
Negative 
−.00 
.13* 
5.151E−5 
.01 
.05 
.01 
−.03 
.04 
−.01 
.03 
.22 
.01 
.91 
.01 
.10 
.16 
*p < .05 
3.3.6 Hypothesis 5: Memory should mediate the relationship between Interpretation bias 
and Fear. 
In Hypothesis 5 it was predicted that the relationship between interpretation bias and fear would 
be mediated by memory; specifically, interpretation bias should, as well as having a direct effect 
on fear, have an indirect effect via biased memory. For this mediation model to be true, (1) 
Interpretation bias should predict fear (NRT or FBQ or both) (which it does not, Table 3.3); (2) 
Memory should predict fear (which it does: more negative memory predicted avoidance (NRT) 
and both more negative memory and false negative memory predicted fear beliefs (FBQ) see 
Table 3.8) and (3) Interpretation bias should predict memory, which is the case for both the more 
negative and false negative memory variables (Table 3.6). However, the fact that there was no 
significant relationship between interpretation bias and fear (neither NRT or FBQ) obviously 
means that memory bias as a mediator could not be tested. 
Table 3.8: Bias corrected bootstrap estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors (based on 1000 
samples) of ten independent regressions that were run with a different outcome variable each time.  
Memory 
Predictor 
Outcome B SE CI (lower) CI (upper) p R2 
Accurate NRT 
FBQ 
.75 
.03 
.88 
.07 
−.99 
−.11 
2.77 
.22 
.28 
.70 
.01 
.00 
More 
Negative 
NRT 
FBQ 
5.44 
.54** 
2.56 
.17 
1.7 
.25 
11.08 
.87 
.05 
.00 
.09 
.20 
More 
Positive 
NRT 
FBQ 
−4.53 
−.10 
2.48 
.14 
−9.10 
−.45 
1.31 
.20 
.07 
.36 
.06 
.01 
False 
Negative 
NRT 
FBQ 
4.52 
.43* 
3.26 
.15 
−1.20 
.07 
9.33 
.69 
.43 
.01 
.08 
.15 
False NRT −2.19 3.14 −9.94 2.62 .38 .01 
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Positive FBQ .07 .26 −.52 .51 .80 .00 
*p < .05, **p < .01, NRT (nature reserve), FBQ (change in fear beliefs) 
3.4 Discussion 
In contrast with Experiment 1, the current study found that trait anxiety predicted fear 
cognitions: children who are characterized by high trait anxiety became more fearful of the 
animals due to information than children who are less trait-anxious. This finding is consistent 
with what was predicted and with previous research (Field, 2006b; Field & Price-Evans, 2009), 
suggesting that high trait anxious children are more prone to the effects of verbal information 
than low trait anxious children, but what is the mechanism underlying this effect? It was 
predicted that high trait anxious children may interpret the information in a more threatening way 
(interpretation bias) thus causing them to become more fearful; however, in line with Experiment 
1, this hypothesis was not supported: whether children disambiguated the information as 
threatening or as non threatening had no significant effect on their fear beliefs or avoidance.  
Interestingly, the current study found as predicted, that children who disambiguate ambiguous 
information as threatening remember the information as being more negative than it was 
originally and remember more false negative pieces of information about the animals. The 
relationship between interpretation bias and more negative memory (but not false negative 
memory) was more pronounced for high trait anxious children than for low trait anxious children 
(the relationship between interpretation and memory is moderated by trait anxiety). Additionally 
children who remember ambiguous information as being more negative displayed more fear 
cognitions and avoidance behaviour towards the animals. These findings relate to Muris and 
Field’s (2008) model which proposed that the cognitive biases are linked and may interact with 
each other at different stages of information processing and impact on feelings of fear and 
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anxiety. In other words, distortions at an early stage of processing (e.g., encoding) increase the 
likelihood of biases at subsequent stages of processing (e.g., interpretation) (Daleiden & Vasey, 
1997).  
With regard to the cognitive rehearsal manipulation, once again contrary to predictions, it was 
found that whether children (both high and low trait anxious) cognitively rehearsed ambiguous 
information about a novel animal or were prevented from doing so did not significantly affect 
their fear beliefs or avoidance. This finding is not in line with previous research which has 
shown that thinking in an iterative style is associated with poor problem solving skills, impaired 
motivation, and inhibition of instrumental behaviour (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004, for a 
review). It is worth noting, however, that in general children were having more threat thoughts 
about the animal than positive thoughts: the mean thought severity score fell into the ‘medium 
threat’ category and the range of thoughts was small (range = 2). This suggests that there was not 
a range of positive and negative thoughts and therefore it remains unknown what the effect of 
thinking threat thoughts vs. positive thoughts about the animals would be. To investigate this 
possibility it would be necessary to manipulate the content of the children’s animal related 
thoughts, i.e. by having two groups of children: one who were instructed to think exclusively 
negative thoughts about the animals and one group who were instructed to think exclusively 
positive thoughts about the animals. This manipulation would make it possible to look at the 
effect of thinking positively vs. thinking negatively about the animals. 
An obvious limitation with the current experiment was the touch box task. The touch box used in 
both the current experiment and in Experiment 1 failed to produce analysable data. As described 
above in the results section, nearly all children were willing to put their fingers into all the holes 
along the tube leading into the animal boxes, thus producing a ceiling effect. This suggests that 
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the children were not afraid the animal inhabitants. However, this explanation seems unlikely 
due to the fact that many children expressed threat thoughts about the animal during the 
cognitive rehearsal task. A possible explanation for this ceiling effect is that maybe the children 
believed that the animal could not fit into the tube and would therefore be unable to harm them; 
they may have thought that the animal would not be able to reach its paw down the tube (the 
diameter of the tube was approximately 8 cm). Alternatively, the children may have imagined the 
animals to be extremely small and therefore able to crawl down the tube but would be too small 
to cause any harm- an estimation of the size of the animals was not given to the children. 
Another possibility is that because the children were told in the ambiguous information that the 
animals are nocturnal, they may have thought that the animals would be asleep and that simply 
putting their finger into a hole a long way from the animal’s bed would not be enough to wake 
them. In any case it would be necessary to adapt this task for future experiments by perhaps 
removing the tube leading from the animal boxes and instructing the children to place their hand 
directly into the animal box.  
Another limitation of the first two experiments was that physiological fear responses were not 
measured. Lang (1968) famously conceptualized anxiety as three response systems: language 
behaviour (as measured by the FBQ), overt behaviour, such as behavioural avoidance (as 
measured by the Nature reserve task and behavioural avoidance task) and physiological 
responses. It would therefore be beneficial for future experiments to include a measure of the 
children’s physiological responses by for example measuring heart rate whilst approaching the 
animal boxes. 
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4 Experiment 3: The Effect of Positive vs. Negative Cognitive Rehearsal 
4.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 2 high trait anxious children became more fearful of the animals due to the verbal 
information but this relationship was not mediated by interpretation bias nor was it moderated by 
manipulating cognitive rehearsal. Additionally, whether children (both high and low trait 
anxious) cognitively rehearsed ambiguous information about a novel animal or were prevented 
from doing so did not significantly affect their fear beliefs or avoidance. This finding suggests 
that cognitive rehearsal of information had no significant effect on fear; however, Experiment 2, 
did not take into account the content of children’s thoughts. It appears that in general children 
were having more threat thoughts about the animal than positive thoughts: the mean thought 
severity score fell into the ‘medium threat’ category and the range of thoughts was small (range 
= 2). These data suggest that there was not a wide range of positive and negative thoughts and 
consequently the effect of thinking threat thoughts about the animals compared to thinking 
positive thoughts remains unknown. There is substantial evidence that the valence of thought 
content is a key factor in determining whether cognitive rehearsal will be constructive or 
unconstructive. For example, Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, and Shortridge (2003) found that 
negative cognitive rehearsal was related to a poorer level of general mental health, greater 
anxiety, and greater physical symptoms. In a large meta-analysis, Mor and Winquist (2002) 
discovered a strong association between focus on negative self-aspects and increased levels of 
negative affect, whereas focus on positive self-aspects was related to lower levels of negative 
affect. This research has shown that the process of cognitive rehearsal itself is not detrimental to 
mental health unless the nature of these thoughts is negative or threatening. 
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Experiments 1 and 2 have collectively shown that both high and low trait anxious children are 
equally as likely to cognitively rehearse ambiguous information and the severity of their thoughts 
does not significantly affect their fear. However, because the majority of children in these 
experiments had only mild threat thoughts, the effect of severe threat thoughts compared to 
severe positive thoughts remains unknown; we would expect that, based on Mor and Winquist’s 
(2002) meta-analysis, cognitive rehearsal about threat should create anxiety.   
Also, it is possible that if children were more varied in their thought content during the cognitive 
rehearsal task (e.g., if some children had positive thoughts and some had negative thoughts) then 
an effect of cognitive rehearsal on fear would have been found. The current experiment aims to 
explore this idea by experimentally manipulating thinking about ambiguous information in a 
positive way relative to a negative way by explicitly asking children to either think positively or 
negatively about the animals. This manipulation will allow us to obtain greater variability in 
thought severity scores during the cognitive rehearsal task and by manipulating the content of 
thoughts, it is possible to say something about the causal relationship between positive vs. 
negative thinking and fear. Based on the aforementioned research it was predicted that negative 
cognitive rehearsal would increase fear whereas positive cognitive rehearsal would reduce fear 
and this effect would vary as a function of trait anxiety.  
In Experiments 1 and 2, only two of Lang’s (1968) three fear response systems were measured, 
namely language behaviour and overt behaviour. The third fear response, physiological arousal, 
was not measured. Given the well-documented finding that the three fear response systems are 
not necessarily synchronous (Hodgson & Rachman, 1974; Lang, Melamed &Heart, 1970; 
Rachman & Hodgson, 1974; Zinbarg, 1998) it cannot be assumed that physiological responses 
would be affected in the same way as fear cognitions and avoidance behaviour. Therefore, all 
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three fear response systems will be measured in the current experiment. Language behaviour and 
overt behaviour will be measured in the same way as in the previous experiments and 
physiological arousal will be measured in the form of heart rate when the children are asked to 
approach the animals. Heart rate was chosen because it has been found to be a useful indicator of 
physiological arousal in child samples in previous experiments (Field & Schorah, 2007; Weems, 
Zakem, Costa, Cannon, & Watts, 2005). If verbal information has an effect on the physiological 
component of the fear emotion, then we would expect children’s heart rate to increase when 
approaching animals about which they have heard ambiguous information. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 has five main hypotheses, which differ only with 
regards to cognitive rehearsal: (1) Replicating Field (2006b), children who are more trait 
anxious, relative to children who are less trait anxious, would become more fearful of a novel 
animal after hearing some ambiguous information about it. (2) Because children who are more 
trait anxious have been found to disambiguate ambiguous information as more threatening 
(Field, 2006b), the relationship between trait anxiety and fear should be mediated by 
interpretation bias in other words, children who are more trait anxious would interpret the 
information as being more threatening and therefore become more fearful of the animals. (3) 
Negative cognitive rehearsal should increase fear, whereas positive cognitive rehearsal would 
reduce fear and this effect would vary as a function of trait anxiety. (4) Children who 
disambiguate the verbal information in a threatening way (interpretation bias) would 
subsequently encode the information more negatively into memory and therefore show a 
memory bias for the information and this relationship would be moderated by trait anxiety. (In 
other words, the relationship between interpretation and memory would be stronger for highly 
trait anxious children than for less trait anxious children.) (5) Finally it is predicted that memory 
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will mediate the relationship between interpretation bias and fear: children who interpret the 
information as being more threatening would also encode the information as being more 
threatening into memory which would lead to them becoming more fearful of the animals. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Design 
As in the previous experiments, two Australian marsupials were used in the current experiment: 
a quoll and a cuscus. Information was manipulated so that children heard some ambiguous 
information about one of the animals and no information about the other animal 
(counterbalanced across groups). Cognitive rehearsal was manipulated by asking children to 
think of either all the possible ‘good’ or ‘bad’ things that could happen to them when they put 
their hand in the box containing one of two animals (counterbalanced across groups). 
The children’s thoughts were subsequently scored for severity, which could range from (severe  
negative thought) to 5 (severe positive thought). The outcome variables, as in Experiments 1 and 
2, were: fear beliefs (Fear Beliefs Questionnaire, FBQ) and avoidance (Nature Reserve Task, 
NRT) both measured before and after the information was given and after the cognitive rehearsal 
phases of the experiment; behavioural avoidance (measured using a Behavioural Approach 
Task), memory of the information (measured using a free recall task and prompted memory 
questions), and interpretation of the ambiguous information (measured using both forced choice 
and free response questions). Trait anxiety was measured as a predictor using the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory for Children, STAI-C (Speilberger, 1973). 
4.2.2 Ethical Issues 
Ethical approval was obtained by the University of Sussex School of Life Sciences ethics 
committee (see appendix F). The experiment ran on a strict ‘opt- in’ only basis and children were 
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told at the start of the experiment that they could withdraw from the experiment at anytime. At 
the end of the experiment all children were fully debriefed. 
4.2.3 Participants 
Seventy-eight children (23 boys, 55 girls) between the ages of 8 and 11 years (M = 123.33 
months, SD = 10.29) took part. This age range was chosen because normative fears are focused 
on animals during this period (Field &Davey, 2001). Forty children were instructed to think 
about all the possible ‘bad’ things that could happen to them when they approach the animal 
boxes and put their hands in (26 girls and 14 boys) and 38 children were instructed to think of all 
the possible ‘good’ things that could happen when they approach the animal in the impending 
approach task (9 boys and 29 girls). 
The children were enrolled from a school in West Sussex, U.K. Most pupils attending the school 
were from white British backgrounds and nearly all speak English as their home language. 
Parents were sent letters (see appendix A) describing the procedures implicated in the 
experiment (but not the main purpose) along with a consent form (See appendix B) to return to 
the school if they would like their child to participate (the experiment ran strictly on an opt-in 
basis). Two hundred and thirty children were invited to participate, giving a response rate of 
34%. On arrival to the experiment, children were reminded that they could withdraw at anytime.  
4.2.4 Cognitive Rehearsal 
In Experiment 3 a variation of the cognitive rehearsal task was used to explore the effect(s) of 
manipulating thinking about ambiguous information in a positive relative to a negative way. 
Specifically, after hearing the ambiguous information, half of the children were instructed to 
think about all the possible ‘good’ outcomes of putting their hand in the animal box and half of 
the children were instructed to think of all the possible ‘bad’ outcomes of putting their hand in 
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the box. After 15 seconds, children in both groups were prompted to tell the experimenter what 
they had been thinking and their responses were audio recorded. The children were then asked to 
carry on thinking (either negatively or positively depending on the condition to which they were 
allocated) for a further 15 seconds before being asked to again tell the experimenter what they 
had been thinking. This procedure was repeated a further two more times (4 times in total) and 
all responses were audio recorded for later coding.  
4.2.5 Behavioural Approach Task 
Due to the fact that in Experiments 1 and 2 almost every child was willing to put their finger into 
every hole of the animal box thus producing a ceiling effect that rendered the data unusable, it 
was concluded that this task was not a valid measure of avoidance behaviour. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3, this task was modified to resemble tasks used successfully in previous 
experiments (e.g., Field &Lawson, 2003). Specifically, the tube protruding from the pet carriers 
was removed and the entrance of the pet carriers was covered with a piece of fabric so that the 
child could put their hand in but could not see inside. As in Experiment 1, participants were told 
that the box contained an animal about which they had heard some information. The latency to 
place their hand into the box was used a measure of behavioural avoidance (Field &Lawson, 
2003).  
4.2.6 Heart rate 
Heart rate was measured using a Cat Eye PL-6000 heart rate monitor, which has been 
successfully used in previous experiments with children (Field & Price-Evans, 2009). This 
monitor incorporates a sensor in a small non-invasive clip that could be fitted by the 
experimenter onto the child’s ear lobe. The device was programmed to record the average heart 
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rate over a 15 second period whilst the child completed the behavioural approach task to provide 
a physiological measure of fear. 
4.2.7 Ethical Issues 
Ethical approval was obtained by the University of Sussex School of Life Sciences ethics 
committee (see appendix F). The experiment ran on a strict ‘opt- in’ only basis and children were 
told at the start of the experiment that they could withdraw from the experiment at anytime. At 
the end of the experiment all children were fully debriefed. 
4.2.8 Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiments 1 and 2 except for a few 
alterations. For instance, after hearing the ambiguous information, the experimenter told the 
children ‘In a few moments you are going to approach the animal boxes one at a time and place 
your hand inside and stroke the animals, but for now I would like you to sit quietly and think 
about all the possible ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (depending on which condition they were assigned to) 
outcomes of putting your hand in the animal boxes’. After 15 seconds, children in both groups 
were prompted to tell the experimenter what they had been thinking and their responses were 
audio recorded, this process was repeated four times so that children were thinking for a total of 
one minute. The procedure for the touch box task was also adapted in this experiment (see 
above), however the task was still completed at the same time point in the experiment as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. In the present experiment, the touch box task was administered to assess 
the children’s heart rate as a measure of their anxiety. The task began with the experimenter 
clipping the heart rate monitor gently onto the child’s ear. The children were then stood 
approximately 1 meter in front of the boxes and were instructed to approach the first box and 
place their hand into the hole in the front of the box and stroke the animal inside. After the child 
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had placed their hand in the box for 3 seconds, the examiner instructed them to withdraw their 
hand and return to the starting point. The mean heart rate during the time it took for the child to 
approach the box and put their hand inside was recorded. If the child had not put their hand into 
the box after 15 seconds, it was assumed that they did not want to approach the animal and the 
examiner instructed them to proceed to the next box. The child was then instructed to approach 
the second animal box and the average heart rate during the time it took them to approach the 
box and place their hand in was recorded; again, if the child had not approached the box within 
15 seconds, it was assumed that they did not want to do the task and the experimenter proceeded 
onto the next task. This procedure follows that of previous experiments (e.g., Field & Schorah, 
2006; Field &Price-Evans, 2009). 
Fear beliefs, avoidance, memory and interpretations were all measured in the same way as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
4.2.9 Coding 
The severity of children’s thoughts, their interpretations and memory data were all coded by the 
experimenter and a sample of 20 data sets were second coded by an independent undergraduate 
Psychology student. 
Inter-rater reliability: The inter-rater reliabilities were high and significant for the ‘severity of 
animal related thoughts’ in the cognitive rehearsal task, Cohen’s κ = .87, p < .001, the 
interpretation of ambiguous information, κ = .79, p < .001,the prompted recall memory 
questions, κ = .77, p < .001, and the free recall memory task, κ = .70, p < .001. As in Experiment 
1 and 2, inter-rater reliability was not measured for ‘false memories’ in the free recall task 
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because in the sample of 10 children whose data were second coded, there were too few false 
memories reported.  
Internal consistency data for Fear beliefs questionnaire, FBQ: The internal consistencies for the 
FBQ in the current sample were high and consistent with values across several previous studies 
(see Field, 2006b) and also with Experiments 1 and 2: before information: α = .78 (cuscus 
subscale) and α = .75 (quoll subscale); and after information, α = .91 (cuscus subscale) and α = 
.87 (quoll subscale). 
Internal Consistency data for The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children: The STAI-C was 
found to have high reliability in the current sample, α = .81. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Initial Analysis 
Interpretation bias data: As in Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that the scores for the open 
response and forced choice interpretation questions were highly correlated, bias corrected 
bootstrapped Pearson’s r = .40, p < .001 (two-tailed) and so the average of the open response and 
forced choice scores for each child was used as the measure of interpretation bias.  
Positive vs. negative thinking manipulation: An independent samples t-test (based on 1000 
bootstrap samples) was conducted to compare the thought severity scores of the negative and 
positive thinking conditions. A significant difference in severity scores was found for the 
negative (M = 3.40, SD = 0.59) and positive (M = 1.02, SD = 0.56) thinking conditions; t(74) = 
18.11, p < .01 (severity scores could range from 0, indicating a very negative thought to 5, 
indicating a very negative positive). This finding shows that the cognitive rehearsal manipulation 
was successful in creating either more positive or more negative thoughts in the children. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of all the main variables  
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
STAI-C 78 22 54 36.37 7.03 
FBQ 78 −1.63 2.88 .13 .83 
NRT 78 −27.00 32.00 2.61 9.29 
IB 78 1.00 14.00 6.09 3.05 
False positive Memory 78 0.00 1.00 .08 .21 
False Negative memory 78 0.00 1.50 29 .45 
More negative memory 78 0.00 3.00 .39 .66 
Accurate memory 78 0.00 8.50 3.54 1.83 
More Positive memory 78 0.00 1.50 .29 .40 
CR 76 0.00 4.50 2.18 1.33 
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Table 4.2: Bias corrected bootstrap Pearson correlation coefficients and their Confidence Intervals (based on 1000 
samples) for all main variables.  
Variables Pearson Correlation CI (Lower, Upper) 
STAI−C   FBQ 
NRT 
IB 
CR  
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
 
.01 
.10 
.15 
.09 
−.17 
.12 
−.05 
−.03 
.10 
−.24, .27 
−.12, .33 
−.08, .38 
−.13, .31 
−.45, .13 
−.07, .35 
−.28, .15 
−.28, .20 
−.12, .33 
FBQ NRT 
IB 
CR  
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.58** 
.20 
.04 
−.03 
−.04 
.07 
.07 
.17 
.38, .73 
−.04, .44 
−.18, .25 
−.24, .18 
−.24, .13 
−.13, .27 
−.14, .29 
−.07, .39 
NRT IB 
CR  
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.13 
.03 
−.11 
−.21 
.04 
.08 
.08 
−.14, .38 
−.17, .23 
−.28, .06 
−.42, .02 
−.18, .25 
−.18, .30 
−.12, .26 
IB CR  
False Negative 
False Positive 
More Negative 
Accurate 
More Positive 
−.18 
.34** 
−.13 
.10 
−.13 
−.14 
−.39, .08 
.08, .54 
−.34, .13 
−.13, .31 
−.34, .10 
−.31, .07 
CR  False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
−.21 
.07 
−.06 
−.07 
−.04 
−.41, .04 
−.11, .21 
−.28, .19 
−.28, .15 
−.25, .17 
False Negative Memory False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
−.03 
−.14 
−.26* 
−.13 
−.16, .13 
−.28, .03 
−.42, −.07 
−.29, .04 
False Positive Memory More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
−.10 
−.17 
.07 
−.21, .04 
−.31, −.06 
−.14, .25 
More Negative Memory Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
 
−.01 
−.11 
−.20, .23 
−.30, .12 
Accurate Memory More Positive Memory 
 
.41** .16, .62 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Analysis: Analyses were conducted by performing simple regressions unless stated otherwise. 
The estimates of the regression coefficients and their standard errors were bias corrected based 
on 1000 bootstrap samples.  
4.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Trait anxiety should predict fear 
In line with the findings from Experiment 1, but contrary to expectations and Experiment 2, trait 
anxiety did not significantly predict fear beliefs or avoidance due to information (Table 4.3).  
4.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Interpretation bias should mediate the relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear. 
Because no significant relationship was found between trait anxiety and fear (see hypothesis 1) 
this relationship could not be tested. 
4.3.4 Hypothesis 3: Cognitive rehearsal should mediate the relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear. 
As with hypothesis 2, due to the fact that a significant relationship between trait anxiety and fear 
was not found, this relationship could not be tested. Indeed, trait anxiety was not found to predict 
interpretation bias or severity of thoughts during the cognitive rehearsal task significantly (Table 
4.3) and similarly, cognitive rehearsal did not significantly predict fear beliefs or avoidance 
(Table 4.3) indicating that whether a child had severe negative animal related thoughts or severe 
positive thoughts had no significant bearing on how fearful of the animals they became. Also 
surprising was that interpretation bias did not significantly predict fear: whether children 
interpreted the information as threatening or as not threatening was not predictive of how fearful 
of the animals they would be (Table 4.3). Additionally, and once again contrary to expectations, 
trait anxiety did not significantly predict increased heart rate when approaching the animal boxes 
or time to approach the animal boxes (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Bias-corrected regression coefficient estimates and their standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples. 
Predictor Outcome b SE CI 
(lower) 
CI 
(upper) 
P     R2 
STAI-C FBQ .00 .01 −.02 .03 .90 .00 
 NRT .12 .14 −.16 .39 .38 .01 
 IB .08 .05 −.02 .18 .11 .03 
 CR −.02 .02 −.06 .02 .37 .01 
 Touch box .01 .04 −.07 .09 .91 .00 
 Heart rate −.13 .27 −.63 .44 .62 .00 
IB FBQ .05 .04 −.01 .13 .19 .04 
 NRT .24 .41 −.48 1.15 .63 .01 
 Touch box  .09 .08 −.03 .26 .24 .02 
 Heart rate .13 .66 −1.26 1.36 .87 .00 
CR FBQ −.03 .07 −.17 .13 .72 .00 
 NRT −.20 .74 −1.68 1.27 .79 .00 
 Touch box .30 .18 −.01 .67 .11 .04 
 Heart rate −.89 1.52 −3.91 2.12 .54 .01 
 
4.3.5 Hypothesis 4: Interpretation Bias should predict Memory Bias and this relationship 
should be moderated by trait anxiety 
In line with Experiment 2, interpretation bias was found to significantly predict false negative 
memory (Table 4.4). However, unlike in Experiment 2, interpretation bias did not significantly 
predict the number of more negative memories. It was predicted in hypothesis 4 that trait anxiety 
would moderate the relationship between interpretation bias and biased memory; in other words, 
trait anxiety would exacerbate the relationship between interpretation bias and biased memory. 
This was tested as in Experiment 2 by predicting false negative memory from trait anxiety, 
interpretation bias and the interaction between trait anxiety and interpretation bias (Table 4.5). 
The regressions included IB, STAIC and also their interaction term (to test for moderation). The 
IB and STAIC predictors were centred before computing their interaction term. Table 4.5 shows 
that interpretation bias has a significant positive relationship with false negative memory but this 
relationship is not significantly moderated by trait anxiety. Therefore, children who interpret 
ambiguous information as threatening will encode more false negative information into memory 
regardless of levels of trait anxiety. 
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Table 4.4: Bias-corrected regression coefficient estimates and their standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples. 
Predictor Memory 
Outcome 
b SE CI (lower) CI (upper) p R2 
IB Accurate  −.07 .07 −.21 .06 .30 .02 
 More 
negative 
.02 .03 −.03 .08 .59 .01 
 More 
positive 
−.02 .01 −.04 .01 .10 .02 
 False 
negative 
.04* .02 .01 .07 .03 .08 
 False 
positive 
−.01 .01 −.03 .01 .20 .02 
*p < .05 
4.3.6 Hypothesis 5: Memory should mediate the relationship between interpretation bias 
and fear 
Hypothesis 5 stated that memory should mediate the relationship between interpretation bias and 
fear. However in line with Experiments 1 and 2, no significant relationship was found between 
interpretation bias and fear and therefore this hypothesis could not be tested (Table 4.3). 
Unexpectedly, biased memory did not significantly predict any of the fear responses, yet 
accurate memory had a significant positive relationship with time to approach the touch box, 
(Table 4.6). This finding is not in line with Experiment 1, which found that false positive 
memories were negatively related to change in fear beliefs, or Experiment 2, which found that 
both the false negative and more negative memory variables were positively related with change 
in fear beliefs due to information. 
Table 4.5: Bias-corrected regression coefficient estimates and their standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples. The outcome variable: False negative memory. 
Predictor b SE   CI    
(lower) 
   CI 
(upper) 
p R2 
STAI-C −.02 .01 −.03 −.00 .12 .14 
IB .05* .02 .02 .07 .02  
STAIC*IB −.00 .00 −.01 .01 .80  
*p < .05 
106 
 
Table 4.6: Bias−corrected regression coefficient estimates and their standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples 
Memory 
Predictor 
Outcome b SE   CI 
(lower) 
CI (upper) p R2 
Accurate NRT .44 .59 −.74 1.68 .46 .01 
 FBQ .03 .05 −.06 .14 .57 .01 
 Touch box .15* .09 −.02 .35 .03 .02 
 Heart rate 1.07 1.14 −1.05 3.50 .41 .01 
More 
Negative 
NRT 
FBQ 
Touch box 
Heart rate 
.63 
.29 
−4.50 
1.66 
1.55 
.13 
.29 
2.86 
−2.50 
−.16 
−.35 
−10.23 
3.20 
.30 
.86 
2.57 
 
.65 
.40 
.21 
.09 
.00 
.01 
.01 
.03 
More 
Positive 
NRT 
FBQ 
Touch box 
Heart rate 
1.66 
.34 
.62 
6.21 
2.21 
.22 
.55 
5.14 
−2.73 
−.07 
−.49 
−3.25 
6.53 
.78 
1.65 
16.66 
.36 
.09 
.25 
.19 
.01 
.03 
.02 
.02 
False 
Negative 
NRT 
FBQ 
Touch box 
Heart rate 
−2.15 
−.05 
.38 
2.35 
1.99 
.22 
.41 
4.08 
−6.38 
−.47 
−.36 
−5.78 
2.11 
.35 
1.12 
9.62 
.19 
.82 
.24 
.51 
.01 
.00 
.01 
.00 
False 
positive 
NRT 
FBQ 
Touch box 
Heart rate 
−8.88 
.14 
−.89 
2.93 
5.92 
.10 
1.08 
13.30 
−23.13 
−.05 
−3.41 
−29.48 
.10 
.35 
.61 
19.32 
.17 
.17 
.35 
.85 
.04 
.00 
.01 
.00 
*p < .05 
4.4 Discussion 
Contrary to what was expected, but in line with Experiment 1, the present study indicates that 
high levels of trait anxiety did not significantly predict change in any of Lang’s (1968) three 
response systems of the fear emotion in children: avoidance behaviour, fear cognitions and 
physiological arousal. This finding is inconsistent with Experiment 2 in which it was found that 
children who were more trait anxious became more fearful and avoidant of the animals due to the 
information provided. The current finding is also inconsistent with previous research (e.g., Field, 
2006b; Field & Price-Evans, 2009) showing that trait anxiety moderates the effect of threat 
information on fear. In these studies, children high on trait anxiety showed greater avoidance and 
attentional bias towards previously novel animals after experiencing verbal information. 
However, as also noted in the discussion of Experiment 1, Field (2006b) and Field and Price-
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Evans (2009) used threat information whereas ambiguous information was used in the current 
study, which could explains this inconsistency; however, this observation does not explain why a 
significant result was found in Experiment 2.  
Nevertheless, we predicted that anxious children should interpret the ambiguous information in a 
more threatening way and this did not appear to be the case in any of the three experiments. This 
finding is not only inconsistent with what was predicted but also with a growing body of research 
which has demonstrated that high trait anxious children do show a tendency for interpreting 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Bögels & Zigterman, 2000; Hadwin et al., 1997; Muris, 
Merckelbach et al., 2000; Muris & van Doorn, 2003; Taghavi et al., 2000; Lester, et al., 2010). 
Additionally, this finding is inconsistent with the adult literature, which has found considerable 
evidence that high trait anxious and individuals with anxiety disorders show a disproportionate 
tendency to interpret ambiguous cues as threatening (e.g. Beck et al., 1985; Eysenck, 1997; 
Mogg& Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). 
As predicted, children who disambiguated the information as threatening encoded more false 
negative pieces of information into memory; this relationship was also found in Experiment 2 but 
not in Experiment 1. Contrary to our predictions, but consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, this 
relationship was not moderated by trait anxiety. However, in Experiment 2 but not in the current 
experiment, children who interpreted the information as threatening encoded the information into 
memory as being more negative (as well as remembering false negative information) than it was 
originally and this relationship was moderated by trait anxiety.  
It was hypothesized that biased memory would predict an increase in all three of Lang’s (1968) 
fear response systems yet this was not found to be the case for any of the fear responses. What 
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was found however was that accurate memory recall predicted greater behavioural avoidance in 
the form of a greater latency to approach the animal box. These findings are inconsistent with 
Experiment 1, which found that a greater number of false positive memories predicted a decrease 
in fear beliefs, and Experiment 2, which found that children who remembered the information as 
being more negative than it was originally had more fear cognitions about the animals.  
The present findings indicate that the content of the children’s thoughts during the cognitive 
rehearsal task had no significant impact on their levels of fear or avoidance. In other words, 
whether a child had severe negative animal-related thoughts or severe positive animal-related 
thoughts had no significant bearing on how fearful of the animals they became. These findings 
are surprising due to a large body of evidence in adults indicating that the valence of thought 
content is a key factor in shaping whether cognitive rehearsal will have a positive or negative 
effect on the mental health of the individual.  For example, Segerstrom et al. (2003) have found 
that a more negative content of thoughts during cognitive rehearsal is related to greater anxiety 
levels and a larger number of physical symptoms. Martin and Tesser (1996) recognized that 
cognitive rehearsal contains several subclasses or modes, including repetitive thought about 
positive content or about negative content, suggesting that content of thoughts during cognitive 
rehearsal are not just negative. Moreover, in a large meta-analysis of the self-focus literature it 
was found that attention to negative aspects of the self was strongly associated with a greater 
degree of negative affect, whereas attention to positive aspects of the self was associated with 
lower levels of negative affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Thus, the valence of thought content 
during cognitive rehearsal appears to be a major determinant of whether cognitive rehearsal has 
constructive or unconstructive consequences. However, this was not found to be the case in the 
current experiment.  
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It was also predicted that the effect of positive vs. negative cognitive rehearsal on fear would 
vary as a function of trait anxiety although this was not found to be the case. This result is 
inconsistent with past research on adults: for example, Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) 
found that mildly-to-moderately depressed individuals became significantly more depressed after 
an 8 minute cognitive rehearsal task and significantly less depressed after an 8 minute distraction 
task whereas the mood of non-depressed participants was not significantly affected by cognitive 
rehearsal or distraction. Our failure to find a significant effect of cognitive rehearsal on anxiety 
could be partly due to the fact that the current experiment used children whereas the 
aforementioned studies used adults. For example, our children may not yet have reached the 
level of cognitive development necessary for the process of cognitive rehearsal to have an impact 
on fear. However, this explanation seems unlikely due to the fact that the children used in the 
current study were 8-11 years old and research has shown that anxious youth of this age 
frequently present with anxiety disorders and express a tendency to cognitively rehearse possible 
negative outcomes and feared events (Comer et al., 2004). Additionally, there is evidence which 
suggests that children may be capable of engaging in an adult-like worry process as young as 7 
or 8 years of age (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994; Bacow, Pincus, Ehrenreich & Brody, 2009), and that 
this ability to worry is linked to the developing meta-cognitive understanding that children in this 
age range possess (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & van den 
Brand, 2002). In fact, meta-cognitive knowledge about strategies and tasks is thought to come 
about once children start school, and is possibly linked to the onset of the concrete operational 
stage which usually emerges in children at age 7 (Piaget, 1970). 
An alternative explanation might be that because children were asked to think of all the possible 
good or bad (depending on the group to which they were assigned) things that could happen to 
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them when they approached the animal box, their answers may not have been a true reflection of 
how they actually felt about the animals or what they really believed would happen when they 
approached the animals. Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (1999) have indicated that a repetitive style 
of thinking appears to be a stable individual difference characteristic, which has been 
hypothesized to be learnt in childhood, either because it was modelled by parents who 
themselves had a passive coping style (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Mumme, 
Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or because the child failed to learn more active coping strategies for 
negative affect as a consequence of overcritical, intrusive, and over controlling parents (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1995). It is feasible then that the children in the current sample had already 
developed active coping strategies as modelled by their parents, which may have protected them 
from the effects of cognitively rehearsing possible negative outcomes with the animals. Another 
possibility, based on the aforementioned research is that to have any effect on fear, the process of 
cognitive rehearsal needs to be learned over a longer period of time. For example, children in the 
current experiment cognitively rehearsed for only one minute and this was broken down into four 
sets of 15 seconds each whereas participants in Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) cognitively 
rehearsed for a solid period of 8 minutes. Future experiments with children could extend the 
length of the cognitive rehearsal task to a period of 8 minutes or perhaps look at the effect of 
cognitive rehearsal manipulation over a period of multiple sessions. Future work also needs to 
look at cognitive rehearsal longitudinally, which would provide a better understanding of the 
natural development of cognitive rehearsal in children over time. 
Although Experiments 1, 2 and 3 have produced some consistent findings, there have also been 
many inconsistent results amongst them leading to confusion as to what the true effects might be. 
Due to the fact that all three experiments employed very similar procedures with the only 
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variation between them being the cognitive rehearsal task, it would be beneficial to combine 
these data to produce a larger sample (N =187). Larger samples are more representative of the 
population and add precision to the regression coefficient estimates thus providing a more 
accurate picture of the true relationships between the variables measured across the three 
experiments.
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5 Analysis of Combined Data From Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 found fairly inconsistent results; it is possible that some of these 
inconsistencies are due to the relatively small sample sizes of each individual experiment. For 
example, estimates of population statistics tend to fluctuate more in smaller samples than larger 
ones (Field, 2009). Larger samples also provide greater statistical power; for example, with a 
sample of 55, the previous experiments would have had the power to detect only medium to 
large effects (Field, 2009). It was therefore decided to combine data from all three experiments 
to produce a relatively large data set (N = 187), which would generate parameter estimates that 
are more precise and representative of the population. Combining the data was made possible by 
the fact that the designs of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 were virtually identical, the only difference 
among them being that they each looked at a different variation of the cognitive rehearsal 
manipulation. Although the cognitive rehearsal manipulation was slightly different in each 
experiment, it was possible to combine these data because the methods for scoring and coding 
the severity of thoughts were comparable across the three studies. 
As in Experiments 1, 2 and three, there are five main hypotheses: (1) Replicating Field (2006b), 
children who are more trait anxious, relative to children who are less trait anxious, would 
become more fearful of a novel animal after hearing some ambiguous information about it. (2) 
Because children who are more trait anxious have been found to disambiguate ambiguous 
information as more threatening (Field, 2006b), the relationship between trait anxiety and fear 
should be mediated by interpretation bias in other words, children who are more trait anxious 
would interpret the information as being more threatening and therefore become more fearful of 
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the animals. (3) The relationship between trait anxiety and fear should also be mediated by how 
children think about the information: children who are more trait anxious are predicted to 
cognitively rehearse the ambiguous information and in doing so derive a more negative meaning 
from it, leading them to become more fearful of the animals. (4) Children who disambiguate the 
verbal information in a threatening way (interpretation bias) would subsequently encode the 
information more negatively into memory and therefore show a memory bias for the information 
and this relationship would be moderated by trait anxiety. (In other words, the relationship 
between interpretation and memory would be stronger for highly trait anxious children than for 
less trait anxious children.) (5) Finally it is predicted that memory will mediate the relationship 
between interpretation bias and fear: children who interpret the information as being more 
threatening would also encode the information as being more threatening into memory which 
would lead to them becoming more fearful of the animals. 
5.2 Method 
The data from participants in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 were combined into one data set producing 
a sample size of (N=187). The combined sample consisted of 71 boys and 116 girls between the 
ages of 8 and 11 years (M = 120.82 months, SD = 10.53). As mentioned above, it was possible to 
combine the cognitive rehearsal data from the three experiments even though the cognitive 
rehearsal manipulation was slightly different in each experiment because the methods for scoring 
and coding the severity of thoughts were kept constant across the three studies. Therefore, in the 
current analyses the cognitive rehearsal variable represents the children’s mean thought severity 
score (severity of animal thought − severity of non-animal thought). 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Initial Analysis 
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Measures of Fear (NRT and FBQ): It was found that the NRT and FBQ scores were highly 
correlated; r = .44, p <  .001and because the sample size was fairly large (N= 187) it was decided 
to combine these variables to create a latent variable ‘Fear’. Figure 5.1 illustrates the general 
model that was used when analyzing ‘fear’ (unless otherwise stated). The box labelled 
‘predictor’ was replaced with a different variable each time the analysis was run. The regression 
parameters and standard errors (and, therefore, confidence intervals) were bias-corrected based 
on 1000 bootstrap samples. All analyses were run in AMOS 16. When a latent variable was not 
used, for example for the memory data, detailed descriptions of the analysis that was used will be 
provided. 
Figure 5.1: a path diagram showing how the latent variable ‘fear’ was created from the NRT and FBQ variables. 
Memory Variables: A principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 10 memory 
variables with orthogonal rotation (varimax). An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues 
for each component in the data. Five components had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 
and in combination explained 68.52% of the variance. Table 5.1 shows the factor loadings after 
rotation. The result was five factors that related very clearly to: accurate, more positive, more 
negative, false positive and false negative memories. Each component had two variables that 
loaded onto it: the free and prompted versions. Therefore, as mentioned in Chapter 2, five new 
ε 
Fear 
FBQ 
NRT 
ε λ 
ε 
Predictor 
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variables were created for use in all of the analyses in this and previous chapters. These variables 
were created by taking the average of the free and prompted recall memory variables, the 
resulting memory variables were: accurate, more negative, more positive, false negative and 
false positive memories. 
Table 5.1: Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for the 10 memory variables. 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
 
Memory Variable 
Accurate  More 
Negative  
False 
Negative  
More 
Positive  
False 
positive  
Prompted recall Accurate .83     
Free recall Accurate 
 
.82     
Prompted recall More negative  .86    
Free recall More Negative 
 
 .85    
 
Prompted recall False Negative 
   
.78 
  
 
Free recall False Negative 
   
.76 
  
 
Prompted recall More positive 
    
.85 
 
 
Free recall More Positive 
    
.71 
 
 
Prompted recall False Positive 
     
.84 
 
Free recall False Positive 
     
.56 
 
Eigenvalues 
 
1.88 
 
1.50 
 
1.25 
 
1.16 
 
1.06 
 
% of variance 
 
18.77 
 
14.96 
 
12.55 
 
11.62 
 
10.62 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of all the main variables  
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
STAI-C 187 22 54 36.53 6.87 
FBQ Effect 187 −1.63 4.13 .26 .86 
NRT Effect 187 −43.00 62.00 2.76 12.80 
Interpretation Bias 187 .00 14.00 5.15 2.94 
CR 136 .00 5.00 3.22 1.19 
False Positive Memory  187 .00 2.00 .16 .36 
False Negative Memory 187 .00 3.00 .34 .55 
More Negative Memory 187 .00 3.00 .49 .64 
Accurate Memory 187 .00 8.50 3.13 1.69 
More Positive Memory 187 .00 3.00 .58 .60 
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Table 5.3: Bias corrected bootstrap Pearson correlation coefficients and their Confidence Intervals (based on 1000 
samples) for all main variables 
Variables Pearson Correlation CI (Lower, Upper) 
STAI-C   FBQ 
NRT 
IB 
CR 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.11 
.09 
.08 
−.02 
−.09 
.08 
.00 
−.05 
.03 
−.05, .27 
−.05, .24 
−.09, .25 
−.09, .25 
−.17, .15 
−.25, .06 
−.17, .18 
−.21, .10 
−.11, .18 
FBQ NRT 
IB 
CR 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.44** 
.21** 
−.11 
.12 
−.05 
.10 
.04 
.18* 
.22, .62 
.02, .38 
−.26, .04 
−.07, .29 
−.17, .12 
−.07, .27 
−.12, .21 
.04, .33 
NRT IB 
CR 
False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.13 
−.06 
−.08 
−.20* 
.05 
.03 
.00 
−.03, .32 
−.22, .11 
−.22, .06 
−.43, .04 
−.09, .18 
−.13, .18 
−.15, .16 
IB CR 
False Negative 
False Positive 
More Negative 
Accurate 
More Positive 
−.23** 
.26** 
−.13 
.08 
−.06 
−.28** 
−.37, −.08 
.09, .42 
−.27, .02 
−.08, .22 
−.21, .10 
−.42, −.13 
CR False Negative Memory 
False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
−.19* 
.05 
−.10 
.00 
.10 
−.32, −.03 
−.15, .25 
−.27, .07 
−.16, .16 
−.06, .25 
False Negative Memory False Positive Memory 
More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
−.02 
−.04 
−.14 
−.01 
−.15, .13 
−.18, .12 
−.26, .02 
−.14, .13 
False Positive Memory More Negative Memory 
Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.05 
−.18* 
.00 
−.11, .23 
−.28, −.05 
−.15, .18 
More Negative Memory Accurate Memory 
More Positive Memory 
.08 
−.03 
−.07, .23 
−.16, .14 
Accurate Memory More Positive Memory 
 
.19* .05, .31 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Analysis: Analyses were conducted by performing regressions unless stated otherwise. The 
estimates and their standard errors of the regression coefficients were bias corrected bootstrapped 
based on 1000 samples. 
5.3.2 Hypothesis 1: Trait anxiety should predict fear 
Hypothesis 1 stated that trait anxiety would predict fear and Table 5.4, shows that this hypothesis 
is supported: the more trait anxious the child, the more fearful they became of the animals 
following the information.  
5.3.3 Hypothesis 2: Interpretation bias should mediate the relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear 
It was also predicted that the relationship between trait anxiety and fear would be mediated by 
interpretation bias; specifically, a child who is more trait anxious is more likely to interpret 
information in a negatively biased way and this interpretation bias creates an increase in fear (in 
other words trait anxiety should, as well as having a direct effect on fear, have an indirect effect 
via interpretational biases). For this mediation model to be true, (1) trait anxiety should predict 
fear (which it does); (2) interpretation bias should predict fear (which is also true – Table 5.4 
shows that as interpretation bias increases so does the change in fear due to information), and (3) 
trait anxiety should significantly predict interpretation bias, which was not the case (Table 5.4). 
The fact that trait anxiety does not significantly predict interpretation biases means that 
interpretation biases do not mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and the change in fear 
towards the animals. 
Given that trait anxiety predicts fear and interpretation biases do not mediate this relationship, 
perhaps interpretation biases moderate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. In other 
words, fear is exacerbated by a combination of trait anxiety and interpretation bias. This 
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hypothesis was tested by predicting fear from trait anxiety, interpretation bias and the interaction 
between trait anxiety and interpretation bias (Figure 5.2). The independent regressions included 
IB, STAI-C and also their interaction term (to test for moderation), the IB and STAIC predictors 
were centred before computing their interaction term. Looking at Figure 5.2, it appears that there 
was some evidence for a moderation model: interpretation bias has a main effect in predicting 
fear and the interaction between interpretation bias and STAI-C was significant when not 
bootstrapped (b = .01, p = .04) and nearly significant when bias corrected and bootstrapped (b = 
.01, p = .08).  
. 
Figure 5.2: Moderation model displaying the unstandardized beta estimates based on 1000 bias corrected bootstrap 
samples. * p < .05 
  
STAI-C 
Interpretation 
Bias 
Interpretation 
Bias × STAIC 
Fear 
FBQ ε 
NRT ε 
λ 
b = .01, 
b = .01, 
b = .06,* 
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Table 5.4: Bias-corrected regression coefficient estimates and their standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples. Trait anxiety (STAI-C), Interpretation bias (IB) and Cognitive rehearsal (CR). 
Predictor Outcome B SE 95% CI 
(lower) 
95% CI 
(upper) 
p R2 
STAI-C Fear .02*  .00 .03 .01  
 IB .04 .03 −.03 .10 .24 .01 
 CR .00 .02 −.02 .03 .88 .00 
IB Fear .06*  .01 .11 .01  
CR Fear .08 .06   .19  
 IB .55* .20 −.15 .95 .01 .05 
*p < .05 
5.3.4 Hypothesis 3: The relationship between trait anxiety and fear would be mediated 
by cognitive rehearsal 
This hypothesis predicted that anxious children would be more likely to cognitively rehearse the 
ambiguous information, which would then lead them to feel more fearful towards the animal. 
However, looking at Table 5.4, trait anxiety did not significantly predict cognitive rehearsal and 
cognitive rehearsal did not significantly predict fear. Therefore, cognitive rehearsal does not 
mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear of the animals. However, cognitive 
rehearsal was found to predict interpretation bias: children who had more severely negative 
thoughts about the animals were significantly more likely to interpret the ambiguous information 
as threatening than children who had less negative thoughts or indeed positive thoughts. 
5.3.5 Hypothesis 4: Interpretation bias should predict biased memory and this 
relationship should be moderated by trait anxiety 
Hypothesis 4 stated that interpretation bias would predict biased memory and this relationship 
would be moderated by trait anxiety. In other words, children who interpret the information more 
negatively are more likely to encode and store the information more negatively in memory and 
this relationship will be stronger for trait anxious children than for non-trait anxious children. 
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Multiple regressions were run on these data with a different outcome (memory) variable each 
time. The sample estimates (betas, standard error, and 95% confidence intervals) were based on 
1000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples. The independent regressions included IB, STAI-C and 
also their interaction term (to test for moderation); the IB and STAIC predictors were centred 
before computing their interaction term (see above). 
These analyses tell us whether the effects of interpretation biases on memory exist when 
controlling for trait anxiety, and also look at whether trait anxiety moderates the effect of 
interpretation biases on memory. Looking at Table 5.5 below it seems that: (1) Interpretation bias 
had no significant effect on accurate memory recall or more negative memories; (2) 
Interpretation bias had a significant negative relationship with more positive memories and false 
positive memories; (3) Interpretation bias has a significant positive relationship with false 
negative memories; and (4) Trait anxiety did not significantly moderate these effects at all. 
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Table 5.5: Bias-corrected regression coefficient estimates and their standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap 
samples. Trait anxiety (STAI-C) and Interpretation bias (IB). 
Predictor Memory 
Outcome 
B   SE  95% CI        
(lower) 
 95% CI     
(upper) 
P    R2 
STAI-C Accurate −.01 .02 −.04 .02 .69 .01 
IB  −.02 .04 −.11 .07 .73  
STAIC*IB  
 
−.01 .01 −.02 .01 .23  
STAI-C More Negative −.00 .01 −.02 .01 .79 .01 
IB  .02 .02 −.01 .05 .33  
STAIC*IB  .00 .00 −.00 .01 .39  
 
STAI-C More positive .01 .01 −.01 .02 .40 .07 
IB  −.05** .01 −.08 −.02 .00  
STAIC*IB  −.00 .00 −.01 .00 .16  
 
STAI_C False Negative −.01 .01 −.02 .00 .12 .07 
IB  .05** .01 .02 .70 .00  
STAIC*IB  −.00 .00 −.01 .00 .22  
 
STAI_C False Positive .00 .00 −.01 .01 .79 .02 
IB  −.02** .01 −.03 −.00 .00  
STAIC*IB  .00 .00 −.00 .00 .89  
*p < .05, **p < .01 
5.3.6 Hypothesis 5: Memory should mediate the relationship between Interpretation bias 
and fear 
Hypothesis 5 stated that memory should mediate the relationship between interpretation bias and 
fear, in other words children who interpret the information more negatively will encode this 
information more negatively into memory and this memory bias will then have the effect of 
increasing their fear of the animal. To test this, (based on Baron and Kenny, 1986) it is necessary 
for interpretation biases to predict fear (the direct effect), which was indeed found to be the case 
(see Table 5.4). Additionally, interpretation biases are required to predict memory and this 
appeared to be true for more positive memories; the greater the child’s IB, the fewer positive 
memories were made, false negative memories; the greater the child’s IB, the more false 
negative memories were made and false positive memories; the greater the child’s IB, the fewer 
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false positive memories were encoded (see Table 5.5). Therefore these three memory variables 
can be tested as mediators, see Figure 5.3 below. 
Figure 5.3: General mediation model in which memory mediates the relationship between interpretation bias and 
fear. 
 
The model in Figure 5.3 was tested in which ‘memory’ was replaced in turn with ‘more positive’ 
‘false positive’ and ‘false negative’. In each case, the indirect effect of interpretation bias on fear 
was tested using a bias corrected confidence interval based on 500 bootstrap samples in AMOS 
16. The term ‘indirect effect’ is used because it is predicted that interpretation bias causes biased 
memory (mediator variable), which in turn causes fear, therefore it is predicted that interpretation 
bias has an indirect effect on fear via biased memory. For all indirect effects, significance was 
ascertained from the bias-corrected 95% confidence interval (based on 500 bootstrap samples). It 
was found that: (1) for ‘more-positive memories’ there was a significant mediation effect, 95% 
CI (−.03, −.00), (p = .02); (2) For ‘false-positive memories’ there was no significant mediation 
effect, 95% CI (−.01, .08), p = .13, this finding is complicated slightly by the fact that when 
testing the unstandardized betas the mediation effect was almost significant (p = .05); (3). For 
‘false-negative memories’ there was no significant mediation effect, 95% CI (−.02, .10), p = .18.  
Memory 
Interpretation 
Bias 
Fear 
FBQ 
NRT 
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The link between IB and fear is mediated only by fewer positive memories. False-negative 
memories did not significantly mediate the link between interpretation bias and fear. 
5.4 Discussion 
When data from all three experiments were combined, trait anxiety was found to predict fear; in 
other words, the more trait anxious the child, the more fearful they became of the animals due to 
information. This finding is in line with what was predicted and with previous research, which 
has shown that trait anxiety moderates the effect of threat information on fear (Field, 2006b; 
Field & Price-Evans, 2009). Although a large amount of inconsistency was found amongst 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 with regards to whether trait anxiety predicts fear, we can view the 
current finding with greater confidence because larger sample sizes add precision to the 
regression coefficients. 
Although interpretation bias was found to increase fear following verbal information, it was not 
found to mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. However, tentative evidence 
was found indicating that interpretation bias moderates the relationship between trait anxiety and 
fear. In other words, fear is exacerbated by a combination of trait anxiety and interpretation bias, 
however this effect was only significant when the regression parameters and estimates were not 
bias-corrected and based on bootstrap sampling and should therefore be taken with caution. 
Hence, this finding only partially supports predictions and previous research demonstrating that 
high trait anxious children are inclined to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Bögels & 
Zigterman, 2000; Hadwin et al., 1997; Muris, Merckelbach et al., 2000; Muris & van Doorn, 
2003; Taghavi et al., 2000; Lester et al., 2010).  
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Cognitive rehearsal was not found to have a significant relationship with fear (not surprising 
when considering the results from Experiments 1, 2 and 3) and this finding did not vary as a 
function of trait anxiety. However, children who experienced more severely negative thoughts 
about the animals interpreted the information as more threatening than children who had less 
negative thoughts or indeed positive thoughts about the animals. Although interpretations were 
measured later, it is possible that the direction of this relationship is the other way i.e. negative 
interpretation leads to more negative thoughts. This finding makes sense as if children are 
thinking negative thoughts about the animals: they must have interpreted the information 
negatively to arrive at their negative thoughts.   
Compared to children who interpreted the information as non-threatening, children who 
interpreted the information as threatening constructed: (1) more false-negative memories; (2) 
fewer false-positive memories and; (3) fewer more-positive memories. These findings are in line 
with what was predicted. However, contrary to predictions trait anxiety did not significantly 
moderate any of these relationships.  
It was also predicted that biased memory would mediate the relationship between interpretation 
bias and fear; this prediction was found to be true for positive memories only. In other words 
children who showed an interpretation bias for the ambiguous information constructed fewer 
positive memories of the information leading them to become more fearful of the animals. These 
findings are in line with Williams (1997) who reported that depressed and non-depressed 
individuals differ with regards to speed of retrieval of positive not negative memories. 
Specifically, people suffering from depression have been found to be slower at retrieving 
positive life events from memory than non-depressed controls; however they are not much 
quicker than non-depressed controls at retrieving negative events. Whilst the current study is 
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looking at anxiety and not depression, as mentioned above, it is well documented that anxiety 
and depression are strongly related conditions in both adult and youth populations (Mineka, et 
al., 1998; Seligman & Ollendick, 1998). Additionally, it has been argued that anxiety and 
depression share a variety of cognitive aspects (e.g., Kendall & Watson, 1989).
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6 General Discussion 
There were three main aims of this thesis: (1) to investigate the presence of cognitive biases (i.e. 
cognitive rehearsal, interpretation bias and memory bias) as a function of trait anxiety in 
children; (2) to investigate whether these cognitive biases predict the development of fear in the 
face of ambiguous information; and (3) to explore whether the cognitive biases (either alone or 
in combination) can explain the relationship between high levels of trait anxiety and fear, i.e. do 
the cognitive biases explain the mechanism underlying the relationship between trait anxiety and 
fear. Each of these aims will be evaluated, followed by a consideration of theoretical and clinical 
implications of the findings, the limitations of the current work and the implications for future 
work.  
Due to the fact that in all three experiments of this thesis the methods and procedures were 
identical with respect to interpretation bias and memory bias, the current general discussion will 
focus on the findings from Chapter 5 (all data) in which data from each experiment were pooled 
and analysed as one large data set. This strategy was chosen because as mentioned previously, 
larger samples provide greater statistical power and generate parameter estimates that are more 
precise and representative of the population (Field, 2009). However, because each experiment’s 
method and procedure differed with respect to the cognitive rehearsal manipulation, the findings 
for cognitive rehearsal from each experiment will be discussed in turn. 
6.1 Summary of key findings 
When data from each of the three experiments were pooled, it was found, as predicted, that trait 
anxiety predicts fear: children who were more trait anxious became more fearful of the animals 
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due to ambiguous information. Additionally, a threat interpretation bias was found to predict 
increased fear: children who interpreted the ambiguous information in a more threatening 
manner became more fearful of the animals as a result. However, contrary to what was predicted, 
neither interpretation bias nor cognitive rehearsal mediated the relationship between trait anxiety 
and fear. In other words, according to the present findings, the relationship between trait anxiety 
and fear cannot be explained by a threat interpretation bias or by the process of negative 
cognitive rehearsal.  
On a more positive note, in line with what was predicted, interpretation bias was found to predict 
biased memory encoding. Specifically, children who interpreted the ambiguous information in a 
more threatening manner were found to construct fewer false-positive memories (positive 
information remembered that was not in fact told) and more false-negative memories (negative 
information remembered that was not in fact told) of the information. However, contrary to what 
was predicted, the relationship between interpretation bias and memory was not moderated by 
trait anxiety; in other words, the relationship between interpretation bias and memory was not 
more pronounced for children who are more trait anxious than for children who are less trait 
anxious. 
Interestingly, the relationship between interpretation bias and fear was mediated by a memory 
bias in the form of fewer positive memories. In other words, children who interpreted the 
information as being more threatening, constructed fewer positive memories of the ambiguous 
information, and in turn, became more fearful of the animals. As such, biased memory in the 
form of fewer positive memories can potentially explain the relationship between interpretation 
bias and fear. Each of these findings will now be discussed in more detail. 
129 
 
6.2 Trait Anxiety and Fear 
Trait anxiety was found to predict fear1 resulting from ambiguous information about two novel 
animals. In other words, the more trait anxious the child, the more fearful they became of the 
animals due to ambiguous information thus providing support for previous research (Field, 
2006b; Field &Price-Evans, 2009), which has shown that trait anxiety moderates the effect of 
threat information on fear. Given that trait anxiety can lead to changes in fear-related responses, 
the next important question is how this might occur. What is the mechanism underlying the 
relationship between trait anxiety and fear?  
It was predicted that cognitive rehearsal and the cognitive biases would explain the relationship 
between trait anxiety and fear: when they hear some ambiguous information highly trait anxious 
children should interpret it negatively, cognitively rehearse it and remember it as being more 
threatening than it was originally, which, in turn increases their feelings of fear and anxiety. The 
findings relating to cognitive rehearsal, interpretation bias and memory bias as possible 
mediators of the relationship between trait anxiety and fear will now be discussed in turn. 
6.2.1 Does Cognitive Rehearsal Explain the relationship between trait anxiety and fear? 
Across the three experiments, cognitive rehearsal was consistently found not to be a significant 
mediator (or moderator in Experiment 2) of the relationship between trait anxiety and fear, 
suggesting that cognitive rehearsal does not explain the relationship between trait anxiety and 
fear. The findings relating to cognitive rehearsal of each experiment will be examined in more 
detail because it was manipulated in different ways across different experiments. 
                                                
1 When we talk about ‘fear’ we refer to the latent variable which was created by combining data from the fear beliefs 
questionnaire (FBQ) and the animal avoidance task (NRT). Therefore, this latent variable covers two of Lang’s three 
fear-response systems: subjective experience (measured by self-report) and avoidance behaviour (measured by the 
nature reserve task). 
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Experiment 1 was a naturalistic study and looked at whether high trait-anxious children are more 
likely than less trait anxious children to engage in cognitive rehearsal subsequent to hearing 
some ambiguous information regarding a novel animal and being told that they would soon be 
asked to approach the animal. However, contrary to predictions, it was found that trait anxiety 
did not significantly affect the extent to which children cognitively rehearse ambiguous 
information and whether they cognitively rehearsed the information or not made no significant 
difference to their levels of fear for the animals. Experiment 2 was designed to look at the effect 
of cognitive rehearsal compared to no cognitive rehearsal by experimentally manipulating 
whether a child engaged in cognitive rehearsal or distraction. Once again, contrary to predictions, 
whether children were instructed to cognitively rehearse the ambiguous information or were 
prevented from doing so (via a distraction task) made no significant difference to their levels of 
fear towards the animals. Experiment 3 investigated whether the content of thoughts (positive or 
negative) during cognitive rehearsal would have an effect on fear responding, and whether the 
effects would vary as a function of trait anxiety. Unfortunately, the results followed the pattern 
of null results from the previous two experiments and revealed that fear of the animals was not 
significantly affected by experimentally inducing a negative or positive cognitive rehearsal style 
and this effect did not vary as a function of trait anxiety. 
Unsurprisingly then, given the null results of Experiments 1, 2 and 3, analysis of these data 
pooled together (in Chapter 5) revealed that cognitive rehearsal did not have a significant 
relationship with fear and this finding did not vary as a function of trait anxiety. However, what 
was found was that children who experienced more severely negative thoughts about the animals 
interpreted the information as more threatening than children who had less negative thoughts, or 
indeed positive thoughts about the animals. This finding is in line with a previous study by 
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Suarez and Bell-Dolan (2001) who found a strong relationship between self reported child-worry 
(cognitive rehearsal) and threat interpretation bias. Specifically, they found that children who 
often engage in cognitive rehearsal in their everyday lives, compared to those who do not, 
interpreted both ambiguous and threatening situations as more threatening. This suggests that 
children who engage in cognitive rehearsal are at increased risk for cognitive distortions that may 
act to increase risk of fear development.  
Alternatively, although in the current experiments, interpretations were measured after the 
cognitive rehearsal task, it is also possible that the direction of this relationship is the other way: 
i.e., negative interpretation leads to more negative thoughts. This possibility makes sense 
because if children are thinking negative thoughts about the animals, they must have interpreted 
the information negatively to arrive at their negative thoughts. Future researchers could try to 
disambiguate these two explanations by investigating whether: 1) Experimentally manipulated 
negative cognitive rehearsal can act to change children’s original interpretations of ambiguity 
and; 2) Experimentally manipulating interpretation bias (either positively or negatively) impacts 
on valence of thoughts during cognitive rehearsal. Such knowledge would shed some light onto 
the question of causality between interpretation bias and cognitive rehearsal. 
The current findings indicate that what children think after hearing ambiguous information has 
little or even possibly no impact on their feelings of fear towards the animals. These findings are 
inconsistent with prior research in adults indicating that following a traumatic episode, many 
individuals engage in negative cognitive rehearsal of the traumatic US (Marks, 1987), which acts 
to inflate and refine the aversive representation of the US that is evoked by future encounters 
with the CS causing an increased fear response (Davey, 1992; Jones & Davey, 1990) and is 
related to a poorer level of general mental health, greater anxiety, and greater physical symptoms 
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(Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003).The current findings are also inconsistent with 
research from the child-anxiety literature in which the majority of studies have shown a clear 
relationship between cognitive rehearsal and anxiety in children and adolescents (Muris et al., 
2004; Muris et al., 2009; Schwartz &Koenig, 1996). One possible explanation for the non-
significant effects of cognitive rehearsal found throughout the current experiments relates to the 
ambiguous nature of the verbal information used, which may not have been threatening enough 
for effects to be found. Future researchers could use a mildly negative experience to investigate 
the effects of cognitive rehearsal on fear in children. 
Findings from Experiment 2 are particularly surprising and inconsistent with prior experimental 
manipulations of cognitive rehearsal and distraction in adults showing that cognitive rehearsal 
can exacerbate negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), negative thinking 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema 1995), negative autobiographical memory recall 
(Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), poor problem solving skills, impaired motivation and inhibition of 
on going behaviour (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004 for a review). The current findings are also 
inconsistent with the small amount of research that has been done in the child literature. For 
example, Roelofs et al. (2009) found that children and adolescents (10-17 years) who have a 
greater tendency to engage in cognitive rehearsal compared to distracting themselves have 
increases in depression and anxiety scores over time, whereas those who have a greater tendency 
to engage in distraction compared to cognitive rehearsal have decreases in depression and 
anxiety symptoms over time. However, Roelofs et al., (2009) used a self-report measure of 
children’s natural coping strategies over time, whereas the current study experimentally 
manipulated distraction and cognitive rehearsal in a short laboratory study. 
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Results obtained from Experiment 3 were also surprising, because prior research has shown the 
valence of thoughts during cognitive rehearsal to be a key factor in determining whether 
cognitive rehearsal will be constructive or unconstructive. For example, in a large meta-analysis, 
Mor and Winquist (2002) discovered a strong association between focus on negative self-aspects 
and increased levels of negative affect, whereas focus on positive self-aspects was related to 
lower levels of negative affect. Garnefski Rieffe, Jellesma, Terwogt and Kraaij (2007) 
investigated coping strategies in a sample of non-clinically anxious children and adolescence (9-
11 years) and found that a substantial percentage (i.e., 28%) of the variance in fearfulness in 
children could be explained by the use of cognitive coping strategies. Specifically, cognitive 
rehearsal, self-blame, and catastrophizing were positively related to fearfulness, whereas positive 
reappraisal had a strong negative association with fearfulness, suggesting a protective value. In a 
similar study, Legerstee, Garnefski, Frank, Verhulst and Utens (2010) found that anxiety-
disordered youth scored significantly higher on self-blame, cognitive rehearsal, catastrophizing, 
and acceptance and lower on positive reappraisal, positive refocusing, and refocus on planning 
than non-clinically anxious children. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, our failure to find any significant effects of cognitive rehearsal is 
unlikely to be due to the children in the current experiments being too young (8-11 years) to be 
able to engage in and thus be affected by these sorts of cognitive processes. This is because there 
is evidence suggesting that children may be capable of engaging in an adult-like worry process 
as young as 7 or 8 years of age (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994; Bacow et al., 2009), and that this 
ability to worry is linked to the developing meta-cognitive knowledge that children in this age 
range possess (Flavell, et al., 1995; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters et al., 2002). In fact, meta-
cognitive knowledge about strategies and tasks is thought to appear after children enter school, 
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and may be related to the onset of the concrete operational stage, which emerges in children at 
age 7 (Piaget, 1970). 
An alternative explanation for why no significant effects of cognitive rehearsal were found in the 
current experiments comes from research by Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (1999) who have 
indicated that a repetitive style of thinking appears to be a stable individual difference 
characteristic, which has been hypothesized to be learnt in childhood, either because it was 
modelled by parents who themselves had a passive coping style (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Mumme, Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or because the child failed to learn more active 
coping strategies for negative affect as a consequence of overcritical, intrusive, and over 
controlling parents (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995). It is feasible then that the children in the 
current sample had already developed active coping strategies as modelled by their parents, 
which may have protected them from the effects of cognitively rehearsing possible negative 
outcomes with the animals. Another possibility, based on the aforementioned research is that to 
have any effect on fear, the process of cognitive rehearsal needs to be learned over a longer 
period of time. For example, children in the current experiment cognitively rehearsed for only 
one minute and this was broken down into four sets of 15 seconds each whereas the adult 
participants in Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) cognitively rehearsed for a solid period of 8 
minutes.  
It is also possible that processes such as cognitive rehearsal only have negative effects in 
children who are clinically anxious. The current experiments used a community sample of non-
clinically anxious children, who varied in their trait anxiety; however it could be the case that 
these children were not trait anxious enough and were able to constructively rehearse the 
ambiguous information. Research has shown that recurrent thinking about negative events can be 
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functional and result in effective problem solving or successful emotional processing (Harvey, 
Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004). In Wells’s (1995) model, it is the subsequent development 
of negative rehearsal about negative rehearsal (meta-worry) or (meta-rehearsal), which 
transforms normal worry (cognitive rehearsal) into problematic varieties. Therefore, it could be 
the case that non-clinically anxious children are able to use negative cognitive rehearsal as a 
normal process of problem solving whereas clinically anxious children view the process of 
negative rehearsal as a threat in itself, thus adding to their feelings of fear and anxiety. 
In summary, prior research suggests that recurrent thinking may play a causal role in the 
maintenance of psychological disorders (e.g., Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004; 
Muris, Folke & Kwik, 2009; Schwartz and Koenig, 1996). However this was not found to be the 
case in the current experiments. Specifically, the current experiments found that: 1) cognitive 
rehearsal does not mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear; 2) the likelihood of 
cognitively rehearsing ambiguous information did not significantly vary as a function of trait 
anxiety; and 3) whether children cognitively rehearse ambiguous information or not does not 
impact on their fear responding. Given the current findings, it might be tempting to conclude that 
cognitive rehearsal has no bearing on fear development, yet, very few empirical studies have 
examined cognitive factors specifically in development and maintenance of cognitive rehearsal 
in children and adolescents (Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003) and relatively little is known 
about children’s interpretations or appraisals of their own cognitive rehearsal processes. Future 
work is needed to investigate the relationship between cognitive rehearsal and interpretation bias 
and how this impacts on fear development. 
6.2.2 Does Interpretation Bias Explain the Relationship between Trait Anxiety and Fear? 
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It was predicted that children who are more trait-anxious would interpret ambiguous information 
more negatively than children who are less trait-anxious, which in turn would result in the more 
trait-anxious children becoming more fearful of the animals. However, although negative 
interpretation bias was found to increase fear following ambiguous information, which is in line 
with previous interpretation bias training studies (e.g., Muris, Huijding, et al., 2008), 
interpretation bias was not found to mediate the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. 
Specifically, as trait anxiety increased children were more likely to become fearful of the novel 
animals subsequent to ambiguous information; however, this was not because they were 
interpreting the information more negatively than children who were less trait-anxious. 
Therefore, the link between trait anxiety and fear cannot be explained by interpretation bias. This 
finding is inconsistent with a large body of previous research, which has demonstrated that high 
trait-anxious children are more likely to interpret ambiguous information as more threatening 
than less-trait anxious children (see Hadwin &Field, 2010; Lester et al. 2010). Nonetheless, this 
experiment was novel in that it used novel animals to look at how interpretation biases feed into 
learning about new ambiguous stimuli and as such cannot be directly compared to previous 
studies. 
Nevertheless, although children who were high trait anxious were not found to be more likely to 
negatively interpret ambiguous information, tentative evidence was found indicating that 
interpretation bias moderates the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. In other words, fear 
is exacerbated by a combination of trait anxiety and interpretation bias. However, this effect was 
only significant when the regression parameters and estimates were not bias-corrected and based 
on bootstrap sampling and should therefore be treated as speculative. Hence, it remains unclear 
as to why high trait-anxious children become more fearful of novel animals than low trait-
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anxious children after hearing some ambiguous information about them. Nonetheless, the current 
research tentatively suggests that interpretation bias may be important in strengthening the 
relationship between trait anxiety and fear.  
6.3 Interpretation bias and Memory 
6.3.1 Does Interpretation Bias Predict Memory Bias and is this Relationship moderated 
by Trait Anxiety? 
Results revealed that a threat interpretation bias does indeed impact on memory of ambiguous 
information. Specifically, compared to children who interpreted the information as non-
threatening, children who interpreted the information as threatening constructed more negative 
and less positive memories. These findings are in line with what was predicted and also with 
models of biased information processing (see Muris & Field, 2008), which suggest that the 
cognitive biases are unlikely to operate in isolation, and that a bias at one stage of information 
processing (i.e. interpretation) is likely to impact on later stages (i.e. memory encoding). Thus, 
when required to retrieve the information from memory, a more threatening recollection of the 
original information is recalled. However, contrary to predictions and Muris and Field’s (2008) 
model, the relationship between interpretation bias and memory did not vary significantly as a 
function of trait anxiety. This finding is inconsistent with a very recent investigation by Visu-
Petra, Tincas, Cheie and Benga (2010) who found that compared to low trait-anxious children 
high trait-anxious children were slower and less accurate at detecting and remembering the 
location of happy faces and more accurate at remembering the location of angry faces. This 
finding suggests that a bias towards the processing and encoding of threatening stimuli and a bias 
away from the processing and encoding of positive environmental information and stimuli is 
characteristic of high-trait anxious children. Possible reasons for such inconsistencies with past 
research are discussed in Section 6.6.1. 
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6.3.2 Does Memory bias Mediate the Relationship between Interpretation Bias and 
Fear? 
As we have just seen above, a threat interpretation bias predicted more false-negative and less 
false-positive memories of the ambiguous information but how does this relationship impact on 
fear? It was predicted that a threat interpretation bias would lead children to construct more 
negative memories and less positive memories of the information, which would in turn lead to an 
increase in fear of the animals. This prediction was found to be correct but for false positive 
memories only. In other words, although children who interpreted the information as more 
threatening constructed more false-negative and less false-positive memories of the information, 
it was only the lack of false-positive memories that resulted in them becoming more fearful of 
the animals.  
This finding relates to previous research in the depression literature. For example, Williams 
(1997) found that depressed and non-depressed individuals differ with regards to speed of 
retrieval of positive, not negative memories. Specifically, people suffering from depression were 
slower at retrieving positive life events from memory than non-depressed controls; however, 
they were not much faster than non-depressed controls at retrieving negative events. This finding 
suggests that it is not so much the presence of negative memories that increases an individual’s 
risk for depression but it is the lack of positive memories that is important. Whilst the current 
study is looking at anxiety and not depression, extensive research has shown that there is a large 
overlap in the symptoms of anxiety and depression in both adult and youth populations (Clark & 
Watson, 1991; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Seligman & Ollendick,1998).  
Moser, Huppert, Duval and Simons (2008) have attempted to account for the differential 
processing of both negative and positive information in high trait anxious participants by 
proposing the existence of a double-edged bias. On one hand, a negative bias would be revealed 
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by a tendency of high-trait anxious individuals to preferentially process threatening information; 
on the other hand, the lack of a positive bias would deprive the same high trait anxious 
individuals of the preferential processing of positive social stimuli (and the protective bias away 
from negative information) found in normal controls.  
6.4 General Implications 
In accordance with theories of anxiety (e.g., Grey, 1987) and experimental research (e.g. Field, 
2006b; Field & Price-Evans, 2009), the results from the current experiments collectively support 
the conclusion that high trait-anxious children are at an increased risk of developing fear after 
exposure to ambiguous information. However, although clinical and experimental theories 
assume that cognitive biases such as interpretation bias and memory bias represent a causal 
substrate that operates to influence cognitive representation in such a way as to directly mediate 
anxiety vulnerability (see Beck & Clark, 1997, for a review; Williams et al., 1997), this was not 
found to be the case in the current experiments. Although both interpretation bias and memory 
bias significantly predicted increased fear due to ambiguous information, increases in trait 
anxiety were not found to be significantly more likely to predict information processing biases to 
threat. However, tentative evidence was found that trait anxiety exacerbates the relationship 
between interpretation bias and fear. 
The findings that (a) a threat interpretation bias predicts the construction of more false-negative 
and less false-positive memories of ambiguous information, and (b) that construction of fewer 
false-positive memories mediates the relationship between threat interpretation bias and fear are 
in line with models of biased information processing (e.g., Muris & Field, 2008), which suggest 
that the cognitive biases are unlikely to operate in isolation, and that a bias at one stage of 
information processing (i.e., interpretation) is likely to impact on later stages (i.e., memory 
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encoding and retrieval). However, contrary to Muris and Field’s (2008) model, the relationship 
between interpretation bias and memory did not vary significantly as a function of trait anxiety: 
relationship between interpretation bias and memory bias was not moderated by trait anxiety.  
Given there is currently only a handful of studies that have investigated memory biases in highly 
trait-anxious children and the fact that what has been done has provided mixed results (see Muris 
& Field, 2008, for a review), the lack of evidence found in support of high trait anxiety 
predicting memory bias in the current experiments is not hugely surprising. Memory bias has in 
general, been linked more with depression than with anxiety (Williams et al., 1997); thus it may 
be that the associations found between anxiety disorders and memory biases in some studies are 
due to concurrent depression symptoms. Nevertheless, the finding that high levels of trait-anxiety 
does not predict a threat interpretation bias is surprising, especially when considering the large 
body of research demonstrating that high trait-anxious children do show a greater tendency for 
interpreting ambiguous stimuli as threatening than less trait-anxious children (Bögels & 
Zigterman, 2000; Hadwin et al., 1997; Lester, et al., 2010; Muris, Merckelbach et al., 2000; 
Muris and van Doorn, 2003; Taghavi et al., 2000). Some possible reasons for these 
inconsistencies will now be discussed. 
6.4.1 Why was Trait-anxiety not Predictive of Information Processing Biases? 
One possible reason why trait anxiety did not predict any of the cognitive biases throughout the 
current experiments (with the exception of Experiment 2, in which trait anxiety moderated the 
relationship between threat interpretation bias and more-negative memories) is that the current 
sample of children were unusually low trait-anxious and therefore, even the most trait-anxious of 
the children were not highly trait-anxious enough for any effects between trait-anxiety and the 
cognitive biases to be found. However, when inspecting the trait anxiety scores of the current 
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sample of children, this explanation seems unlikely. For example, the distribution of scores in the 
current sample was highly comparable to that of a large (N = 1554) non-clinical sample of 
children aged 8-11 years reported by Spielberger (1973). Specifically, in the current sample, the 
lower quartile = 30, median = 36 and upper quartile = 41.5 and in the sample from Spielberger 
(1973), the lower quartile = 32, the median score = 37 and the upper quartile = 41.  
Another possible reason why trait anxiety did not predict cognitive bias in the current research is 
that perhaps the effects of anxiety on cognitive biases are only present in clinical samples. For 
example, the current study used a community sample of non-clinical children but it is possible 
that cognitive biases are specific to clinically diagnosed anxiety and not to anxiety as a 
personality trait. There could be something different about clinically diagnosed anxiety that 
causes these effects to only be found in clinical samples. Previous research reporting high trait-
anxiety to be a significant predictor of interpretation bias and memory bias in non-clinical child 
samples suggests that this explanation is also unlikely (e.g., Bell-Dolan, 1995; Bögels et al., 
2003; Chorpita et al. 1996; Daleiden, 1998; Dineen and Hadwin, 2004; Hadwin et al.,1997; 
Muris, Kindt et al., 2000; Reid et al., 2006; Visu-Petra et al., 2010). 
It is worth considering that the lack of any significant relationships between trait anxiety and the 
cognitive biases is a result of measurement issues. For example, the current study used the 
STAIC as a measure of child trait anxiety. However, looking at Tables 6.1 and 6.2, it appears 
that none of the previous studies reporting a significant relationship between trait anxiety and 
either interpretation bias or memory bias have used the STAIC as a single measure of trait 
anxiety. Although the STAIC has acceptable to good psychometric properties and provides 
useful information on childhood anxiety symptoms (Muris, Merckelbach, Ollendick, King & 
Bogie 2002; Papay, Costello, Hedl & Spielberger 1975), its main limitation is that it is not linked 
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to the anxiety categories that are listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1994; see Stallings &March, 
1995 for a discussion), it is unidimensional and hence does not tap various symptom domains. 
As a result, the clinical utility of the STAIC has often been questioned (see Muris, Merckelbach, 
Ollendick et al., 2002). Therefore, it is possible that the current experiments did not find a 
significant relationship between trait anxiety and cognitive bias because the STAIC was not 
measuring the right thing (i.e., it did not tap into the right aspects of trait anxiety). It has been 
documented that the more recently developed instruments for measuring trait anxiety such as the 
Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED), the Multidimensional 
Anxiety Scale for Children (MASC) and the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale (SCAS), are more 
closely connected to current diagnostic systems such as the DSM-1V (American Psychiatric 
Association (APA), 1994) and thus facilitate communication about anxiety problems in children 
and adolescents (Chorpita, Yim, et al., 2000). As such it may have been preferable to use one of 
the more recently developed questionnaires over the STAIC. On the other hand, many of these 
studies listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 that have reported a significant relationship between trait 
anxiety and cognitive biases have used the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale 
(RCMAS) which has been found to be strongly allied with the STAIC; both questionnaires have 
been found to tap general levels of anxiety (Muris, Merckelbach, Ollendick et al., 2002), thus 
providing support for use of the STAIC in the current context. 
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Table 6.1: Overview of published experimental studies examining the relationship between anxiety and 
interpretation bias in children. 
Study Measure(s) 
of Anxiety 
Clinical 
Sample? 
Interpretation Bias Measure Anxiety level 
predictive of 
Interpretation Bias? 
Bell-Dolan (1995) RCMAS No Videotaped peer interaction 
vignettes. 
Yes 
Barrett et al. (1996) ADIS-C Yes Vignettes of ambiguous 
situations. 
Yes 
Chorpita et al. (1996)  No  Yes 
Hadwin et al. (1997) RCMAS No Ambiguous homophones Yes 
Dalgleish et al. (1997) RCMAS Yes Ambiguous social scenarios Yes 
Bögels and Zigterman 
(2000) 
DISC Yes Ambiguous stories Yes 
Taghavi et al. (2000) RCMAS Yes Ambiguous homophones Yes 
Muris, et al.(2000a) SCARED, 
STAIC and 
DISC 
No Ambiguous stories Yes 
Muris, et al. (2000b) SASC–R 
and 
SCARED 
Yes Ambiguous stories of social 
situations 
Yes 
Suarez &Bell-Dolan (2001) PSWQ-C No Ambiguous and threatening 
situations. 
Yes 
Bögels et al. (2003) SCARED-R No Vignettes of social situations Yes 
Dineen &Hadwin (2004) RCMAS No Ambiguous social scenarios Yes 
Creswell et al. (2005) RCMAS and 
ADIS-CP 
Yes Ambiguous scenarios Yes 
Waters et al. (2008) ADIS-C and 
MASC 
Yes Ambiguous stories Yes 
Micco &Ehrenreich (2008) ADIS-CP 
and RCADS. 
Yes Ambiguous stories Yes 
Reid et al. (2006) 
 
RCMAS No Ambiguous situations Yes, but also found in 
depressed and 
aggressive children. 
Note: ADIS-CP = Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Child and Parent versions; ADIS-C = Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule for Children; RCMAS =the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale; DISC = National Institute of Mental 
Health Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children; SCARED =The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders; 
MASC = The Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children; RCADS = Revised Child Depression and Anxiety Scale; PSWQ-
C = Penn-State Worry Questionnaire For Children; SASC-R= Social Anxiety Scale for Children–Revised. 
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Table 6.2: Overview of published experimental studies examining the relationship between anxiety and memory bias 
in children. 
Study Measure(s) 
of Anxiety 
Age 
(years) 
Clinical 
Sample? 
Memory Bias Measure Anxiety level predictive of 
Memory Bias? 
Daleiden 
(1998)  
STAIC, 
CASI, 
11-14 No Positive negative and neutral 
words: 
1) Word fragment completion 
task to measure perceptual 
memory processing.  
2) Semantic cue task to index 
conceptual memory 
processing.  
Yes. Only on the conceptual 
memory task, suggesting that 
memory bias occurs only in 
tasks that require processing 
of the meaning of stimuli. 
Moradi, et 
al. (2000)  
 DSM-IV - 
criteria for a 
primary 
diagnosis of 
PTSD. 
9-17 Yes  
(PTSD)  
Free-recall task of negative, 
positive and neutral words 
followed by a recognition test. 
Yes, but only weak evidence. 
Free recall task – no 
difference between PTSD and 
control youths with regard to 
negative words, but control 
participants recalled 
significantly more neutral and 
positive words.  
Recognition test - no 
significant group differences. 
Dalgleish, 
et al. 
(2003) 
RCMAS 7-18 Yes 
(PTSD or 
GAD) 
Free-recall test using the same 
methodology as Moradi, et al. 
(2000)  
No. Anxiety disordered 
children did not differ to 
controls. 
Watts and 
Weems 
(2006)  
RCADS 9-17 No Examined the relationship 
between self-reported and 
parent-reported anxiety and 
memory bias. 
 
Yes but the effect was 
modest. Memory bias score 
correlated significantly with 
child- and parent- reported 
anxiety scores, r􏳩.23 and r􏳩.26, 
respectively. 
Visu-Petra 
et al. 
(2010) 
SCAS 4-7 No Angry, happy and neutral 
facial expressions in a 
modified version of the odd 
one out task 
Yes. Between group 
differences- Compared to low 
anxious children, high anxious 
children were slower and less 
accurate in detecting and 
updating happy faces, but 
more accurate in responses to 
angry faces. Within group 
differences- Low anxious 
children were less accurate in 
response to angry (relative to 
happy and neutral) faces, 
while high anxious children 
were less accurate in response 
to happy (relative to neutral) 
facial expressions.  
DSM-IV = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, criteria for a primary diagnosis of PTSD. RCADS 
= The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression scales. RCMAS = Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale. STAIC = the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children. CASI = Children’s Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory. SPAS = Spence Preschool Anxiety 
Scale. 
Another possible reason for the non-significant relationships found between trait anxiety and 
cognitive biases throughout the current experiments is that trait anxiety was analysed along a 
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continuous, dimensional scale ranging from high to low trait anxious and it could be the case that 
a more categorical analysis would have been more appropriate. For example, perhaps there is a 
cut off point somewhere along the trait anxiety sale and only the children who score above a 
certain threshold are highly trait-anxious enough for effects between trait anxiety and cognitive 
bias to be found. For example, Daleiden (1998) found trait anxiety to be predictive of memory 
bias in a group of high- and low- trait anxious children using the STAIC, but this study used a 
cut-off point to distinguish high from low trait anxious children. Specifically, trait anxiety scores 
of 45 and 55 were used as cut-off points to identify groups of low-anxious and high-anxious 
children respectively. Indeed it is frequently contended that categorical diagnoses are favored for 
professional communication, clinical decision-making and distinguishing between individuals 
with and without a mental disorder (Kamphuis & Noordhof, 2009). Nevertheless, it has been 
noted that The DSM-V will likely place more emphasis on dimensional rather than categorical 
representation of mental disorders, as dimensional systems have the psychometric advantage that 
more statistical power is preserved for identifying differences in subsequent analyses (as argued 
by Frances, 1993; Widiger, 1992). 
6.5 Clinical Implications 
The current findings can suggest some ways in which the development of childhood fear may be 
reversed or possibly even prevented. For example, the more we know about how fears develop, 
the better equipped we will become at understanding how they can be reduced or even prevented. 
First, the findings confirm that children who show a disproportionate tendency to interpret 
ambiguous cues as threatening are more likely to become fearful of new and potentially 
threatening stimuli in their environment, both directly and indirectly through reduction in 
positively biased memory. Therefore, it is possible that training children to interpret information 
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more positively may reduce their risk of developing fear. Indeed, previous research in adults has 
consistently shown that inducing a positive interpretation bias reduces state anxiety (e.g., 
Mathews &Mackintosh, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006; Yiend et al., 2005). Despite the current lack 
of such experiments in the child literature, so far findings indicate that positive interpretation 
bias training also reduces state anxiety in children (e.g., Muris, Huijding et al., 2008; 
Vassilopoulos et al., 2009) but not consistently so; for example, in a study by Muris, Huijding et 
al., (2009) experimental training was successful in influencing children’s interpretation biases in 
the predicted direction. However, high-anxious children were not significantly more affected by 
the experimental manipulation than low-anxious children. Moreover, the change in interpretation 
bias was not significantly associated with change in avoidance tendencies. This research is still 
in its infancy and it is clear that more research is needed to discover the optimal experimental 
conditions for training a positive interpretation bias and reducing anxiety in children.  
The current findings also confirm for therapists treating fears and phobias that a lack of 
positively biased memories poses a risk factor for fear development. Thus training children to 
have a positive memory bias may act to prevent fear development in the face of ambiguous 
information. Indeed in Experiment 1 it was found that fear beliefs decreased in children who 
remembered the ambiguous information as being more positive than it in fact was. However, 
because positively biased memory mediated the relationship between interpretation bias and fear, 
it is possible that treatment that trains a positive interpretation bias will in turn increase more 
positively biased memories and thus reduce fear. Nevertheless, it may be the case that both 
positive interpretation bias training and positive memory bias training together would be the 
optimal treatment for fear reduction in children, especially if, for example, treatment of fears is 
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found to be more effective when specifically aimed at each stage of biased information 
processing through which the fear is acquired or maintained.  
6.6 Limitations and Future Work 
One important limitation to consider is that there were various inconsistencies in findings across 
the three experiments. For example, when the data from each experiment were pooled and 
analyzed as one data set, trait anxiety was found to predict fear. However, with regard to each 
experiment separately, the relationship between trait anxiety and fear was found only to be 
significant in Experiment 2. As mentioned previously, this inconsistency could be partly be due 
to the fact that each individual experiment had a relatively small sample size and so would have 
had low power to detect the effects; also, estimates of population statistics tend to fluctuate more 
in smaller samples than larger ones (Field, 2009).  
It could also be the case that trait anxiety predicted fear in Experiment 2 but not in the other two 
experiments because Experiment 2 consisted of a particularly high trait-anxious sample, or 
alternatively, Experiments 1 and 3 consisted of particularly low trait anxious samples. However, 
looking at Table 6.3, the distributions of scores across the three experiments were highly 
comparable suggesting that this explanation is unlikely. Table 6.3 also shows that the distribution 
of trait anxiety scores in the current Experiments were highly similar to the distribution of trait 
anxiety scores from Spielberger et al. (1973), who collected normative data for the STAIC from 
a large sample (N = 1554) of non-clinical children aged 8-11 years, indicating that the children in 
the current samples were not abnormally high or low trait anxious. 
As discussed above, it is possible that the STAIC was not the most appropriate measure of trait 
anxiety due to the fact that it is not as closely related to current diagnostic systems such as DSM-
148 
 
IV as the more recently developed trait anxiety measures such as the SCARED, MASC and the 
SCAC, which better facilitate communication about anxiety problems in youths (Chorpita, Yim, 
et al., 2000). Future work is needed to replicate the current experiments using one of the newly 
developed trait anxiety measures to investigate this possibility. 
Table 6.3: Distribution of trait anxiety scores in Experiments 1,2 and 3 and from data collected by 
Spielberger (1973) 
Experiment Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile 
1 32.0 38.0 42.0 
 2 30.0 35.5 39.3 
 3 30.0 36.0 42.0 
Spielberger et al. (1973) 32.0 37.0 41.0 
 
An obvious limitation with Experiments 1 and 2 was the touch box task. The touch box used in 
these experiments failed to produce analysable data. Nearly all children were willing to put their 
fingers into all the holes along the tube leading into the animal boxes, thus producing a ceiling 
effect. Although in Experiment 3 this task was modified to resemble tasks used successfully in 
previous experiments (e.g. Field & Lawson, 2003), it remains unknown how the variables in 
Experiments 1 and 2 affected behavioural avoidance of the animals. Additionally, comparisons 
cannot be made between the first two experiments and Experiment 3 regarding this task. 
An important finding of the current research is that a threat interpretation bias increases a child’s 
risk of becoming fearful, both directly and indirectly via a reduction in the construction of 
positive memories. Investigations into positive interpretation bias training in children are still in 
their infancy and results have been inconsistent (e.g. Muris, Huijding et al., 2008; Muris, 
Huijding et al., 2009) suggesting that further work is needed to refine the methods of positive 
interpretation bias training in youth populations. Additionally, future research is needed to 
investigate whether successful positive interpretation bias training also impacts on memory bias 
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(i.e., in the current research, a threat interpretation bias was found to predict fewer positive 
memories. As such, it is possible that a trained positive interpretation bias would increase the 
number of positive memories and decrease the number of negative memories constructed.  
Future research into positive memory training is also needed. For instance, future experiments 
could look at whether positive memories can be trained in children via techniques such as 
modelling and positive reinforcement and if so, what is the impact on fear? Further research 
could investigate whether interpretation bias training alone is enough to increase positive 
memory construction and reduce fear in children, or whether positive interpretation bias training 
and positive memory bias training have independent and additive effects on fear reduction which 
would suggest that a combination of both training procedures would be the optimal method of 
fear reduction. Such information would inform treatment programmes targeting the detrimental 
social and academic consequences associated with childhood anxiety, given the causal role that 
cognitive biases are likely to play in the etiology and maintenance of such unwanted outcomes 
(Vasey & MacLeod, 2001). However, the current experiments used a sample of non-clinical 
children and therefore, cannot be used to draw conclusions about children with anxiety-related 
disorders. Future experiments are needed to investigate these effects in a sample of clinically 
anxious children. 
As mentioned earlier with regard to cognitive rehearsal, it is possible that to have any effect on 
fear, the process of cognitive rehearsal needs to be learned over a longer period of time. For 
example, children in the current experiments cognitively rehearsed for only one minute and this 
was broken down into four sets of 15 seconds each, whereas adult participants in Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) cognitively rehearsed for a solid period of 8 minutes. Future 
experiments with children could extend the length of the cognitive rehearsal task to a period of 8 
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minutes or perhaps look at the effect of cognitive rehearsal manipulation over a period of 
multiple sessions. Future work also needs to look at cognitive rehearsal longitudinally, which 
would provide a better understanding of the natural development of cognitive rehearsal in 
children over time. Finally, children in the current experiments cognitively rehearsed ambiguous 
information, but it is possible that for cognitive rehearsal to significantly affect fear it has to be 
about something traumatic. As such, future research should investigate the effects of cognitive 
rehearsal in the face of a mildly threatening experience.  
6.7 Final Summary 
The current research investigated the link between cognitive bias (cognitive rehearsal, 
interpretation bias and memory bias) and fear in a sample of high and low trait anxious children 
with the use of ambiguous information about two novel animals. Results revealed that while trait 
anxiety significantly predicted fear, none of the cognitive biases were able to explain the 
mechanism underling the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. However, tentative 
evidence suggests that interpretation bias exacerbates the relationship between trait anxiety and 
fear. Unfortunately, it was found that whether children rehearsed the ambiguous information or 
not had no significant impact on their fear levels, nor did the valence of their thoughts. However, 
negative cognitive rehearsal was found to predict threat interpretation bias, suggesting that a 
repetitive negative thinking style can lead to cognitive distortions, which pose a risk of fear 
development. Significant relationships were found between a threat interpretation bias and a 
more-negative and less-positive memory bias and interestingly it was the lack of false-positive 
memories that lead children to become more fearful of the animals. 
The current results carry some implications for treatment programmes. Positive interpretation 
and memory bias training may act to decrease or even help to prevent fear development in 
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children. Research into the development of the cognitive biases is still currently lacking, 
especially with regard to memory bias and cognitive rehearsal. Much more work is needed, for 
example with younger age groups, and it will be important to investigate the longitudinal course 
of the cognitive biases to shed more light on how these biases develop.  
7 Critical Appraisal of the Research Undertaken 
After taking time to reflect on the research undertaken in this thesis, I have gathered some 
thoughts on the overall theoretical conceptualization and methodological operationalization of 
the key variables within the three studies described. This section will discuss these thoughts and 
aims to give rise to suggestions for a possible new sequence of studies to investigate the most 
important theoretical propositions.  
7.1 Theoretical Conceptualization 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether memory bias, cognitive rehearsal and 
interpretation bias could explain the relationship between trait anxiety and fear. Five main 
hypotheses, based on theory and past research, ran through the experimental chapters, 
specifically: (1) Replicating Field (2006b), children who are more trait anxious, relative to 
children who are less trait anxious, would become more fearful of a novel animal after hearing 
some ambiguous information about it. (2) Because children who are more trait anxious have 
been found to disambiguate ambiguous information as more threatening (Field, 2006b), the 
relationship between trait anxiety and fear should be mediated by interpretation bias. In other 
words, children who are more trait anxious would interpret the information as being more 
threatening and therefore become more fearful of the animals. (3) The relationship between trait 
anxiety and fear should also be mediated by how children think about the information: children 
who are more trait anxious are predicted to cognitively rehearse the ambiguous information and 
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in doing so derive a more negative meaning from it, leading them to become more fearful of the 
animals. (4) Children who disambiguate the verbal information in a threatening way 
(interpretation bias) would subsequently encode the information more negatively into memory 
and therefore show a memory bias for the information and this relationship would be moderated 
by trait anxiety. In other words, the relationship between interpretation and memory would be 
stronger for highly trait anxious children than for less trait anxious children. (5) Finally it is 
predicted that memory will mediate the relationship between interpretation bias and fear: 
children who interpret the information as being more threatening would also encode the 
information as being more threatening into memory which would lead to them becoming more 
fearful of the animals. 
These hypotheses have each looked at how small subsets of the cognitive biases might interact 
and impact on the processing of ambiguous information, however, there has as yet been no 
consideration of how they might interact in one inclusive theoretical framework. There are in 
fact a number of forms in which such a model could take. Based on the hypotheses of this thesis, 
one possible model might predict that children who are more trait anxious should interpret 
potentially threatening information more negatively than a child who is less trait anxious, and 
subsequently engage in negative cognitive rehearsal of the information and thus encode the 
information into memory as being more negative than it was originally, resulting in an increase 
in feelings of fear.  
This model appears to make sense, as when considering the order of information processing (see 
Daleiden and Vasey’s 1997 model), it seems sensible that for information to be rehearsed and 
encoded into memory it first needs to have been interpreted. However, it could also be the case 
that engaging in cognitive rehearsal helps children to determine how new information is 
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interpreted and encoded and as such, it could be the case that cognitive rehearsal occurs prior to 
interpretation. Additionally, the experiments in this thesis have not considered or looked at the 
effect of past memory on interpretation. Muris and Field (2008) suggest that in anxiety, recall of 
memories congruent with the cause of one’s anxiety ultimately results in a biased interpretation 
of ambiguous situations. This suggests that when learning about new potentially threatening 
stimuli, memories of past anxiety provoking situations may bias how new information is 
processed, suggesting that memory can also impact on interpretation bias. 
Another potential problem with the proposed model, and also the interpretation of the results 
throughout this thesis is that ‘fear’ is assumed to be the outcome of the interaction between the 
cognitive biases. For example, one of the main findings of this thesis was that a threat 
interpretation bias led to fewer false positive memories, which in turn led to increased fear. 
However, because interpretation bias and memory were not manipulated in the current set of 
experiments causality cannot be inferred, and as such, it is also possible that fear comes into play 
at a much earlier stage in the model. For example, it is possible that ‘fear’ elicited by a threat 
interpretation bias, brings about negative cognitive rehearsal and less positively biased memory 
encoding. Recent interpretation bias training studies have found that experimentally inducing 
either a negative or positive interpretation bias in children affects state anxiety; specifically, 
successful positive interpretation bias training was found to reduce state anxiety, whereas 
negative interpretation bias increased state anxiety (Muris et al., 2008) this research suggests that 
a threat interpretation bias can indeed increase fear. Nonetheless, research has also shown that 
manipulating interpretive biases can result in corresponding changes in memory biases (Tran, 
Hertel, and Joormann, 2011). 
It would seem then, that there are multiple possible forms of which such an inclusive model 
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could take. The causal relationships between these variables are difficult to unpick and it would 
take many experiments before reaching any sort of sound conclusion, one method of conducting 
such experiments would be to manipulate one variable and measure how it affects the other 
variable(s). For example, to investigate whether the finding of the current thesis that; ‘memory 
mediates the relationship between interpretation bias and fear’ is actually better explained as; 
‘fear mediates the relationship between interpretation bias and memory; three proposed studies 
are briefly outlined: 
Study 1 could look at the effect of experimentally inducing a threat interpretation bias via 
interpretation bias training (eg., Muris et al., 2008; Muris et al., 2009) versus a control condition 
in which no interpretation bias training is received, on memory and fear of ambiguous 
information, this would give an indication of whether interpretation bias causally effects memory 
and fear. As mentioned previously, Tran et al. (2011) have shown that induced interpretation bias 
does result in a corresponding memory bias for ambiguous information. 
Study 2 could look at the effect of experimentally inducing a memory bias vs. a control on fear. 
This study would indicate whether memory causally affects fear. After taking a baseline measure 
of fear, memory could be manipulated by providing children with a short vignette containing a 
mixture of positive and negative information. Children would then be primed to recall as much 
of the negative information that they could to induce a memory bias. There would then need to 
be a manipulation check of whether memory bias training had been successful before measuring 
fear in both the memory bias and control group. 
Study 3 could then look at whether fear is able to causally affect memory by using a fear 
induction task. There would be ethical issues attached to a fear induction task and it would have 
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to involve only a very mild threat. Children could be provided with the same vignette as in Study 
2 (containing both threatening and positive information) followed by the fear induction or no fear 
induction (depending on which group the child was in) a manipulation check would then be 
required to test whether the fear induction had successfully induced fear followed by a memory 
test of the information.  
Of course, the above-proposed studies would only shed light onto a small part of the model and a 
major limitation is that they do not take cognitive rehearsal into account. Unfortunately, the lack 
of significant relationships found between cognitive rehearsal and the other variables in this 
thesis, makes it difficult to predict where (and even if) cognitive rehearsal fits into the model. It 
is possible that the lack of significant effects of cognitive rehearsal found here is due to the fact 
that children of this age group are not yet able to engage in cognitive rehearsal. However, a more 
likely explanation relates to measurement issues, which will be discussed below. 
7.2 Methodological Operationalisation of Key Variables  
The experiments in this thesis used a combination of reliable measures that have been used in 
previous experiments (e.g., the Fear Beliefs Questionnaire, Nature Reserve task, the touch box 
task and the STAI-C) and novel measures which were developed specifically for the purpose of 
the current experiments (e.g., the interpretation bias and memory questionnaire and the cognitive 
rehearsal tasks). When using novel methods, there is always an issue of whether they are both 
reliable and valid. In the three experiments described in this thesis, reliability and validity are 
particularly in question with regard to the cognitive rehearsal tasks.  
So far only a very limited amount of research has been conducted on cognitive rehearsal in the 
child anxiety literature, and as a result it is unknown whether cognitive rehearsal exists in 
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children. For example, it is unclear whether children possess the cognitive abilities to cognitively 
rehearse and if so, whether they cognitively rehearse in the same way as adults. An additional 
consequence of the lack of research in this area is that there is as yet no president for how to 
measure cognitive rehearsal in children, and as such, the methods used in this thesis were novel. 
To recap, cognitive rehearsal was measured subsequent to providing children with some 
ambiguous information regarding a novel animal by asking them to verbalize what they had been 
thinking at a total of 4 x 15 second intervals. At each 15-second interval children tended to 
respond with a single thought rather than multiple thoughts, which was coded for severity 
ranging from severe negative to severe positive and whether the thought was an animal or non-
animal thought. If at any of the four time intervals a chid did have more than one thought, all 
thoughts were taken into account and an overall severity score was given. Therefore, each child 
ended up with four severity scores in total and a mean severity score was then calculated for each 
child by subtracting mean animal-thought severity score from mean non-animal thought severity 
score. 
One concern with this method of measuring cognitive rehearsal is whether what the children 
were doing in the experiments was in fact cognitive rehearsal, or whether they were simply 
having independent thoughts and not rehearsing the same thought(s). It is difficult to know what 
cognitive processes the children were engaging in during the 15-second intervals between being 
asked to verbalise their thoughts. On the one hand, it could be argued that asking children what 
they had been thinking is a good way to sample thoughts and get an idea of what thinking 
processes they were engaging in, however, on the other hand, asking children what they were 
thinking every 15 seconds may have disrupted any cognitive rehearsal that was taking place. 
Perhaps it would have been better and less disruptive to ask the children to think about the 
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information and approach task solidly for a couple of minutes and then ask them what sorts of 
thoughts they had been having during that time, and also ask them about the style of thinking 
they were engaging in i.e. whether they were rehearsing the same thoughts or having 
independent or random thoughts. However, this method would rely on the children being able to 
understand, articulate and remember the thoughts they were having and the style of thinking they 
were engaging in, which may be too challenging for young children of this age group (8-11 
years). 
Another potential problem with regard to the cognitive rehearsal measure refers to the method of 
scoring the children’s thoughts. For example, during the cognitive rehearsal task thoughts were 
scored for how severe they were (ranging from severely negative to severely positive on a five 
point scale) rather than whether the child was rehearsing the same thought. It might have made 
more sense to score thoughts for whether they were repetitive as well as how severe they were. 
For example, a child may have had some severe negative thoughts but they may not have all 
been of a similar nature; the child may not have been thinking in a repetitive style and as such, it 
could be argued that instead of looking at whether children who are more trait anxious naturally 
cognitively rehearse ambiguous information, the experiments were looking at whether children 
who are more trait anxious naturally have threat thoughts about ambiguous information.  
Cognitive rehearsal is a difficult construct to measure, as it is difficult to get at what people are 
really thinking. Suarez and Bell-Dolan (2001) used a questionnaire to measure how often 
children engage in cognitive rehearsal in their every day lives. The benefits of measuring 
cognitive rehearsal in this way are that cognitive rehearsal happens over a long period of time 
and thus trying to capture whether a child tends to naturally cognitively rehearse in a short 
experiment is very difficult. However, it is uncertain whether children of this age group would be 
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able to give an accurate appraisal of the thought processes that they usually engage in, also some 
or all children aged 8 years may not understand what cognitive rehearsal is. Additionally, whilst 
using a questionnaire may give an indication of whether children who are more trait anxious 
naturally cognitively rehearse, Experiments 2 and 3 looked at causal relationships between 
cognitive rehearsal and fear and thus it was necessary to experimentally manipulate cognitive 
rehearsal.  
It could be the case that each experiment in this thesis looked at too many variables. Perhaps 
interpretation bias and memory should have been investigated together in one set of experiments 
since they seem to impact on each other, and cognitive rehearsal should have been looked at in a 
separate set of experiments, and then at the end all of the cognitive biases could have been 
looked at together. One reason for doing this is that perhaps when looking at cognitive rehearsal 
it is necessary to use a mildly threatening experience rather than ambiguous information, 
whereas ambiguous information is required when looking at interpretation bias and memory bias. 
It is also possible that the process of cognitive rehearsal is not problematic; research has shown 
that recurrent thinking about negative events can be functional and result in effective problem 
solving or successful emotional processing (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004). In 
Wells’s (1995) model, it is the subsequent development of negative rehearsal about negative 
rehearsal (meta-worry) or (meta-rehearsal), which transforms normal worry (cognitive rehearsal) 
into problematic varieties. Therefore, it could be the case that most children are able to use 
negative cognitive rehearsal as a normal process of problem solving and it is only when children 
view the process of negative rehearsal as a threat in itself, thus adding to their feelings of fear 
and anxiety that it becomes a problem. As such, perhaps meta-worry should have been measured 
in the current experiments rather than cognitive rehearsal. 
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Due to the limited research available on cognitive rehearsal in children, it may have been more 
appropriate to take a step back and look at whether children of the age group tested possess the 
cognitive abilities to engage in cognitive rehearsal. One possible method of doing this would be 
to look longitudinally at whether cognitive rehearsal correlates with cognitive development. In 
other words, is there a point in development where children are suddenly able to engage in 
cognitive rehearsal? Muris, Mayer, Vermeulen, and Hiemstra (2007b) found that children’s 
performance on conservation tasks and a Theory- of-Mind test were significant predictors of 
anxious interpretations and emotional reasoning scores, which suggests that these phenomena are 
influenced by cognitive development. In the worry literature, a recent study has found that age 
does not affect amount of worry, but it does affect worry elaboration, suggesting with increasing 
age children are able to catastrophize more (Grist & Field, submitted). On the other hand, other 
researchers have pointed out that certain cognitive distortions (e.g., attention bias) begin as 
normal developmental phenomena over which children gradually gain control as they become 
older. A failure to control or inhibit such biases would be indicative of children and adolescents 
with anxiety problems (Kindt & Brosschot, 1999; Kindt et al., 1997; Kindt, van den Hout, de 
Jong, & Hoekzema, 2000).  
In summary, taking time to reflect over the research conducted in this thesis has been very 
valuable in helping me to gain a better understanding of the research process and how important 
it is to take time to think and plan thoroughly before conducting the next experiment. If I were to 
conduct this research again, I would carry out some pilot studies before conducting each 
experiment and I would have taken more time between conducting Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2. Due to the fact that this M.Phil was unfunded, I felt financial pressure to complete the data 
collection in as short a time period as possible. However, I realise now that as a consequence of 
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this, the design of the experiments suffered from lack of thinking and planning time. After taking 
considerable time to think about the design and results of Experiment 1, I think instead of 
conducting Experiment 2, it would have been better to take a step back and investigate whether 
children are able to engage in cognitive rehearsal, and if so from what age. I also think it would 
have been more appropriate to look at cognitive rehearsal in a separate set of experiments to that 
of memory bias and interpretation bias. The reason for this is that it may be more appropriate to 
use mildly threatening information (or a mildly threatening experience) when investigating 
cognitive rehearsal, whereas ambiguous information is more appropriate when investigating 
memory bias and interpretation bias. 
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9 Appendices 
9.1.1 Appendix A: Parent’s Letter 
  
Dear Parent, 
I invite your child to take part in a study on feelings and behaviours towards novel animals in children. 
This study is an important part of our ongoing research aimed at helping children who suffer with anxiety. 
The purpose of this research is to establish why some children are more likely to develop animal fears 
than others.  
Your child will be under no stress, risk or discomfort from taking part in this research. Based on past 
experience, it is anticipated that your child will find the session an enjoyable and educational experience. 
As a participant your child will be asked to partake in some fun animal-based activities with the guidance 
of myself, they will then hear some information about an animal and finally they will be offered the 
opportunity to approach the animals.  
Participation is voluntary and confidential and your child is free to withdraw from this study at any time. 
Every child who participates will receive a free CATT Lab T-shirt. 
If you have any questions regarding participation of your child in this research or the aims of the research, 
please feel free to contact Dr Andy Field andyf@sussex.ac.uk or myself Zoë Nightingale 
Z.C.Nightingale@sussex.ac.uk. 
Many thanks for your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
Zoe Nightingale 
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9.1.2 Appendix B: Parent’s Consent form 
Consent Form 
As part of a project looking at why some children more readily develop animal fears, it is necessary to 
collect data from ‘normal’ (non-anxious) children. With your agreement, your child will take part in a short 
experiment in which they will complete (with the researchers help) some questionnaires and then hear 
some information about some animals. They will then have the opportunity to approach the animals. The 
versions of the questionnaires I will be using have been specially developed for children under 10 years 
old. Your child will then participate in some fun and factual exercises about the animals, they will receive 
a t-shirt and any questions will be answered.  
As a participant, your child will be under no stress, risk or discomfort from taking part in this 
research. In past experiments, using similar procedures, the children have enjoyed the 
experience. 
Your child is automatically assigned a code, their name will never be attached to the data collected from 
them so the information is completely confidential. The study has been reviewed by the ethics committee 
of the Psychology Department, University of Sussex. Please note Zoë Nightingale has been CRB 
checked. 
If you are happy for your child to participate then please explain to your child that if at any point they do 
not wish to continue with the experiment they should tell the experimenter and they can stop. 
If you have: 
 Read the information above and in the cover letter and understood it 
 Asked questions if you wanted to, and got satisfactory answers 
 Explained to your child that they are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a 
reason 
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Please sign below to indicate that you agree for your child to take part in the study and return this sheet of 
paper to the school by the 3rd November 2008. 
 
Name of child (in block letters): __________________________________ 
 
Name of Parent (in block letters): _________________________________ 
 
Parent’s signature: ______________________ DATE: __________________ 
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9.1.3 Appendix C: Activity sheets 
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The Truth About Quolls, Cuscuses and Quokkas 
Quolls (genus Dasyurus) 
 
 
Quolls are found in many habitats including grasslands, rainforests, eucalyptus 
forests bounded by agricultural fields, alpine areas, and scrubland.  Although 
they can live in a wide variety of habitats, some species, such as the Eastern 
Quoll, have become endangered because of competition from wild cats, dogs and 
foxes. 
The quoll is nocturnal (most active at night). During the day it retreats to a grass-
lined den in a burrow, a rock-pile, or a hollow log.  
The quoll is about 60 cm long including a long tail, and weighs roughly 1½ kg. 
The female is slightly smaller than the male. It has thick, soft grey-brown to black 
fur with white spots. The long tail is hairy and has no spots.  
Quolls are carnivores (meat-eaters) who mostly eat insects (especially grubs and 
beetles), but also occasionally prey upon rabbits, mice and rats. They sometimes 
scavenge carrion (dead animals that they find) and eat fruit. They compete with 
the Tasmanian Devil for food.  
Up to 18 young are born in a litter, but only 6 babies survive after 2 days. The 
young spend their early months in the mother's pouch, each drinking milk from 
one of her 6 teats.  
 
Cuscuses (genus Phalanger) 
 
 
 
The spotted cuscus lives in lowland tropical rainforests and neighbouring 
mangroves, which are found only in the very north of Australia. 
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Cuscuses are nocturnal, and in the daytime they sleep curled up in hollow trees 
and clumps of vegetation. When they are active, they move around slowly, 
making them an easy target for people who hunt cuscuses for their thick soft fur. 
Cuscuses can vary in size from as small as a mouse to as big as a large domestic 
cat, and weigh between 1 and 4 kg.  The spotted cuscus is usually about 75 cm 
long, with its body being 35 - 45cm and its tail between 30 - 40 cm.  It is 
sometimes described as having a monkey-like appearance.  This is especially 
true of the face, which is round with large eyes, a sensitive nose and tiny ears.  It 
has dense fur, which is shades of orange, brown and white.  Their tails are curled 
towards the end, and have no fur from about halfway down. The cuscus’ tail is 
prehensile (meaning that it can hold onto things) so it can wrap it around 
branches and tree limbs for more security when it’s climbing.  
Cuscuses mainly eat fruit, leaves, nectar and insects, but they do sometimes eat 
small animals, like birds.  The spotted cuscus has few enemies, but if it is 
frightened it can attack with its front paws and will use its loud bark to scare 
intruders away.  
Typically, the female has only one baby, which is raised in her pouch until it is 
ready to leave, when it is carried on the mother’s back. 
 
Use the information above to answer these questions: 
 
1. What colour fur do quolls have? 
2. Which animal lives in the trees? 
3. Which animal has white spots? 
4. What does the cuscus’ tail help him to do? 
5. How big is a quoll? 
6. Why might it be easy for hunters to catch a cuscus? 
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9.1.4 Appendix D: Ambiguous Information 
Ambiguous information 
The Quoll /The Cuscus 
 
Have you never heard of a quoll/cuscus? Well, quolls/cuscuses come from Australia; they have 
white shiny teeth, scruffy fur and big black eyes that watch you. Quolls/Cuscuses have long 
sharp claws that they use to dig and scratch. They also have a very unusual smell and make 
strange noises. 
Quolls/Cuscuses live in dark places and they can be hard to see. They like to be by themselves 
and their nests can be very messy. Other animals keep away from quolls/cuscuses. 
Quolls/Cuscuses are nocturnal animals which means they sleep during the day and creep out at 
night. Quolls/Cuscuses can jump quite high and move very quickly. They are so quiet and fast 
when they move that you can’t hear them even when they are very close to you. If you go to the 
woods and see a quoll/cuscus hiding there, you never know what it might do. 
Quolls/Cuscuses feed on all sorts of things. They eat quickly, greedily and gulp down their food. 
They get very thirsty when they eat and so they drink whatever they can. 
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9.1.5 Appendix E: Interpretation bias and Memory Questionnaire. 
 
Interpretation Bias and Memory Questionnaire 
The Quoll or the Cuscus-Depending on Counterbalancing Order. 
 
1) Prompt: what can you remember about how a Quoll looks? 
:………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
(a) Quolls have long sharp claws that they use to scratch. What do you think they 
scratch?  
 
   …………………………………………………………………………. 
Which of these do you think is the most likely? 
They scratch humans and other animals { } 
They scratch trees { } 
(b) Quolls have big black eyes that watch you, why do you think they watch you? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………….. 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They are waiting to attack you { } 
They are scared of you { } 
(c) Quolls have an unusual smell, what do you think they smell of? 
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......................................................................... 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They smell disgusting like rotten egg { } 
They smell fresh a bit like strawberries and flowers { } 
(d) Quolls make strange noises, what sort of noises do you think they make? 
 
........................................................................................................... 
 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They make freighting growling noises { } 
They make purring noises like a cat { } 
(e) Quolls have scruffy fur, why do you think they have scruffy fur? 
 
......................................................................................................................... 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They are dirty and have fleas { } 
They like to play in the leaves and their fur gets messy { } 
 
2) Prompt: what can you remember about where a Quoll lives? 
………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………. 
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(a) Quolls live in dark places and they are difficult to see, why do you think they live in 
dark places? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
The dark keeps them safe from other animals {}  
The dark makes it easier for them to creep up and attack other animals and humans {} 
(b) Other animals keep away from quolls. Why do you think that is? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
Other animals know that quolls prefer to be on their own so they just leave them in peace { } 
Other animals are scared of quolls because they can be dangerous { } 
(c) Quoll’s nests can be very messy, why do you think their nests are messy? 
 
………………………………………………………………. 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
Their nests are full of rotten animal bones that the quolls have killed and eaten {} 
Their nests are made from hay and leaves that get blown about in the wind {} 
 
3) Prompt: what can you remember about how a Quoll behaves? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
(a) Quolls are so quiet and fast when they move that you can’t hear them even when 
they are very close to you. Why do you think they are so fast and quiet? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They do not want to disturb other animals in the wood because they are shy and nervous { } 
They attack other animals and humans and so do not want to be heard { } 
(b) If you go to the woods and see a Quoll hiding there, you never know what it might do 
but what do you think it might do? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They would jump up and attack you { } 
They would hide in the bushes because they are shy and scared of humans { } 
(c) Quolls are nocturnal animals which means they sleep during the day and creep out 
at night, why do you think they creep out at night? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
Because it is cooler at night { } 
Because most animals are sleeping, so it is easier for quolls to attack them { } 
 
4) Prompt: what can you remember about what a Quoll eats and drinks? 
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…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(a) Quolls eat all sorts of things, what sorts of things do you think they eat? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They eat berries     { } 
They eat raw meat { } 
(b) Quolls eat quickly, greedily and gulp down their food. Why do you think they eat like 
this?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They are vicious carnivores { } 
They don't want to be attacked while they eat { } 
(c) Quolls get very thirsty when they eat and so they drink whatever they can, what do 
you think they like to drink? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Which of these do you think is most likely? 
They drink water { } 
They drink blood { } 
(d) Quolls like to be by themselves, why do you think they like to be by themselves? 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Which of these do you think is the most likely? 
They are nasty and do not like other animals { } 
They are shy and nervous of other animals { } 
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9.1.6 Appendix F: Ethical Approval Certificate  
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This project has been given ethical approval by the School of Life Sciences Research 
Governance Committee.   
 
NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate 
of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed 
circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures. 
 
Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions: 
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• Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the committee 
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• Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the 
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The principal investigator is required to provide a brief annual written statement to the committee, 
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